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C HAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Fault management is defined as the characteristic by which a distributed system can mask the
fault’s occurrence and recover from it (Gadgil, Fox, Pallickara, and Pierce, Gadgil et al.2007).
This means that when a system can determine a fault and recover from it, then we can say that it
has fault management capability. The main role for fault management is to increase the ability of
a system to perform its function correctly even in the presence of internal faults, thus increasing
the dependability of a system (Burns and Wellings, Burns and Wellings2001). Two main actions
must be performed at any fault occurrence (Denaro, Pezzé, Tosi, and Schilling, Denaro et al.2006):
detection and recovery. Fault detection is the first step in the system to assess if a specific functionality is, or will be faulty. After the system has detected a fault, the next step is to prevent or
recover from this fault, this is defined as fault recovery. The goal of fault detection is to verify that
the services being provided are functioning properly. The simplest way to perform such a task is
through observation (e.g., log file) and manual removal of incorrect values. The techniques for detection are the following: self diagnosis, group detection and hierarchical detection. Through self
diagnosis the node itself can identify faults in its components. With group detection, several nodes
monitor the behavior of other nodes. Finally, in hierarchical detection, fault detection is performed
using a detection tree where a hierarchy is defined for the identification of faulty nodes.
There are two general techniques used for developing robust systems against system faults.
These are:
1. Fault tolerance aims to control either hardware or software faults and continue the system
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operation with a reduction in throughput or an increase in latency. The main method used is
exception handling, which provides activities to handle various faults (Liu, Li, Huang, and
Xiao, Liu et al.2010).
2. Fault management provides users with information of existing faults as accurately and informatively as possible, to enable detection of malfunctions of desired properties, and diagnosis
of the root causes.
Fault tolerance focuses on improving the availability and reliability of distributed systems.
Fault management compliments fault tolerance by enabling users to (1) fix the design or the implementation to strengthen the robustness of distributed systems and (2) detect and analyze malicious
behaviors to minimize the impact on the systems.
Current fault management techniques have two typical features: First, they are added a posteriori to existing applications. This means that the applications are not designed for being faultmanaged. They often lack a suitable architecture and satisfactory means for the diagnosis and
repair of faults. Second, they typically use external management functionality. State information is extracted from the application and analyzed by an external manager, which makes them
much more difficult to diagnose and correct (also violating the principle of encapsulation) (Kokash,
Kokash2007).
In related literature, fault management is divided into different stages (Gadgil, Fox, Pallickara,
and Pierce, Gadgil et al.2007) (Dialani, Miles, Moreau, Roure, and Luck, Dialani et al.2002) (Ardissono, Console, Goy, Petrone, Picardi, Segnan, and Dupré, Ardissono et al.2005) (Demsky and
Rinard, Demsky and Rinard2003): (1) Detection aims to discover potential faults as early, and
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as close to their origin as possible, (2) Diagnosis traces the detected fault symptom back to the
cause, and (3) Repair takes measures to eliminate the fault effects. Similarly, (Paradis and Han,
Paradis and Han2007) divides the stages as: (1) Fault prevention to avoid a fault, (2) Fault detection using different matrices to collect symptoms of possible faults, (3) Fault isolation to correct
different types of faults received from the networks and proposed hypothesis, (4) Fault identification to test each proposed hypothesis and (5) Fault recovery to treat from faults. In (Lutfiyya,
Bauer, Marshall, and Stokes, Lutfiyya et al.2000), these are: (1) Fault detection: Which monitors
execution of a distributed system and checks the observations against its expected behaviors. The
fault is reported whenever a deviation from the expected behavior is discovered. Instead of manual inspection, automated processes are introduced. (2) Fault diagnosis: Once a fault is detected,
additional mechanisms are utilized to diagnose the system to identify the nature of the fault and
track the root causes. (3) Evidence Generation: Evidence can be defined as a set of processed
information that demonstrates the assertions drawn from fault diagnosis. In addition, (Katchabaw,
Lutfiyya, Marshall, and Bauer, Katchabaw et al.1996) (Wu, Wei, and Huang, Wu et al.2009) (Mulo,
Zdun, and Dustdar, Mulo et al.2010) (Halima, Drira, and Jmaiel, Halima et al.2008) proposed that
fault management can be divided into: (1) Fault monitoring, (2) Fault diagnosis, and (3) Recovery.
However, in (Lyu, Lyu2007) proposed four techniques: (1)Fault prevention. (2)Fault removal.
(3)Fault tolerance: by using redundancy. (4)Fault forecasting: to estimate the occurrence consequence of the faults. Similarly, (Hanemann, Hanemann2006) (Cheng, Li, and Chen, Cheng
et al.2008) proposed: (1) Detection, (2) Diagnosis and (3) Recovery.
A Failure is defined as a condition where the a running system deviates from its specified be-
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havior. The cause of a failure is thus called an error, which represents an invalid system state. The
error itself is therefore the result of a defect/fault in the system. In other words, a fault is the root
cause of a failure, which means that an error is merely the symptom of a fault. A fault may not
necessarily result in an error. Similarly, a fault may result in multiple errors. Moreover, a single
error may lead to multiple failures, and a fault may be the result of one or more errors (Ben Lakhal,
Kobayashi, and Yokota, Ben Lakhal et al.2009). Physical faults include faults that affect hardware,
interaction faults includes all external faults, and development faults include faults that occur during development.
Fault management is the set of functions that detect, isolate, and correct faults. As mentioned
earlier, a software system fails when it deviates from its specified behavior. A single error may
therefore lead to multiple failures. Thus, fault management mainly includes maintaining and examining error logs, acting on error detection notifications, and tracing, identifying and correcting
faults. Since faults can occur in different places (e.g., software application, network connection,
hardware resources, etc.), traditional fault management tools are not fully equipped to automatically monitor, analyze, and resolve faults in an SOA, where the focus is usually aimed towards
enhancing the QoS at run time. Example QoS measurements include (Yu, Liu, Bouguettaya, and
Medjahed, Yu et al.2008) (Zarras, Vassiliadis, and Issarny, Zarras et al.2004):
1. Reliability measures the ability of a service operation to be executed within the expected
time.
2. Availability measures the probability that the service operation is operating at any moment
and will do the operation of behalf of the users.
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3. Accessibility measures the degree that the service operation is able to serve the request (i.e.
success rate).
4. Integrity measures how the service operation maintains the correctness with respect to the
source.
5. Response time measures the expected delay between the time that the service operation starts
and receiver receives the response.
6. Cost measures the expense of managing the fault and recover from it.
Note that the above list is not exhaustive, and other QoS attributes can be added.

1.1 Service-oriented Architecture (SOA)
Services involved in an SOA often do not operate under a single processing environment and
need to communicate using different protocols over a network. Under such conditions, designing
a fault management system that is both efficient and extensible is a challenging task. In essence,
SOAs are distributed systems consisting of diverse and discrete software services that work together to perform the required tasks. Reliability of an SOA is thus directly related to the component services’ behavior, and sub-optimal performance of any of the components may degrade the
SOA’s overall quality. The problem is exacerbated due to security, privacy, trust, etc. concerns,
since the component services may not share information about their executions. This lack of information translates into traditional fault management tools and techniques not being fully equipped
to monitor, analyze, and resolve faults in SOAs.
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An SOA is defined as “a paradigm for organizing and utilizing distributed capabilities that may
be under the control of different ownership domains” (Paradis and Han, Paradis and Han2007) (Katchabaw, Lutfiyya, Marshall, and Bauer, Katchabaw et al.1996). In other words, boundaries of SOAs
are usually explicit, i.e., the services need to communicate across boundaries of different geographical zones, ownerships, trust domains, and operating environments. Moreover, explicit message
passing is applied in SOAs instead of implicit method invocations. The services in SOAs are autonomous, i.e., they are independently deployed, the topology is dynamic, i.e., new services may
be introduced without advanced acknowledgement, and the applications consuming a service can
leave the system or fail without notification. Services in SOAs share schemas and contracts. The
message passing structures are specified by schemas, and message-exchange behaviors are specified by contracts. Service compatibility is thus determined based on explicit policy definitions that
define service capabilities and requirements.
Two major entities are involved in any SOA transaction: service consumers and service providers
(see Figure 1.1). As the name implies, service providers provide a service on the network with the
corresponding service description (Malik and Bouguettaya, Malik and Bouguettaya2009) (Lin,
Lu, Lai, Chebotko, Fei, Hua, and Fotouhi, Lin et al.2008). A service consumer needs to discover a matching service to perform a desired task among all the services published by different
providers (Keromytis, Keromytis2007). In situations where a single service does not suffice, multiple services could be composed to deliver the required functionality. Finally, the consumer binds
to the newly discovered service(s) for execution, where input parameters are sent to the service
provider and output is returned to the consumer (Guinea, Guinea2005) (Denaro, Pezzé, Tosi, and
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Schilling, Denaro et al.2006).
Service Broker

F i
nd
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bli
Pu

Service Consumer

Service Provider
Interact

Figure 1.1: Service-Oriented Interaction Model.

A fault may occur at any of the interaction stages. At publication stage, faults are normally
caused by an incorrect description, which can only be detected by checking the description files.
Publishing faults may be related to format deployment or context, and when the format of the description is incorrect, there is an incomplete description. There might be some other faults when a
service provides different versions of features than are published in the description. If the description mentions features but those are not provided by the deployed service, these are called Missing
Features (Robinson and Kotonya, Robinson and Kotonya2008).Similarly, if the feature described
does not match the feature actually provided, it is an Incorrect Feature Description. Service deployment faults occur when the service is not successfully deployed on the target platform. In
case the service is missing a Required Resource, the service may be deployed successfully but will
fail to perform as desired. Content faults can be detected by validating using predefined criteria.
However, it has been reported (Dudley, Joshi, Ogle, Subramanian, and Topol, Dudley et al.2004)
that deployment faults cannot be detected before the execution.
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The faults during discovery may occur either on search invocation or while returning the found
services (Gadgil, Fox, Pallickara, and Pierce, Gadgil et al.2007). These are relatively easy to detect
if no service is found. On the other hand, a wrong service found fault is difficult to detect. The
fault can only be detected when the service is actually invoked or executed. The found service may
fail if the client specifies incorrect search criteria, there is a faulty lookup service, or the provided
specification does not match the actual provided service(s).
The composition process may also present different faults due to various reasons: (1) if the
components are incompatible, then the services cannot be connected. (2) Parts of the composition
are missing or services are required to translate between services are missing. (3) The returned
composition may not meet the specified requirements. (4) Certain properties are not supported by
all parts of the composition (e.g. security may only be guaranteed by the first and last service,
but not in between). (5) Preconditions, post conditions, or invariants are not fulfilled resulting in
the contract between the services being violated. Moreover, logical faults, system faults, content
faults, and SLA faults described above may appear in composition at run time (Liu, Li, Huang,
and Xiao, Liu et al.2010).
During the binding process, the service consumer and service provider negotiate the conditions
to execute the service (Hashmi, Alhosban, Malik, and Medjahed, Hashmi et al.2011). The binding
may be denied if authorization is denied, authentication fails, or accounting problems occur. Insufficient security may also be a reason (e.g. one side does not trust the certificate of the other) for
fault at this stage.
Execution faults occur when the service is executed but the result does not match the expected
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outcome. If the service delivers an incorrect result, this can be either due to a software fault or
incorrect input (Katchabaw, Lutfiyya, Marshall, and Bauer, Katchabaw et al.1996) (Paradis and
Han, Paradis and Han2007). To summarize these faults we have
• Publication stage faults: Incorrect description, service description mismatch, content fault,
missing a required resource.
• Discovery stage faults: Required service does not exist or not listed in lookup service, faulty
lookup service.
• Composition stage faults: No valid composition, changes in contract.
• Binding stage faults: Authorization denied, authentication failed, accounting problems.
• Execution stage faults: Mismatched results, service crash.
SOAs can be dynamically and flexibly composed by integrating new and existing component
services to form complex processes and transactions using standard protocols such as SOAP and
WSDL. Each service in an SOA may be invoked using a different invocation model. Here, an
invocation refers to triggering a service (by calling the desired function and providing inputs) and
receiving the response (return values if any) from the triggered service. An SOA may thus be categorized as a ‘composite service’, which is a conglomeration of services with invocation relations
between them. There are six major invocation relations: Sequential Invocation, Parallel Invocation,
Probabilistic Invocation, Circular Invocation, Synchronous Activation, and Asynchronous Activation (D’Mello and Ananthanarayana, D’Mello and Ananthanarayana2009). A brief overview of
these follows(see Figure 1.2).
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Figure 1.2: Major SOA Invocation Models.
Sequential Invocation: In sequential invocation, a service S invokes its unique succeeding
service A (Menasce, Menasce2004). It is denoted as Sequential (S : A) (see Figure 1.2-(a)). Sequential invocation is also defined as a serial invocation (Yu, Zhang, and Lin, Yu et al.2007). A
fault may occur in a sequential invocation if the succeeding service fails (service A in Figure 1.2(a)), or if the connection/link between service S and service A is broken, i.e., service S cannot
reach service A. Similarly, if there is no response from one of the services or response times-out
from the invoked service (Vaculin, Wiesner, and Sycara, Vaculin et al.2008).
Parallel Invocation: In parallel invocation, a service S invokes its succeeding services in parallel (Menasce, Menasce2004). For example, if S has successors A and B which are independent,
S can invoke both A and B at the same time. It is denoted as Parallel (S : A, B) (see Figure 1.2-(b)).
Parallel invocation faults may occur if either of service A or service B fails. Since these work in
parallel, a fault in one of the services will effect the system model.
Probabilistic Invocation: In probabilistic invocation, a service S invokes its succeeding service(s) with a probability (see Figure 1.2-(c)). For example, if S invokes successor A with the
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probability p and successor B with the probability 1 - p, it is denoted as Probabilistic (S : A|p,
B|1 - p). The probabilistic invocation is also defined as fork invocation (Menasce, Menasce2004).
In this type of invocation, faults may occur when the probability of service A and probability of
service B equal to 1, i.e., we cannot invoke service A or service B, or if service A and service B
fail, or there are missing links from service S to service A and service B.
Circular Invocation: In circular invocation, a service S invokes itselfn times. It is denoted as
Circular (S|n). A circular invocation can be defined as cloning itself n times (see Figure 1.2-(d)).
A fault may occur if we encounter an infinite loop, which means that n = ∞, or if n = 0 which
means that this service cannot invoke itself (when it should) (Bai, Hu, Xie, and Ng, Bai et al.2005).
Synchronous Activation: In synchronous activation, a service S is activated only when all its
preceding services have been completed. For example, if S has synchronous predecessors A and
B, both these services would need to complete before S can progress. It is denoted as Synchronous
(A, B : S) (see Figure 1.2-(e)). Faults encountered in synchronous activation are similar to the ones
discussed above for parallel invocation.
Asynchronous Activation: In asynchronous activation, a service S is activated as the result
of the completion of one of its preceding services (Menasce, Menasce2004). For example, if S
has asynchronous predecessors A and B, either A or B’s completion would cause S to progress.
It is denoted as Asynchronous (A, B : S) (see Figure 1.2-(f)). Asynchronous activation faults are
similar to the ones discussed above for the probability invocation model. Table 1.1 shows some of
the major faults that may appear in each model.
Self-healing systems have the ability to modify their own behavior in response to changes in
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Invocation model
Sequential
Parallel

Probabilistic

Circular
Synchronous
Asynchronous

Table 1.1: Expected Faults in Invocation Models
Expected faults
Service A failed, missing the link to service A, i.e. service S cannot
reach service A, no response, response time-out.
Service A failed, service B failed, missing the link to service A or missing link to service B, i.e. service S cannot reach service A and/or cannot
reach service B.
Probability of service A and probability of service B equal to 0, service
A failed, service B failed, missing the link to service A or missing link
to service B, i.e. service S cannot reach service A and/or service B.
Infinite loop, n equal to 0.
Service S did not get activated because service A and/or service B did
not complete, service A failed and/or service B failed.
Service S did not get activated because service A and service B did not
complete, service A failed and service B failed.

their environment, such as resource variability, user needs and mobility (Lala and Kumar, Lala and
Kumar2002) (Chan and Bishop, Chan and Bishop2009) (Paradis and Han, Paradis and Han2007).
The lifecycle of self healing systems consists of four major activities as follows: (1) monitoring
the system at runtime, (2) planning the changes, (3) deploying the change descriptions and (4)
enacting the changes. A self healing system depends on the following requirements for solving
any fault(Jacques-Silva, Challenger, Degenaro, Giles, and Wagle, Jacques-Silva et al.2008).

• Adaptability: The system should enable modification of system properties such as structural,
topological, dynamic behavioral and interaction aspects.
• Dynamicity: The system should encapsulate the adaptability concerns during runtime. For
example, communication integrity and internal state consistency.
• Awareness: The system should support performance monitoring such as state, behavior,
correctness and reliability. It should then be able to recognize performance anomalies.
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• Observability: The system should enable monitoring of a resulting self healing system’s
execution environment. The system may not be able to influence changes in its environment,
but it may plan changes within itself in response to the environment.
• Autonomy: The system should provide the ability to address the anomalies which are discovered through awareness and observability in the performance of a resulting system and/or
its execution environment. Autonomy is achieved by planning, deploying, and enacting the
necessary changes.
• Robustness: The system should provide the ability for a resulting system to effectively respond to unforeseen operating conditions. Such conditions may be imposed by the systems
external environment, for example malicious attacks and unpredictable behavior of the systems, as well as errors, faults, and failures within the system.
• Distributability: The system should support effective performance of a resulting system in
the face of different distribution/deployment profiles.
• Mobility: The system should provide the ability to dynamically change the physical or logical locations of system’s constituent elements.

1.2 Challenges
In the previous sections, we list some of the fault management techniques in different distributed systems. However, not all of these techniques are directly applicable to SOA. The characteristics of SOA raise the following problems for fault management:
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• It is hard to apply a non-distributed management approach to SOA. A manager needs to
communicate with the managed nodes through authentications.
• The management of a SOA is composed of services that may lie outside the management
domain of the current system. System management usually involves management of web
servers, application servers, databases, and other infrastructures which are usually under a
single domain. Service management and infrastructure management should be unified to
achieve the goals of SOA fault management.
• Managers and Services may run on heterogeneous platforms and virtual machines where the
services are deployed on, and they need to be integrated together.
• A management system needs to adapt to the different QoS and physical service changes.

1.3 Thesis Goals
Many efforts have been made to resolve the faults in distributed systems in general (Castro and Liskov, Castro and Liskov2002) (Zhao, Zhao2007) (Katchabaw, Lutfiyya, Marshall, and
Bauer, Katchabaw et al.1996) (Castro, Rodrigues, and Liskov, Castro et al.2003)
(Kotla, Clement, Wong, Alvisi, and Dahlin, Kotla et al.2008) (Singh, Fonseca, Kuznetsov, Rodrigues, and Maniatis, Singh et al.2009) (Aghdaie and Tamir, Aghdaie and Tamir2009) (Merideth,
Iyengar, Mikalsen, Rouvellou, and Narasimhan, Merideth et al.2005) (Castro and Liskov, Castro
and Liskov2002) (Santos, Lung, and Montez, Santos et al.2005) (Morgan, Shrivastava, Ezhilchelvan, and Little, Morgan et al.1999) (Liang, Lo, Kao, Yuan, and Chang, Liang et al.1997) (Kon-
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togiannis, Lewis, Smith, Litoiu, Muller, Schuster, and Stroulia, Kontogiannis et al.2007) (Denaro,
Pezzé, Tosi, and Schilling, Denaro et al.2006) (Chan and Bishop, Chan and Bishop2009) (Garlan
and Schmerl, Garlan and Schmerl2002) (Paradis and Han, Paradis and Han2007) (Wu, Wei, and
Huang, Wu et al.2009) (Griffith, Kaiser, and López, Griffith et al.2009) (Guinea, Guinea2005) (Keromytis,
Keromytis2007) (Park, Youn, and Lee, Park et al.2009). The problems in the current fault management mechanisms is that they are not completely suitable for SOAs due to their special needs
and features. Thus, we cannot use the distributed system fault management for SOA because of
the following reasons:

• Usability: The first challenge involves improving the usability of fault management. Specifically, in the following three aspects: (1) Allowing mechanisms to be applied to applications written in any language (2) Enabling fault management without manual modification
of source code (3) Allowing users to specify expectation of system behavior.
• Execution Time: improving the ability of system operators to reason about time. Most
mechanisms increase the waiting time which will increase the overall execution time of the
system.
• Utilization of Distributed Resources: Most detection and diagnosis mechanisms adopt centralized approaches. However, in SOA we need a decentralized approach.
• Impact Analysis and Repair: Given detected faults, and their root causes, a challenging
research topic is how to accurately estimate their impact on the current system and how to
repair the system online, i.e. without recompilation and rerun. As a secondary goal it should
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also minimize the impact of faults on a running system.

Considering requirements of SOAs, we give the following insights about the objective of the
current research for fault management in the context of self-healing for SOA (FLEX).

• FLEX needs to guarantee high levels of availability, especially for system critical services.
Thus, the monitoring component needs improvement. The monitoring process when active
will place additional load on the provider, since it should response to other requests generated
by the monitor system. Previous studies show that the monitoring increases the system
overhead by sending control messages. In our work we reduce this overhead by minimizing
these control messages based on the history of the services.
• FLEX should be able to detect the fault, and recover from it in a best effort way. The
recovery process should have the ability to resolve the fault and put the system in stable
state. The selection of how to recover from the fault is a challenge. We combine between
the existing processes and find the best solution at run time.
• Fault management in FLEX should have a high level of reliability. Ideally speaking we
should have a fault free system. FLEX should be able to prevent these faults from happening and respond by executing recovery plans preemptively. Previous studies are more
focused on the expected faults, which means that the system is analyzed and a database of
expected faults is maintained. In our work, we include the detection and prevention/recovery
of unexpected faults in the system.
• FLEX needs to be automated. In previous studies, the recovery or repair plans are usually
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predefined during the design phase. However, for SOA we need on-demand plans that are
created at run-time. These plans should be applicable for the current expected or unexpected
faults.
• The traditional recovery plans in FLEX are time consuming. These may not be suitable for
the current services or do not meet consumer’s performance requirements. FLEX reduces
the waiting and processing times as much as possible. It considers the consumer priorities
and requirements if a change occurs in the system.

1.4 Motivating Example
In this section, we present an example scenario to motivate the problem and associated solution.
Assume a travel planning system that is based on a service-oriented architecture (Figure 1.3.). The
company provides travel planning services that include hotel booking, flight reservation, and car
rental. In addition to these reservation services, the system also provides an insurance service for
the entire trip or individual travel components.
A student (Sam) intends to attend a conference in London, UK. He needs to purchase an airline
ticket and reserve a hotel for this travel. Moreover, he needs some transportation to
go from the airport to the hotel and from the hotel to other venues (since this is the first time he’s
visited the UK, he intends to do some “Site-seeing” also). Sam has a restricted budget, so he is
looking for a “deal”.
Assume that Sam would be using a SOA-based online service (let’s call it SURETY) that is
a one-stop shop providing all the five options (airline ticket, hotel, attractions, transportation and
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Figure 1.3: Scenario with Invocation Models.
discounts) through outsourcing. SURETY provides many services such as: attraction service which
outsources to three services (representing individual services): Art, Museums, and Area tours.
This service provides arrangement to visit different areas through sub-contractor companies. For
clarity, Figure 1.3 shows the options at one level. Sam may select Art, Museum, Area tours, or any
combination of these services. In terms of transport options, Sam can either use a taxi service, or
move around in a rental car, bus, or bike. The different transport companies provide services based
on the distance between the places (attractions, etc.) Sam plans to visit. SURETY also provides a
package optimization service that finds “deals” for the options chosen by Sam.
In Figure 1.3, the potential services are shown for clarity from “Get request” (when SURETY
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receives Sam’s request) to “Send result” states (when SURETY sends result(s) to Sam). This is
done to show a combination of different invocation models. In reality, service invocations may not
follow such a flat structure. Since Sam is looking for a travel arrangement that include: booking
a ticket, booking a hotel, transportation (rental car, bike or bus) or taxi, and visiting some places,
some of these services can be invoked in parallel (here we assume that SURETY provides such an
option). Booking a ticket and finding attractions is an example of parallel invocation. Among the
three choices that Sam can select from (Area tours, Museums, and Art), for area attractions, he
has to make a choice among these service instances; this is an example of probabilistic invocation.
Similarly, taxi or rental car, bike and bus services can be classified as probabilistic invocations
since SURETY has to invoke one service from among multiple services. SURETY then provides
the results of transport selection to the Package Optimization service, which hunts for available
discounts (e.g., if the customer uses the system for more than one year he will get a 20%, etc.).
This invocation is an example of asynchronous invocation, as one of the transport selections will
suffice. SURETY then sends the final selection itinerary to Sam.
In SURETY, the system includes multiple services and the fail of one of these service will affect
the overall system reliability. For example, if the flight service does not response within a period
of time the system will not invoke the hotel service until it solves this issue. Moreover, the hotel
service is executed without problems but returns wrong outputs (i.e., reservation for different date).
This fault may cased by incorrect input of the client. Another scenario, the transportation service
received too many orders which went to out of time or the attraction service denied the binding
because of the security certificate. In the following, we predict the previous and other faults and
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recover from them.
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Figure 1.4: Time line for Invocation Models.

In Figure 1.4, we link the invocation models to our scenario through time line. A composed
service using one or more of the invocation models described above, may encounter a fault during its execution. The likelihood of encountering a fault is directly proportional to the system’s
complexity, i.e., the more the invocation models involved, the greater the likelihood of a fault’s
occurrence.
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1.5 Thesis Organization
The organization of this dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 presents a survey of the related
work (i.e., literature review) . Chapter 3 briefly explains the motivation for the work our proposed self-healing framework. Chapter 4 presents the proposed semantic similarity and ranking
technique. Chapter 5 presents our fault management propagation approach. Chapter 6 presents
the performance analysis for the proposed techniques. Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation and
presents possible directions for future research work.
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C HAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, we provide a brief overview of the related literature for each stage of our
proposed framework. Thus, we compared FOLT with similar prediction techniques; compared
S2 R with other matching techniques; and we compared FLEX with multiple fault management
techniques that use planning.
Current fault management techniques have two typical features: First, they are added a posteriori to existing applications. This means that the applications are not designed for being fault
managed. They often lack a suitable architecture and efficacious means for the diagnosis and repair of faults. Second, they typically use external management functionality. State information
is extracted from the application and analyzed by an external manager, which makes them much
more difficult to diagnose and correct. This also violates the principle of encapsulation (Kokash,
Kokash2007).
Developing fault tolerance mechanisms for distributed systems will become less difficult if
they are provided with manageability. A system’s manageability refers to its capability to be managed, how much a service can report, and change the system’s state, and the ease of interaction
with the service. The manageability of a system depends on the manageability of its subsystems
and components. It is impossible to manage a large-scale SOA if services offer no manageability. Developing services with built-in manageability is indispensable for composing manageable
SOAs. The manageability of a service depends on the manageability features of its platform and
its design.
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The researchers divide fault management technique into different stages. For instance, fault
management is divided into three phases in (Gadgil, Fox, Pallickara, and Pierce, Gadgil et al.2007) (Dialani, Miles, Moreau, Roure, and Luck, Dialani et al.2002) (Ardissono, Console, Goy, Petrone, Picardi, Segnan, and Dupré, Ardissono et al.2005) (Demsky and Rinard, Demsky and Rinard2003):
(1) Detection aims to discover potential faults as early, and as close to their origin as possible, (2)
Diagnosis traces the detected fault symptom back to the cause, and (3) Repair takes measures to
eliminate the fault effects. Similarly, (Paradis and Han, Paradis and Han2007) divides the stages
as: (1) Fault prevention to avoid a fault, (2) Fault detection using different matrices to collect
symptoms of possible faults, (3) Fault isolation to correct different types of faults received from
the networks and proposed hypothesis, (4) Fault identification to test each proposed hypothesis
and (5) Fault recovery to treat from faults. In (Lutfiyya, Bauer, Marshall, and Stokes, Lutfiyya
et al.2000), these are: (1) Fault detection: Which monitors execution of a distributed system and
checks the observations against its expected behaviors. The fault is reported whenever a deviation
from the expected behavior is discovered. Instead of manual inspection, automated processes are
introduced. (2) Fault diagnosis: Once a fault is detected, additional mechanisms are utilized to
diagnose the system to identify the nature of the fault and track the root causes. (3) Evidence Generation: Evidence can be defined as a set of processed information that demonstrates the assertions
drawn from fault diagnosis. In addition, (Katchabaw, Lutfiyya, Marshall, and Bauer, Katchabaw
et al.1996) (Wu, Wei, and Huang, Wu et al.2009) (Mulo, Zdun, and Dustdar, Mulo et al.2010)
proposed that fault management can be divided into: (1) Fault monitoring, (2) Fault diagnosis,
and (3) Recovery. However, in (Lyu, Lyu2007) proposed four techniques: (1)Fault prevention.
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(2)Fault removal. (3)Fault tolerance: by using redundancy. (4)Fault forecasting: to estimate the
occurrence consequence of the faults. Similarly, (Hanemann, Hanemann2006) (Cheng, Li, and
Chen, Cheng et al.2008) proposed: (1) Detection, (2) Diagnosis and (3) Recovery. Table 2.1 lists
some major related works and the techniques used there in.
Table 2.1: Fault Management Techniques in Literature.
Technique

Prevention
Detection
Monitoring
Diagnosis
Identification
Planning
Repair
Recovery
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and Rinard, Demsky
and Rinard2003)

(Katchabaw, Lutfiyya,
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and
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et
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(Wu,
Wei, and Huang, Wu
et al.2009) (Mulo,
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Wang,
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Huang
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2.1 Traditional Fault Management Strategies
There is a growing demand for highly-available systems that provide correct service without
interruptions. These systems must manage the faults because they are a major cause of outages.
Fault management is divided into: hardware and software fault management. Hardware fault management is about building computers that automatically recover from faults that occur in hardware
components. The techniques employed to do this generally involve partitioning a computing system into modules, each module is backed up with protective redundancy so that, if the module
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fails, others can assume its function. Special mechanisms are added to detect faults and implement
recovery. Two general approaches to hardware fault recovery have been used, fault masking and
dynamic recovery (Singh, Fonseca, Kuznetsov, Rodrigues, and Maniatis, Singh et al.2009) (Kotla,
Clement, Wong, Alvisi, and Dahlin, Kotla et al.2008). Fault masking is a structural redundancy
strategy that completely masks faults within a set of redundant modules. A number of identical
modules execute the same functions, and their outputs are voted to remove fault created by a faulty
module. Dynamic recovery is generally more hardware efficient; it is the approach of choice in
resource-constrained systems. Its disadvantage is that computational delays occur during fault recovery, fault coverage is often lower, and specialized operating systems may be required. Software
fault management is building software that can manage software design faults which are a result
of programming errors. There is an approach called design diversity which combines hardware
and software fault management and the goal from this approach is to tolerate both hardware and
software design faults; however this is a very expensive technique because every detail have to be
determined in the design.
Software fault management provides service complying with the relevant specification of faults
by using the following: First, single version software techniques, such as monitoring techniques,
decision verification, and exception handling are used to partially manage software design faults.
Second, multiple version software techniques such as recovery block (RcB), N-version programming(NVP) and N self checking programming(NSCP). Third, the multiple data representation
environment utilizes different representations of input data to provide tolerance to software design
faults, such as retry blocks (RtB), N-copy programming (NCP) and N-self checking programming.
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It has been found that redundancy alone is not sufficient for management of software design faults,
so some forms of diversity must accompany the redundancy and combine it with diversity. The
goal of diversity is to make the modules as diverse and independent as possible to minimize the
identical fault causes. Diversity divided into: design diversity and data diversity.
Diversity can be applied to several layers of the system such as hardware, application, software system operators, and the interfaces between these components (e.g., retry, rollback, roll
forward, recovery with check pointing, restart, and hardware reboot). Since exact copies of software component redundancy cannot increase reliability, we need to provide diversity in the design
and implementation of the software.

BFT: Byzantine Fault Tolerance
When designing replication protocols, we have to determine the types of faults the protocol is
designed to manage. The choice lies between crash fault models, where it is assumed nodes fail
cleanly by becoming completely inoperable, or a byzantine fault model, where no assumptions
are made about faulty components (Singh, Fonseca, Kuznetsov, Rodrigues, and Maniatis, Singh
et al.2009). Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) allows a replicated service to tolerate arbitrary behavior from faulty replica behavior. To more easily identify the problem, definitions of byzantine
fault and byzantine failure are as follows: byzantine fault is a fault presenting different symptoms to different observers and byzantine failure is the loss of system service due to a byzantine
fault (Katchabaw, Lutfiyya, Marshall, and Bauer, Katchabaw et al.1996). BFT has low overhead
storage and provides good performance and strong correctness guarantees if no more than onethird of the replicas fail. However, it requires all replicas to run the same service implementation
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and to update their state in a deterministic way. Therefore, it cannot tolerate deterministic software
errors that cause all replicas to fail concurrently, and it complicates the reuse of existing service
implementations because it requires extensive modifications to ensure identical values for the state
of each replica. The basic idea in BFT is simple. Clients send requests to execute operations, and
all no faulty replicas execute the same operations in the same order. Since replicas are deterministic and start in the same state, all no faulty replicas send replies with identical results for each
operation. The client chooses the result that appears in at least f+1 replies. The hard problem is
ensuring no faulty replicas execute the same requests in the same order. BFT uses a combination
of primary backup and replication techniques to order requests. Replicas move through a succession of numbered configurations called views. In a view, one replica is the primary, and the others
are backups. The primary picks the execution order by proposing a sequence number for each
request. Since the primary may be faulty, the backups check the sequence numbers and trigger
view changes to select a new primary when it appears that the current one has failed.

BASE: BFT with Abstract Specification Encapsulation
Fault management using replication is expensive to deploy. BFT with Abstract Specification
Encapsulation (BASE) combines BFT with work on data abstraction. The main idea of this combination is to reduce the cost of BFT and improve the performance (Castro, Rodrigues, and Liskov,
Castro et al.2003). The goal of BASE is to build a replicated system by reusing a set of off-theshelf implementations of some service. The BASE methodology corrects BFT problems; they
enable replicas to run different implementations. The methodology is based on the concepts of
abstract specification and abstraction function from work on data abstraction. BASE offers several
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important advantages over BFT: (1) Reuse of existing code. (2) It has been observed that there is
a correlation between the length of time software runs and the probability that it fail. BASE combines proactive recovery with abstraction to counter this problem. When a replica is recovered,
it is rebooted and restarted from a clean state. Then it is brought up to date using a correct copy
of the abstract state. (3) Opportunistic N-version programming. Replication is not useful when
there is a strong positive correlation between the failure probabilities of the different replicas. As
we mention in the previous sections, N-version programming exploits design diversity to reduce
the probability of correlated failures, but it has several problems: it increases development and
maintenance costs by a factor of N or more, adds unacceptable time delays to the implementation,
and does not provide a mechanism to repair faulty replicas. BASE enables an opportunistic form
of N-version programming by taking advantage from off-the-shelf implementations of common
services (Zhao, Zhao2007).

Zyzzyva: Speculative Byzantine Fault Tolerance
Zyzzyva is a state machine replication protocol proposed by (Kotla, Clement, Wong, Alvisi,
and Dahlin, Kotla et al.2008) and based on three sub-protocols: (1) agreement to order requests for
execution by the replicas, (2) view change to coordinate the election of a new primary when the
current primary is faulty or the system is running slowly, and (3) checkpoint to limit the state that
must be stored by replicas and reduces the cost of performing view changes. Zyzzyva uses speculation to reduce the BFT cost and simplify the design of replication. Unlike in traditional replication
where the client orders a request to the replicas, Zyzzyva replicas speculatively execute requests
without running an expensive agreement protocol to establish the order. As a result, correct replica
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states may diverge, and replicas may send different responses to clients. If a speculative reply and
history are stable, the client uses the reply. Otherwise, the client waits until the system converges
on a stable reply and history. The challenge in Zyzzyva is ensuring that responses to correct clients
become stable because replicas are responsible for ensuring that all requests from a correct client
are eventually complete, but a client waiting for a reply and history to become stable can speed the
process by supplying information that will either cause the request to become stable rapidly.

Zeno: Eventually Consistent Byzantine-Fault Tolerance
The building of Zeno did not start from scratch but instead it is the adaptation of Zyzzyva (Singh,
Fonseca, Kuznetsov, Rodrigues, and Maniatis, Singh et al.2009). Zeno specifies safety and liveness properties of a generic eventually consistent BFT service. Safe, consistent system behaves
like a centralized server whose service state can be modeled as a multi-set. Each element of the
multi-set is a history which means that a totally ordered subset of the invoked operations being
aware of each other, also limits the total number of divergent histories, which in the case of Zeno
cannot exceed, at any time,
There are two types of operations, weak and strong. A weak operation may return, with the
corresponding result reflecting the execution of all the operations that precede it. In this case,
we say that the operation is weakly complete. For strong operations, they must wait until they
are committed, which means each history has a prefix related by containment before they can
return with a similar way of computing the result. Assuming that each correct client is wellformed, it never issues a new request before its previous (weak or strong) request is (weakly or
strongly, respectively) complete. Zeno service guarantees that a request issued by a correct client
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is processed and a response is returned to the client, provided that the client can communicate with
enough replicas in a timely manner. Zeno is a BFT state machine replication protocol. It requires
N = (3 f + 1) replicas to tolerate f Byzantine faults. Zeno has three components: sequence number
assignment, to determine the total order of operations; view changes, to deal with leader replica
election; and check pointing, to deal with garbage collection of protocol and application state (see
Table 2.2).

Zeno

Table 2.2: Comparison between Zeno and Zyzzyva
Zyzzyva

Allows lower overhead
lower latency
Requires clients to use sequential timestamps
Disables a single-phase performance optimization
Clients send the request to all replicas

Allows higher overhead
Higher latency
Not necessarily sequential timestamps
Offers a single-phase performance optimization
Clients send the request only to the primary
replica.

CoRAL: Connection Replication and Application-level Logging
Most of the previous methods require deterministic servers or changes to the clients, however,
CoRAL recovers in-progress requests and does not require deterministic servers (Aghdaie and
Tamir, Aghdaie and Tamir2009). The basic idea of CoRAL is to use a combination of active
replication and logging. In the normal scenario of sending and receiving data between client and
server, the client sends a request to replicate servers, then the servers send back acknowledgment,
after that the servers send the response and the client sends back acknowledgments. However,
in CoRAL, requests and replies as usual but does not process requests unless the primary server
fails. In addition there is a backup server who receives the request from the client and sends it
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to the primary replica, then the primary replica sends the acknowledgment to the client. On the
other hand, after receiving the acknowledgement from the primary replica, the client send back the
acknowledgment to the backup server which forward this acknowledgement to the primary replica.
Through all these steps the backup logs each request while the replica process the request and reply
to the client after sending a complete copy to the backup. Internally, the primary replica reply to
the backup server if there is no fault, but in case of the fault occur before sending the reply to the
client, the backup transmits its copy. If the primary fails before logging the reply in the backup
server, the backup processes its copy of the request, generates a reply, and sends it to the client.

Thema: Byzantine-Fault-Tolerant Middleware for Web-Service Applications
Thema combines between BFT and web services to provide a structured way to build BFT
survivable web services that application developers can use like other web services (Merideth,
Iyengar, Mikalsen, Rouvellou, and Narasimhan, Merideth et al.2005). BFT assume client-server
model without requiring information from other services, in this case, these systems do not provide
support for multi-tiered applications that have heterogeneous reliability requirements. However,
thema supports the multi-tiered requirements of web services and provide standarized of web services. Thema includes three libraries:(1) a client library that allows client access to BFT web
services, (2) a server library to facilitate the creation of these services, and (3) an external service
library that allows an external web services to be accessed safely by a BFT. Thema is designed
to address the challenges of creating distributed applications which composed of multiple web
services such as: works in a mixed fault model using BFT, allows BFT to make safe interaction
with external services and provides a support for BFT. In web services to be able to use FTB, it
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must support access from non-replicated client and support access to non-replicated web services
with internal consistency which is solved by Thema (Merideth, Iyengar, Mikalsen, Rouvellou, and
Narasimhan, Merideth et al.2005).

CLBFT: Castro-Liskov Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance
CLBFT is a BFT state machine replication protocol and library implementation. The purpose
of creating this protocol is to create client-server fault tolerant applications. There are two characteristic of CLBFT over BFT: (1) There is no assumptions for safety such as upper bound on
communication latency. (2) CLBFT has a better performance than BFT because it does not require the use of public key cryptography during normal operation (Castro and Liskov, Castro and
Liskov2002). From the client side, when the client sends a request, the CLBFT library sends the
request to the CLBFT service and wait for (f+1) response from different replicas, then ensure that
the replicas result is correct. From the server side, the replicas act as independent services but
provide the same operations which needs at least (2f+1) replicas to execute. In CLBFT Not all
replicas will execute, there are out of date replicas. CLBFT does not provide a mechanism for a
replicated service to access external services consistently. This challenge solved in Thema (Castro
and Liskov, Castro and Liskov2002).

CORBA: Common Object Request Broker Architecture
This standard defines a set of services for the implementation of replication techniques in distributed environment. CORBA is based on Object Management Group’s (OMG’s). CORBA has
multiple service objects that provide the functionalities for building fault distributed application
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such as the following: (1) replication management service is contact the object group management
service. (2) group management service which acting dynamically in the input and output of the
replicated objects. (3) generic factory is interacting with local factory which is responsible for
defining and removing replicas. (4) the property management service is responsible for defining
the prosperities of the fault tolerance for each group. (5) the fault management service performs
the interfaces of the fault monitoring. In CORBA, fault detection is incorporated at in the server
level, object level and process level.(6)recovery and logging service, the main objective of recovery
and logging in CORBA is to register requests received by the server and that to keep the replicas in
consistent state (Santos, Lung, and Montez, Santos et al.2005) (Morgan, Shrivastava, Ezhilchelvan,
and Little, Morgan et al.1999) (Liang, Lo, Kao, Yuan, and Chang, Liang et al.1997).

WS-Replication: Web Service Replication
WS-Replication uses a clustering-based approach to guarantee the availability of the system.
Availability is achieved by deploying the same service in a set of sites, so if one site fails, the other
continues providing the service. WS-Replication is based on a group communication web service
and avoids the use of ad hoc mechanisms. The group communication is a web service called (WSMulticast) which uses SOAP as a transport protocol. WS-Multicast provides multicast and the
notion of views. A view contains currently connected and active members. The processes start
when multicast messages are sent to a group, and the system ensures that all available members
deliver the same messages. Also, the system ensures that a message that is delivered to all available
members even if a member fails (Salas, Perez-Sorrosal, Pati and Jiménez-Peris, Salas et al.2006).
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2.2 Fault Prediction
In this section, we provide a brief overview of related literature on fault management and
fault tolerance techniques in service-oriented environments, and the Web in general. Santos et
al. (Santos, Lung, and Montez, Santos et al.2005) proposed a fault tolerance approach (FTWeb) that
relies on active replicas. FTWeb uses a sequencer approach to group the different replicas in order.
It aims at finding fault free replica(s) for delegating the receiving, execution and request replies
to them. FTWeb is based on the WSDispatcher engine, which contains components responsible
for: creating fault free service groups, detecting faults, recovering from faults, establish a voting
mechanism for replica selection, and invoking the service replicas. Raz et al. (Raz, Koopman,
and Shaw, Raz et al.2002) present a semantic anomaly detection technique for SOAs. When a
fault occurs, it is corrected by comparing the application state to three copies of the service code
and data that is injected at a host upon its arrival. Similarly, Hwang et al. (Hwang, Wang, Tang,
and Srivastava, Hwang et al.2007) analyze the different QoS attributes of web services through a
probability based model. The challenge in this approach is composing an alternate work flow in a
large search space (withe the least error). Online monitoring (for QoS attributes) also needs some
investigation in this approach.
Wang et al’s. (Wang, Bandara, and Pahl, Wang et al.2009) approach integrates handling of
business constraint violations with runtime environment faults for dynamic service composition.
The approach is divided into three phases. The first phase is defining the fault taxonomy by dividing the faults into four groups (functional context fault, QoS context fault, domain context fault
and platform context fault) and analyzing the fault to determine a remedial strategy. The second
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phase is defining remedial strategies (remedies are selected and applied dynamically). The remedial strategies are categorized into goal-preserving strategies to recover from faults (ignore, retry,
replace and recompose) and non-goal preserving strategies to support the system with actions to
assist possible future faults (log, alert and suspend). The third phase is matching each fault category with remedial strategies based on the data levels. The main challenge in this approach is the
extra overhead, especially when the selected strategy is a “recomposition” of the whole system.
Simmonds et al. (Simmonds, Gan, Chechik, Nejati, O’Farrell, Litani, and Waterhouse, Simmonds et al.2009) present a framework that guarantees safety and aliveness through the conversation between patterns, and checking their behaviors. The framework is divided in two parts:
(1) Websphere runtime monitoring with property manager and monitoring manager. The property manger consists of graphical tools to transfer the sequential diagram to NFAs and check the
XML file. The monitoring manager builds the automata and processes the events. (2) Websphere
runtime engine. It uses the built-in service component that already exists in BPEL, to provide
service information at runtime. Delivering reliable service compositions over unreliable services
is a challenging problem. Liu et al. (Liu, Li, Huang, and Xiao, Liu et al.2009) proposed a hybrid
fault-tolerant mechanism (FACTS) that combines exception handling and transaction techniques
to improve the reliability of composite services.

2.3 Dynamic Planning
In this section, we provide a brief overview of some of the related fault recovery approaches.
The methods proposed in these works generate recovery plans for SOAs and Web services. In
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SOAs, a business process can terminate successfully if all services finish their work correctly
(providing alternative plans in case of a fault). One option to recover from the fault is to retry
(i.e., Re-do) the failed service. Retry is the easiest to recover from faults since it does not require
extra work such as looking for similar Web services. In (Tan, Fong, and Bobroff, Tan et al.2010)
a new execution model called BPEL4JOB is proposed. BPEL4JOB designed a fault-handling
policy (retry) that uses a signal to indicate the job execution state and adds a retry mechanism
for faulty service, until a valid response is received. Another method using retry mechanism was
described in (Modafferi, Mussi, and Pernici, Modafferi et al.2006). In the proposed approach a
designer defines a WS-BPEL process annotated with information about recovery actions such as
retry and then a preprocessing phase, starting from this annotated WS-BPEL, generates a standard
WS-BPEL file. In (Lakhal, Kobayashi, and Yokota, Lakhal et al.2006), authors used definition
rules, compatibility rules and ordering rules to build a flexible system model. In the proposed
model called (WSC), users define a compensating procedure that is invoked in case a fault occurs
during an activities’ execution life span. The model defined a vitality degree indicating that some
activities are identified as optional. The optional activity could be ignored which is a good example
of the ignore recovery strategy.
In (Dai, Yang, and Zhang, Dai et al.2009), authors proposed a method (SMP) to predict the
QoS and performance of composed and alternative Web services in case of a fault (i.e., replace).
The proposed method used a semi-markov model to predict the service data (e.g., execution time,
input, output, etc) while the services are running. SMP is the extension of markov process based
on time-dependent stochastic behaviors. The proposed method is similar to markov model except
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that its probabilities depend on the amount of time since the last transition. The predicted performance of Web services is used to trigger reselection process for alternate Web services used for
replacing Web services. The challenge in this method is that it is applied to only one of the metrics
for QoS attribute and assumes equivalence of services in term of functionality. Similar strategy (replace) is used in (Chafle, Dasgupta, Kumar, Mittal, and Srivastava, Chafle et al.2006). It proposes
a method for adaptation in Web services composition and execution by using multiple workflows
and given feedback mechanism between the composition, deployment and runtime stages along
with ranking functions. The method selects services based on similarity using the hamming distance function given the QoS dimensions that are handled by the feedbacks coming from different
stages. DISC (Zahoor, Perrin, and Godart, Zahoor et al.2010) provides a constraint based declarative approach that allows users to design the composition by identifying and providing a set of
constraints that mark the boundary of the solution.
In (Vaculin, Wiesner, and Sycara, Vaculin et al.2008) a retry recovery mechanism is used as CVhandler. The CV-handler presents an approach for specification of exception handling and recovery
of semantic web services based on OWL-S. The technique uses standard fault handlers and compensation known from WS-BPEL to provide support for long running transactions. CV-handlers
allow a designer to define what situations are supposed to trigger an erroneous state. FTWeb (Santos, Lung, and Montez, Santos et al.2005) is a fault tolerance approach, that relies on active replicas. FTWeb uses a sequencer approach to group different replicas. It aims at finding fault free
replica(s) for delegating the receiving, execution and request replies. FTWeb is based on the WSDispatcher engine, which contains components responsible for: creating fault free service groups,
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detecting faults, recovering from faults, establish a voting mechanism for replica selection, and invoking the service replicas. Many other replication techniques have been proposed such as (Zhao,
Zhang, and Chai, Zhao et al.2009). The proposed technique is presented as a lightweight fault tolerance framework for Web services (LFT). In this framework, a Web service can be rendered fault
tolerantly by replicating it across several nodes. A consensus-based algorithm is used to ensure
total ordering of the requests to the replicated Web services, and to ensure consistent membership
view among the replicas. Another example of using replication strategy is WS-Replication (Salas,
Perez-Sorrosal, Pati and Jiménez-Peris, Salas et al.2006). The proposed framework provides an
infrastructure for WAN replication of Web services. The infrastructure is based on a group communication Web service. Liu et al. (Liu, Li, Huang, and Xiao, Liu et al.2009) proposed a hybrid
fault-tolerant mechanism (FACTS) that combines exception handling and transaction techniques
to improve the reliability of composite services. Table 2.3 summarizes our findings. A X in a cell
means that the corresponding technique provides explicit support for the corresponding recovery
strategy, whereas an X indicates that the strategy is not supported.

2.4 Semantic Similarity
In this section, we provide a brief overview of some of the related literature. Several methods have been proposed to deal with the Web service matching problem. The technique in (Xia
and Yoshida, Xia and Yoshida2007) uses two stage assessment. In the first stage all service belonging to a specific category are gathered. The second stage consists of finding similarity among
these services based on input, output, conditions and effects. LARKS (Sycara, Klusch, Widoff,
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Table 2.3: Recovery Planning Techniques Summarized
Technique
Replicate Replace Retry
SMP (Dai, Yang, and Zhang, Dai et al.2009)
x
X
x
BPEL4JOB (Tan, Fong, and Bobroff, Tan
x
x
X
et al.2010)
WS-BPEL (Modafferi, Mussi, and Pernici, Modafx
x
X
feri et al.2006)
WFlow (Chafle, Dasgupta, Kumar, Mittal, and Srix
X
x
vastava, Chafle et al.2006)
CV-handler (Vaculin, Wiesner, and Sycara, Vacx
x
X
ulin et al.2008)
FTWeb (Santos, Lung, and Montez, Santos
X
x
x
et al.2005)
FACT (Liu, Li, Huang, and Xiao, Liu et al.2009)
x
X
X
WS-Replication (Salas, Perez-Sorrosal, Pati and
X
x
x
Jiménez-Peris, Salas et al.2006)
LFT (Zhao, Zhang, and Chai, Zhao et al.2009)
X
x
x
WSC (Lakhal, Kobayashi, and Yokota, Lakhal
x
x
x
et al.2006)

Ignore
x
x

Random
x
x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

X
x

X
x

x
X

x
x

and Lu, Sycara et al.1999) defines five techniques for service matchmaking: context matching,
profile comparison, similarity matching, signature matching, and constraint matching. Matching
services to requests is performed by using any combination of the above techniques. The ATLAS
matchmaker (Paolucci and Wagner, Paolucci and Wagner2006) defines two methods for comparing service capabilities described in DAML-S. The first method compares functional attributes to
check whether advertisements support the required type of service or if it delivers sufficient quality
of service. The second method compares the functional capabilities of Web services in terms of inputs and outputs. Anamika (Chakraborty, Perich, Joshi, Finin, and Yesha, Chakraborty et al.2002)
presents a service matching technique for pervasive computing environments. Service descriptions are provided in DAMLS. They also include platform specific information such as processor
type, speed, and memory availability. The composition manager uses a semantic service discovery
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mechanism to select participant services. RACER (Li and Horrocks, Li and Horrocks2003) adopts
techniques from knowledge representation to match DAML-S service capabilities. In particular,
it defines a description logic (DL) reasoner; advertisements and requests are represented in DL
notations.
Another DAML-S based matchmaker implementation is KarmaSIM (Narayanan and McIlraith,
Narayanan and McIlraith2002) where DAML-S descriptions are described in terms of a first-order
logic language (predicates) and then converted to Petri-nets where the composition can be simulated, evaluated and performed. Context-based matching (CBM) has been proposed in (Medjahed
and Atif, Medjahed and Atif2007), the matching process is performed via peer-to-peer interactions between a context-based matching engine, CPAs and community services. A service consumer sends a matching request to context-based matching engine which sends a sub request to
the communities and compares the consumer requirement with each community members. Then
the context-based matching engine finds the intersection between the matching set from each community. The communities have been created based on the policies inside the Web services. The
problem in this technique is that the number of comparisons will be high if the same Web service exists in all communities (i.e., the Web service includes all policies that the consumer has
requested). Circular context-based (CCB) has been proposed in (Segev, Segev2008), the technique
compares context extracted from each Web service based on its WSDL description to with other
Web services’ textual description context. The second stage consists of finding the context overlap
among the Web service through parsing WSDL file. Other service matching techniques are also
presented in (Baı̈na, Benali, and Godart, Baı̈na et al.2001) (Heuvel, Yang, and Papazoglou, Heuvel
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et al.2001) (Mecella, Pernici, and Craca, Mecella et al.2001). However, these techniques mostly
focus on syntactic comparison among attributes of Web services.
Since we use contextual information of Web services, we position our work with existing
context-oriented Web service frameworks. Several context-aware approaches have recently been
proposed to enhance Web service discovery and composition mechanisms. Context attributes (Lee
and Helal, Lee and Helal2003) proposes a context-aware service discovery technique for mobile
environments. It defines the context of a Web service as a set of attributes included in the service
description. Examples of context attributes include user location and network bandwidth. The
discovery engine first lookups for Web services based on traditional criteria (e.g., service category
in UDDI). Then, it reduces the qualified services to be returned to clients through context attribute
evaluation. This approach uses contextual information for service discovery not for service composition. Additionally, it focuses on client-related contextual information. It does not seem to
consider provider-related context which is important for Web service composition. Finally, the
definition of context is limited to some attributes added to service descriptions. We adopt a more
generic definition of Web service context through an ontology-based categorization of contextual
information. Contextualization is proposed at the Web service deployment, composition and conciliation or matching levels in (Maamar, Benslimane, and Narendra, Maamar et al.2006). The
description of contexts is assumed to occur along three categories: profile, process model, and
grounding. The profile describes the arguments and capabilities of a context. The process model
suggests how context collects raw data from sensors and detects changes, that need to be submitted
to the Web service. Finally, the grounding defines the bindings (protocol, input/output messages,
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etc.) that make context accessible to a Web service. The authors did not however mention how
relevant contexts are elicited in a service matchmaking process.
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C HAPTER 3
SELF-HEALING FRAMEWORK
In this chapter, we present our proposed self-healing framework to predict and recover from
service faults. A service fault may be defined as the result of an unsuccessful or undesired outcome
of the service operation. The fault can thus be the result of a data event such as unavailable
reservation on a hotel in our running scenario, or related to execution time, when the service
exceeds the expected execution time.
Invocation
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Service Execution Plan
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Figure 3.1: FLEX phases.

There are other types of faults such as user and network faults, but in this work we focus only
on the faults that occur at the service level. To predict and recover from the failure of a service,
we proposed Fault occurrence Likelihood estimation with EXception handling (FLEX). FLEX is
divided into two phases: Phase I; service reliability and utility and Phase II; runtime planning
and evaluation(see Figure 3.1). In Phase I, we assess the fault likelihood of the service using a
combination of techniques (e.g., Hidden Markov Model, Reputation, Clustering). In Phase II, we
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build a recovery plan to execute in case of fault(s) and we calculate the overall system reliability
based on the fault occurrence likelihoods assessed for all the services that are part of the current
composition. FLEX relies on five key activities to support dynamic management based on the
changes in user requirements and QoS levels.
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Figure 3.2: The autonomic control loop for FLEX.

Figure 3.2 shows the key activities: collect, analyze, decide, plan and execute. FLEX collects
data from the system (and accompanying community) for each service such as: the service history,
the service reputation, the service weight, the service execution time and other QoS parameters.
The accumulated data is then analyzed by calculating the fault likelihood, the utility and the criticality of the services. In the next step, FLEX determines which one of the planning strategies is
to be used (i.e., ignore, replace, etc). Then FLEX generates the new recovery plan(s) and stores
for future. If the fault likelihood exceeds a pre-defined threshold, then FLEX will execute the plan
immediately. These steps are described in details in the following sections.
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3.1 Fault Prediction
In this section, we present the first step of FLEX which is the fault prediction. In this Phase,
we calculate the fault occurrence likelihood (FOLT) for the service to assess its reliability. The
notations used hereafter are listed in Table 3.1. Most of the terms in the table are self-explanatory.

Symbol
T
t0
tn
ti
k
P (x)t
λi
λ′i
∆i
∆′i
f (si )

Table 3.1: Definition of Symbols
Definition
The total execution time.
Start time.
End time.
Time at which a new service is invoked.
Number of services.
Fault occurrence likelihood for servicex when invoked at time t.
Weight of servicei in relation to T.
Weight of servicei in relation to (T − ti ).
First-hand fault history ratio of servicei .
Second-hand fault history ratio of servicei .
The priority of servicei in the composition.

Brief descriptions of other symbols follow: λi is the ratio of the time taken by servicei (to
complete its execution), to the total composition execution time. On the other hand, λ′i is the ratio
of the time taken by servicei to the total time “remaining” in the composition, from the point
when servicei was invoked. ∆i is the first-hand experience of an invoking service regarding a
component servicei ’s propensity to fault. For cases where the invoker has no historical knowledge
of servicei (i.e., the two services had no prior interaction), ∆i = 0. Similarly, ∆′i is the secondhand experience regarding a servicei ’s faulty behavior. This information is retrieved from other
services that have invoked servicei in the past. We assume that trust mechanisms (such as (Malik,
Akbar, and Bouguettaya, Malik et al.2009)) are in place to retrieve and filter service feedbacks.
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f (si ) is the assigned weight of a servicei in the whole composition. It provides a measure for the
importance of servicei in relation to other component services invoked, where

∑n
i=1

f (si ) = 1.
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Figure 3.3: FOLT Architecture.

FOLT architecture (Figure 3.3) is composed of several modules. These are, History Module:
This module keeps track of an individual service’s propensity to fault. The information is stored in
a History Repository that includes the service name, invocation time, reported faults (if any), and
a numerical score. The Estimation Module calculates the fault occurrence likelihood for a service
in a given context (execution history). An optional Priority Module is used sometimes (details to
follow) to indicate the service priority assignment by the invoker in a given execution scenario.
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Lastly, the Planning Module creates plans to recover from encountered faults, and prevent any
future ones. As mentioned earlier, details of the module are not the focus of this work.
In summary, the designers store some of the plan details in a plan repository while others are
generated at run time. Each plan contains specific fields such as: Plan ID, Plan Name, Plan Duration time, Plan Steps and Plan Counter. When FOLT decides to generate a plan, the system starts
the dynamic generation process. The generated plan depends on the chosen invocation model.
When the orchestrator invokes a service at any given time (invocation point), it calculates the fault
history ratio for the invoked service. Here, we use the maximum value among the external ratio
(service’s second-hand experience as observed by the community) and internal ratio (first-hand
experience of the orchestrator). The system then calculates the fault occurrence likelihood of the
invoked service. If the likelihood is greater than a pre-defined threshold (θ1 ) the system builds a
fault prevention plan. Otherwise, the system re-calculates the likelihood taking into consideration
the priority of the current service and compares the value again with θ1 . The purpose of this step is
that non-critical services have no plans built for them, and the system can complete the execution
even if a fault occurs in any of these services. The newly created plan is tested using a series of
verifications. If the plan fails any of the tests, the system returns back to the planning module,
and a new plan is created/checked. The process repeats for x number of times until a valid plan
is found. If no plan is still found, the invoker/user is informed. Once a valid plan is created, it is
stored in the repository. Then, If the likelihood is greater than another pre-defined threshold (θ2 )
the system can execute this fault prevention plan.
Phase 1 is divided into multiple steps: calculating the service’s weight (λ), calculating the
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time weight (λ′ ), calculating the internal history value (∆i ) using a Hidden Markov Model, and
calculating the external history value (∆′i ) using clustering and reputation. The likelihood of a
fault occurring at time t is defined by studying the relationship between the service’s importance,
time it takes to execute, and its past performance in the composition. Thus, each invocation model
will have a different fault likelihood value. As mentioned earlier, λ is the ratio of the time that is
needed to complete the service execution, divided by the total time of completing the execution of
the whole system. Similar to the approach used in (Meulenhoff, Ostendorf, Živković, Meeuwissen,
and Gijsen, Meulenhoff et al.2009), we use this value of λ as one of the basic constructs in FOLT to
measure the (relative) weight of the invoked service to the rest of system time. The basic premise
is that the likelihood of a fault occurrence for a long running service will be more than a service
with very short execution time. Determining the service execution time could be accomplished
in two ways. If the system does not know the execution time for a service, then the service’s
advertised execution time is used. On the other hand, after attaining experience with the service
(prior invocations), the service execution time could be recorded and stored in the repository. Then:

λi =

T (si )
T

(3.1)

λ′i =

T (si )
T − ti

(3.2)

where λi is as described above, T (si ) is the total execution time of servicei , while ti is the invocation time of servicei (i.e., when the service was invoked).
A service’s past behavior is assessed according to first-hand experience of the invoking service
and second-hand experiences of other services obtained in the form of ratings via the community.
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These experiences are evaluated as a ratio of the number of times the service failed, divided by
the total number of times the service was invoked. To assess the First-hand Experience, we use
a Hidden Markov Model (HMM). The HMM provides the probability that the service will fail
in the next invocation, based on the previous behavior of the service within the system. HMMs
have proven useful in numerous research areas for modeling dynamic systems (Malik, Akbar, and
Bouguettaya, Malik et al.2009). An HMM is a process with a set of states, set of hidden behavior
and a transition matrix. In our architecture, all services stay in one of the two states: Healthy or
Faulty (Figure 3.4).
P

q

1-p

Healthy

Faulty

1-q

State
P Probability of being in healthy state.
q Probability of being in faulty state.
1-p Probability of going from healthy to
faulty.
1-q Probability of going from faulty to
healthy.

Figure 3.4: Finite state machine for an HMM of the service.

Each time the composition orchestrator invokes a service, it records the state of that service
(Faulty or Healthy) along with the time of the invocation. Let the vector V = the service behavior
profile, then to asses the probability that Servicei will be in the Faulty state in the next time
instance:
P (F aulty|V ) = P (F aulty|Healthy) + P (F aulty|F aulty)

(3.3)

FOLT also uses other services’ experiences with Servicei to assess its reliability. Services are
divided into clusters based on their similarity (such as in (Abramowicz, Haniewicz, Kaczmarek,
and Zyskowski, Abramowicz et al.2007)). These group of services are consulted for the reputation
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of Servicei . We assume that other services are willing to share their reputation ratings, which
are assimilated using our previous work in (Malik, Akbar, and Bouguettaya, Malik et al.2009).
A combination of service time weights and service history ratios (using HMM, and reputation) is
used to assess the fault occurrence likelihood:

P (si ) = 1 −
t

λi

′
(λ′i ) 1−max(∆i ,∆i )

(3.4)

Note that the fault history is assessed according to max(∆A , ∆′A ). Then, the likelihood of a
service executing without any fault is 1 − max(∆A , ∆′A ). We use this value in relation to the total
execution times (remaining given by λ′ , and overall given by λ) to assess the likelihood of a service
executing without a fault. To get the likelihood of the service’s fault occurrence we subtract this
value from 1 in Equation 3.4. In cases where we need to incorporate a service’s priority weight,
Equation 3.4 becomes:
λi f (si )

P (si )t = 1 − (λ′i ) 1−max(∆i ,∆i )
′

(3.5)

Appendix 1 shows the mathematical proof for Equation 3.5. We observe that with increased
service priority, fault likelihood also increases. Based on the fault likelihood, FOLT decides when
to build a recovery plan. Services with a high priority are usually critical, and a fault in any of
those services may harm the overall QoS. Thus, fault likelihood and service priority are directly
proportional in FOLT.
Using Equation 3.5 as the basis, we define fault likelihood estimation for each invocation
model. For instance, the likelihood of fault(s) in a sequential invocation (Pseq ) is dependent on
the successor service(s) (Cardoso, Miller, Sheth, and Arnold, Cardoso et al.2002). Since FOLT
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uses invocation points, only a single service can be invoked per time instance/invocation point.
Hence the equation stays the same. Let A be the successor service, then

λA f (sA )

Pseq = P (sA )t = 1 − (λ′A ) 1−max(∆A ,∆A )
′

(3.6)

In a parallel invocation, fault estimation at the invocation point translates to the fault occurring
in either of the invoked services. Since all services are independent, we need to add their fault
likelihoods. Moreover, due to the likelihood of simultaneous faults occurring in the respective
services, we have

Ppar =

h
∪

Pi = Σhi=1 Pi − Πhi=1 Pi

i=1
λi f (si )

λi f (si )

Ppar = Σhi=1 (1 − (λ′i ) 1−max(∆i ,∆i ) ) − Πhi=1 (1 − (λ′i ) 1−max(∆i ,∆i ) )
′

′

(3.7)

where h is the number of services invoked in parallel.
In probabilistic invocation (Ppro ), fault likelihood depends on the probability of selecting the
service (Q). Then, if we have k services:

Ppro =

k
∩

Pi = Πki=1 Qi × Pi

(3.8)

i=1

Similarly, the fault likelihood of a circular invocation is:

Pcir = Πni=1 PS

(3.9)
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3.2 Run-time Planning
In this section, we present the second step of FLEX which is the run-time planning. Services involved in an SOA often do not operate under a single processing environment and need to
communicate using different protocols over a network. Under such conditions, designing a fault
management system that is both efficient and extensible is a challenging task. In essence, SOAs
are distributed systems consisting of diverse and discrete software services that work together to
perform the required tasks. Reliability of an SOA is thus directly related to the component services’ behavior, and sub-optimal performance of any of the components may degrade the SOA’s
overall quality. The problem is exacerbated due to security, privacy, trust, etc. concerns, since
the component services may not share information about their executions. This lack of information translates into traditional fault management tools and techniques not being fully equipped to
monitor, analyze, and resolve faults in SOAs.
In Phase I (Alhosban, Hashmi, Malik, and Medjahed, Alhosban et al.2011), we defined a fault
management approach (Fault Occurrence Likelihood esTimation: FOLT) for SOAs. We assume
that component services do not share their execution details with the invoking service (defined as
an orchestrator). The orchestrator only has information regarding the services’ invocation times
and some other observable quality of service (QoS) attributes. Once faults are identified (i.e.,
likely to occur in the future), recovery plans need to be created. However, fault recovery plan
generation is challenging due to the lack of capabilities in current systems to adapt themselves at
run time to cope with dynamic changes in user requirements and the running levels of QoS attributes (Nascimento, Rubira, and Lee, Nascimento et al.2011) (Mulo, Zdun, and Dustdar, Mulo
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et al.2010). In order to support such dynamic changes, we propose FLEX (FoLt with EXception
handling) a fault-tolerant mechanism which combines our planning strategies based on FOLT calculations (Alhosban, Hashmi, Malik, and Medjahed, Alhosban et al.2011) and incorporates the
exception handling constructs of BPEL. Our planning module captures both the functional and
non-functional features of Web services. Functionality is specified by the operations offered by a
Web service, while the non-functional part comprises the QoS properties of a Web service.
Specifically, we propose a novel technique to dynamically evaluate the performance of Web
services based on their previous history (in terms of QoS), and user requirements. The likelihood
of fault occurrence is then used to create (multiple) recovery plans. The ‘best’ recovery plan is then
chosen to be either executed immediately (if fault likelihood is above a pre-defined threshold), or
saved for a later execution (i.e., to be executed when the fault occurs).

3.2.1

Utility and Reliability Calculation

The reliability of a service is determined as the percentage where the service is providing fault
free service or in the worst case the minimum number of faults. This value is used in a utility
function to determine whether we need to create a fault recovery. A utility function R(λ′i ) defined
for 0 < λ′i < 1 has the property of non-satiation (i.e., the first derivation R′ (λ′i ) > 0, and the
second derivation R′′ (λ′i ) < 0). Thus:

λA f (sA )

R(SA ) = (λ′A ) 1−max(∆A ,∆A )
′

(3.10)
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We first find the first derivative for λ′i based on the above equation as:

R′ (SA ) =

λA f (sA )
dR
λA f (sA )
′ 1−max(∆A ,∆′A ) −1
=
(λ
)
dλ′A
1 − max(∆A , ∆′A ) A

(3.11)

By analyzing Equation 3.11 we can see that this will generate a positive value since:

0 < λ′A < 1

(3.12)

0 < f (x) < 1

(3.13)

max(∆A , ∆′A ) < 1, 0 < 1 − max(∆A , ∆′A ) < 1

(3.14)

λA f (sA )
λA f (sA )
′ 1−max(∆A ,∆′A ) −1
(λ
)
>0
1 − max(∆A , ∆′A ) A

(3.15)

dU
>0
dλ′A

(3.16)

then

i.e.,

Similarly,

R′′ (SA ) =

d2 R
dλ′A 2

(3.17)
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λA f (sA )
λA f (sA )
λA f (sA )
2
′ 1−max(∆A ,∆′A ) −2
R (SA ) = (
)(
− 1)(λA )
1 − max(∆A , ∆′A ) 1 − max(∆A , ∆′A )

′′

(3.18)

By analyzing Equation 3.18 we can see that thus will generate a negative value since:

λA f (sA )
<1
1 − max(∆A , ∆′A )

(3.19)

λA f (sA )
−1<0
1 − max(∆A , ∆′A )

(3.20)

subtracting 1 from each side, gives

The minimum expected value for λA , f (sA ), and (1 − max(∆A , ∆′A )) is equal to 0.01 then the
minimum value of this equation is 0.01, thus, (0.01 - 1 = -0.99). However, the maximum expected
λA f (sA )
− 1) will be
value for the previous parameters is 0.99 then (0.99 - 1 = -0.01). So, ( 1−max(∆
′
A ,∆ )
A

always less than 1 which makes the whole equation (Equation 3.18) negative.

d2 U
<0
dλ′A 2

(3.21)

Form the Equations 3.11 and 3.18 we can see that our equation is a valid objective utility function
(as per the definition). As mentioned earlier, the utility value is used to make a decision regarding
plan generation/execution based on the following:
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R=





Rmax
if 0.7 < R ≤ 1;







 Raverage if 0.4 < R ≤ 0.7;



Rmin







 Rrisk

if 0.2 < R ≤ 0.4;
if 0 ≤ R ≤ 0.2;

If the utility is Rmax that means the service is expected to execute correctly without possibility
of a fault. In this case, FLEX invokes the service without any concern and no recovery plan is
generated. However, if the utility is Raverage that means the service has a possibility of failure
but this possibility is low. In such a case FLEX will create a recovery plan and store it in the plan
repository and when the fault occurs, it retrieve and execute the created plan. When the value of
utility is Rmin that means the service has a high possibility of failure, and FLEX should create and
execute the recovery plan instead of invoking the service. Finally, if the utility is Rrisk then the
system should take an immediate action by replacing the service by a similar one.

3.2.2

Dynamic Recovery Plan Generation

Planning can be defined as “a kind of problem solving, where an agent uses its beliefs about
available actions and their consequences, in order to identify a solution over an abstract set of
possible plans” (Jensen, Jensen2004). In any composite system two main types of services may
exist: critical services (CS) and non-critical services (NS). The degree of criticality is thus based
on the tasks undertaken by these services, where each task contains one or more operations. In
FLEX, to determine the criticality degree of a service we use: (i) user priority and operation
weight calculation (UOW), and (ii) the critical path method (CPA). In UOW, the main factors are:
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the operation priority value that is provided by the consumer (W useri ) and operation criticality
(defined as the ratio of the operation’s execution time to the total execution time of the service).
∑
WOpij × nk=1 Rk
OpCritical(opi , servicej ) =
|W | + |D|

(3.22)

Where (WOpij ) is the weight of the operation i in service j which is calculated by dividing the
execution time of the operation over the total service time, (Rk ) is the reputation of the service that
is provided by n different composition, W is the number of component services in the composition,
and D is the number of Web services that depend on Web service j. After determining the criticality
of the operation we calculate the criticality of the task, and the criticality of the overall service
(ServiceSignif icance).
∑z
T askCriticality(taskk ) =

i=1

W useri × OpCritical(opi , servicej )
∑z
i=1 W useri

(3.23)

where z is the number of operations in taskk , and W useri is the user’s weight for opi .

ServiceSignif icance =

m
∑

T askCriticality(taski )

(3.24)

i=1

where m is the number of tasks in the servicej . FLEX uses the ServiceSignif icance value
to create a binary decision for UOW. If ServiceSignif icance > β (where β is a predefined
threshold) then service criticality value for UOW is one, otherwise it is zero. The binary UOW
value is used in conjunction with the CPA value. The discussion follows.
In CPA, we specify the composition in the system as a statechart (Zeng, Benatallah, Dumas,
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Figure 3.5: Statechart of travel scenario (SURETY).
Kalagnanam, and Sheng, Zeng et al.2003). The choice of statechart is for two reasons: it has welldefined semantics and it offers the basic flow invocations that exist in any composition such as
sequential, parallel and circular. In our approach, the states are the Web service(s), and the transitions among the states are the links to the next invocation point. States can be basic or compound.
Basic states are labeled to one Web service. However, compound states contain more than one
Web service. An example for a compound state is a set of Web services (S1,S2, and S3). As a
simplified statechart Figure 3.5 shows the statechart for our running scenario which contains nine
basic states and two compound states.

Definition 1:(Execution path) An execution path of a statechart is a sequence of basic states
[State1 , State2 ,..,Staten ], where State1 is the initial state, Staten is the final state, and Statei ∈
(State1 ,..,Staten ). Statei is a direct successor of one of the states in [State1 ,..,Statei−1 ] and it is not
a direct successor of the states in [Statei+1 ,..,Staten ].
From Definition 1, we see that the statechart has a finite number of paths. In addition, if the
statechart has probabilistic invocation, it has multiple execution paths, where each one represents
a sequence of services.
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Figure 3.6: Representation of different execution paths.
Figure 3.6 gives an example of two execution paths for the statechart in Figure 3.5. Since there
is a probabilistic branch after state6 , there are two paths: path 1 and path 2. In path 1 the execution
goes from state5 to state6 then state10 , while in path 2 the execution goes from state5 to all the
other states (state7 , state8 and state9 ) then state10 . We use the critical path algorithm (CPA) for
determining the critical services in the system. The critical path of a system is a path from the start
state to the final state which has the highest/lowest total sum of weights in the consumers view of
point. In our running example, we assume that the consumer’s main concern is the execution time,
and each service’s execution time is given in Figure 3.7. After calculating the total execution time
for each path, we found that the minimum total execution time is 89 ms (execution path 1). The
critical path is thus (state3 , state4 , state5 , state6 , and state10 ). Every service located in the critical
path is critical service. After determining the critical services using CPA and UOW we are use a
conjunction (XOR) to determine the final decision for criticality. The service criticality is equal to
zero if (CPA = 0 AND UOW = 0).
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Figure 3.7: Critical path and critical services.
3.2.3

Incorporating WS-BPEL

Business Process Execution Language (BPEL) is a commonly accepted standard for defining
business processes with composition of services in SOA (Andrews, Curbera, Dholakia, Goland,
Klein, Leymann, Liu, Roller, Smith, Thatte, Trickovic, and Weerawarana, Andrews et al.2003).
Standard BPEL variables are a snapshot of data returned by a service and thus present a duplicate
version of remote data at some particular time. However, in certain cases we want to ensure that
the process always uses the latest version of important business data as other applications may
change the data in the data source during the BPEL process execution.
This problem arises particularly in case of long-running BPEL processes, which can take a few
days, weeks or even months to complete. WS-BPEL has a few built-in exception handling strategies, that work similar to the try-throw-catch mechanism in programming languages such as JAVA.
Such exception handling mechanisms work after a service is invoked and a fault occurs. However,
the FLEX planning module also enables the creation of a recovery plan before service innovation
(and execute this alternate in special cases). Figure 3.8 shows the general architecture of FLEX.
As mentioned earlier, FLEX works in two different ways (i.e., before or after the occurrence of the
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Figure 3.8: Overview of FLEX.
fault): pre-recovery and post-recovery. In the pre-recovery, FLEX works alone without WS-BPEL,
but in the post-recovery, FLEX fully exploits WS-BPEL’s built-in exception handling constructs.
The pre-recovery actions are predicting the fault, building the recovery plan, and executing the
recovery plan (it needed). The primary post-recovery action is using WS-BPEL to handle the fault,
and if BPEL’s built in strategies can not recover from the fault, then as a secondary action, FLEX
reinitiates the planning process.
In general, before invoking any service the Service Invocation Module sends the service’s infor-
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Figure 3.9: Planning module processes.
mation to the History Module which is responsible for calculating the fault likelihood (Alhosban,
Hashmi, Malik, and Medjahed, Alhosban et al.2011). Based on this value, the Estimation Module
determines if the system needs pre-recovery, or it can continue the invocation process. If the decision is pre-recover then the Planning Module decides the best plan through the Decision Making
Module, i.e., generates the recovery plan, verifies it, stores it in the Service Repository, and execute
it (if needed). When a fault occurs at runtime, the system first employs the WS-BPEL exception
handling strategies to repair it. If the fault is fixed, the composite service continues its execution.

63
Otherwise, the system returns back to the Planning Module which generates an optimal recovery
plan and executes it. The Planning Module (PM) consists of three components: Decision Making
Component (DMC), Validation Component (VC) and Planning Component (PC). Each one of the
components has it is own responsibilities. Starting from DMC, the input of this component is the
service utility which could be (as mentioned earlier) one of four utility values such as: Rmax,
Raverage, Rrisk and Rmin. Based on the utility of the service, DMC decides whether to create a
plan or not. A new/generated plan is then validated (using VC). The decision of VC is based on the
availability of the plan (i.e, whether the services in the new plan are available), the fault likelihood
of the plan, and the execution time of the new plan compared to the current execution time. If VC
determines that the plan is valid, the likelihood of fault is low and the execution time is acceptable,
then the plan is stored in the plan repository. On the other hand, if the plan fails in any one of the
tests, the system returns back to PC, and a new plan is created/validated. The process repeats for x
number of times until a valid plan is found. If no plan is still found, the invoker/user is informed,
and if required FLEX invokes the current service plan with the expected risks (see Figure 3.9).
The six exception handling strategies used in FLEX: Ignore, Parallel-Retry, Retry-Until, Replace,
Active Replication and Passive Replication. Details follow.

Ignore: Just as its name suggests, this strategy does not take any direct action to handle a fault,
other than ignoring the execution of the faulty service (i.e., the system may ignore the current
service and continue the execution without wasting time in fixing the fault). This strategy is used
in situation where the service ignorance will not affect the main goal. For instance, in our scenario
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(Figure 1.3), if there is a fault in S3 (e.g., no response after specific time) FLEX may ignore S3 and
skip to service S4 (Figure 3.10).
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Result
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Figure 3.10: Ignore Strategy.

Precondition: Fault or fault predicted , and Servicex is not critical
1. Disable Servicex , i.e., disable the invocation of this service.
2. Return back to the last step in the execution plan before invoking the faulty service.
3. Create a bypass link to the immediate next service in the system.
4. Resume the execution of the ’new’ composition.
5. Report the state (e.g., a fault report) to the system.
Retry: In this strategy, if a fault occurs in a service, the system repeats the same service
once. The repetition of the service in Retry may be carried out without altering any conditions
or changing some of the conditions (e.g., input variables, etc.). Figure 3.11 shows an example of
retry where the Hotel booking (S2) service was repeated because a fault occurs in this service (e.g.,
change of flight date). In this case, the strategy deletes all previous results and restarts from the
beginning.
Precondition: Fault or fault predicted, and Servicex is available
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Figure 3.11: Retry Strategy.
1. Delete results from the first time invocation for Servicex .
2. Return back to the first step in the execution plan of invoking the faulty service.
3. Change any variables if required.
4. Resume the execution.
5. Report the state (e.g., a fault report) to the system.
Retry-Until: In the retry-until strategy, if a fault occurs in a service, the system repeats the
same service multiple times. The repetition of the service is with a condition that the execution
time should not exceed ρ, where ρ is the maximum time the system allows for this service’s execution. For instance, if ρ = 40 ms, and the Hotel booking service time is equal to 15 ms, then this
service will be repeated for two times at maximum.

Precondition: Fault or fault predicted , Servicex is available, ρ
1. Delete results from the first time invocation for Servicex .
2. Return back to the first step in the execution plan of invoking the faulty service.
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3. Check condition: Check the maximum acceptable time
• Resume the execution.
4. Report the state (e.g., a fault report) to the system.
Replace: Under the replace strategy, the system should find another similar service and replace
the current one. The new service should have the same functional and non-functional parameters.
This is especially interesting in the context of Web services since each Web service is represented
by a category. In our scenario (Figure 3.12), if the Flight reservation (S1) service fails then the
system looks for similar services and replace it with the new one (i.e., the same category under
UDDI).
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Figure 3.12: Replace Strategy.

In FLEX, we have two types of replacement: overlapping and full replacement. In overlapping, we keep the operations that perform well and replace the operations that have faults, while
in full replacement, all service operations are replaced (see Figure 3.13). Otherwise, if the system cannot find that kind of operation, it moves to full replacement of such as servicea (Nepal,
Sherchan, Hunklinger, and Bouguettaya, Nepal et al.2010) (Menascé and Dubey, Menascé and
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Dubey2007) (Bergmann, Richter, Schmitt, Stahl, and Vollrath, Bergmann et al.2001) (Li, Xu, Wu,
and Zhu, Li et al.2012) (Yao, Lu, Fu, and Ji, Yao et al.2010) (Alhosban, Hashmi, Malik, and
Medjahed, Alhosban et al.2012).
Precondition: Fault or fault predicted, and Servicey is available
1. Delete results from the first time invocation for Servicex .
2. Return back to the first step in the execution plan of invoking the faulty service.
3. Similar service. i.e., find a service Servicey which is similar to Servicex .
4. Create link to the new alternative service (Servicey ).
5. Resume the execution.
6. Report the state (e.g., a fault report) to the system.
Replicate: In replicate, the system invokes multiple equivalent services at the same time
(equivalent means that they provide the same functional and (similar) non-functional parameters).
Thus, if a service fails, then there is another service that can fulfill the desired task. In our scenario,
when the strategy is replicate for Transportation service (S4) then the system invokes the similar
services (Sb , Sc and Sd ). (see Figure 3.14).
Precondition: Fault or fault predicted , and similar services are available
1. Delete results from the first time invocation for Servicex .
2. Return back to the first step in the execution plan of invoking the faulty service.
3. Keep the link to Servicex .
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Figure 3.13: Different scenarios of replace strategy.
4. Similar service. i.e., find services that is similar to Servicex .
5. Create link to the new alternative service (Servicey ).
6. Resume the execution.
7. Report the state (e.g., a fault report) to the system.
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In replication we have two types: active and passive replication. In the active replication, the
system invokes all replicas at the same time and takes the service that returns the first response.
Some fault tolerance techniques employee active replication such as Fewer (Santos, Lung, and
Montez, Santos et al.2005), Thema (Merideth, Iyengar, Mikalsen, Rouvellou, and Narasimhan,
Merideth et al.2005) and WS-Replication (Salas, Perez-Sorrosal, Pati and Jiménez-Peris, Salas
et al.2006). In passive replication, the system invokes the primary replica to perform the job and
invokes backup replicas only if the primary replica fails. Some of the fault tolerance techniques
employee passive replication such as FT-SOAP (Fang, Liang, Lin, and Lin, Fang et al.2007) and
FT-CORBA (Majzik and Huszerl, Majzik and Huszerl2002). Table 3.2 summarizes the previous
recovery strategies.

Recovery plan

Table 3.2: FLEX planning strategies
Brief description

Ignore (Servicex )
Retry (Servicex )
Retry-until (Servicex , ρ)
Replace(Servicex , Servicey )
Passive-replication (Servicex ,
Servicey )
Passive-replication (Servicex ,
ServicesSetss )

Ignores the current service and skips to the immediate next
service(s).
Repeats the execution of the current service once.
Repeats the execution of the current service until the service
execution time exceeds ρ.
Executes an alternative of servicex (i.e., replace by
servicey ).
Allows the execution of servicex and servicey at the same
time.
Allows the execution of servicex and all the services in ServiceSet at the same time.

FLEX creates dynamic plans (when the system needs them at run time) based on the utility and
criticality of the services.
• Utility (R): This is the utility of the service which has been calculated in the previous part:

70
Rmax, Raverage, Rmin and Rrisk.
• Criticality (C): This is a binary value assessed from the two different ways (UOW and CPA)
by calculating the criticality degree.
• Ucost: This is a binary value that the user provides to the system. If the user does not accept
any extra cost (i.e., the cost of invoking another services), Ucost will be zero. When Ucost
equals to one that means the user does not mind the extra cost.
• Utime: This is a binary value that the user provides to the system. If the user does not accept
any extra time, Utime will be zero. When Utime is equal to one that means the user does not
mind an increased execution time.
C
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Figure 3.15: Selection Tree for Planning Strategies.

Based on the above notations, we build a selection tree. Figure 3.15 shows our selection tree
which consists of four levels. In the first level, the system checks the service criticality (C), if the
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criticality is equal to zero then it goes to the second level to check the utility (R). If the utility is
Rmax then there is no need to build any plan, but if the utility is Raverage, Rmin or Rrisk then
the system will ignore the service in case of fault because it is not a critical service. On the other
hand, when the criticality (C) is equal to one that means the current service is critical. Thus, if the
service utility is Rrisk then the recovery plan is replace the service immediately before the current
invocation, but if the utility is Rmin then the system moves to the third level to check Ucost. If
Ucost is equal to zero then the planning strategy is replacing the service, but if Ucost is equal to
one then the system moves to the fourth level which checks Utime. In the case that Utime is equal
to zero, then the planning strategy is active replication because the user accepts extra cost but he
does not accept extra time. If Utime is equal to one, then the choice is passive replication because
the user accepts both extra cost and time. When the Utility (R) is Raverage the system checks
Ucost, if it is equal to zero then the planning strategy is replace, but if it is equal to one then the
system checks Utime. If Utime is equal to zero, then the plan is Retry-Until, but if Utime is equal
to one then the plan is Retry.
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C HAPTER 4
SEMANTIC SIMILARITY AND RANKING
In this chapter, we present our proposed Semantic Similarity and Ranking framework. Due
to the competitive and fast growing nature of today’s business climate, most organizations are
automating their business processes for service and operation delivery. In this respect, serviceoriented computing (SOC) has become a main trend in software engineering that exploits Web
services as fundamental elements for developing on-demand applications. Web services are selfdescribed, self-contained and platform-independent computational elements that can be published,
discovered, and composed using standard protocols, to build applications across various platforms
and organizations in a dynamic manner. With the increasing agreement on the functional aspects
of Web services, such as using WSDL for service description, SOAP for communication and WSBPEL for composing Web services etc., the research interest is shifting towards the non-functional
aspects of Web services (Papazoglou, Pohl, Parkin, and Metzger, Papazoglou et al.2010).
Developers can now add descriptions (using standards such as OWL-S) to their Web services to define and advertise the non-functional aspects of services (including input, output, precondition, post-condition and functions), thereby facilitating automated discovery, invocation and
inter-operation. However, the first step in this process is to ‘resolve’ the consumer request against
prospective Web services, so that the most appropriate component could be selected (Alhosban,
Hashmi, Malik, and Medjahed, Alhosban et al.2011). The expected availability of a large number of highly specialized component services, means that it would be increasingly challenging to
find the most suitable service(s) in a reasonable amount of time (Nepal, Sherchan, Hunklinger, and
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Bouguettaya, Nepal et al.2010). Moreover, some Web services may not be able to satisfy consumer
requests individually, and hence need to be integrated with other Web services to provide the desired functionality. This adds to the complexity of an already challenging problem (Bouguettaya,
Krüger, and Margaria, Bouguettaya et al.2008).
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Figure 4.1: Matching levels.
In this chapter, we present our novel approach (defined S2 R: Semantics-based Similarity and
Ranking) for Web service selection (Alhosban, Hashmi, Malik, and Medjahed, Alhosban et al.2012).
S2 R is divided into four levels as shown in Figure 4.1. In the first level (L1), we filter the available
Web services under a specific category based on their functional properties such as input, output
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and operations. In the second level (L2), we further reduce the service search space based on nonfunctional properties, such as Quality of Service (QoS) parameters (Alhosban, Hashmi, Malik, and
Medjahed, Alhosban et al.2011). In the third level (L3), we further reduce the service search space
based on their behavioral properties, and we rank the services based on their utility value (in the
fourth level (L4)). The utility value is calculated using a utility function which allows stakeholders
to ascribe a value to the usefulness of the overall system as a function of several QoS attributes such
as response time, availability, cost, reliability, etc. according to their preferences (Nepal, Sherchan,
Hunklinger, and Bouguettaya, Nepal et al.2010) (Li, Xu, Wu, and Zhu, Li et al.2012) (Yao, Lu, Fu,
and Ji, Yao et al.2010) (Nejati, Sabetzadeh, Chechik, Easterbrook, and Zave, Nejati et al.2007).
The utility value is calculated using a utility function which allows stakeholders to ascribe a
value to the usefulness of the overall system as a function of several QoS attributes such as response
time, availability, cost, reliability, etc. according to their preferences (Nepal, Sherchan, Hunklinger, and Bouguettaya, Nepal et al.2010) (Menascé and Dubey, Menascé and Dubey2007) (Bergmann,
Richter, Schmitt, Stahl, and Vollrath, Bergmann et al.2001) (Li, Xu, Wu, and Zhu, Li et al.2012) (Yao,
Lu, Fu, and Ji, Yao et al.2010). Using utility function, S2 R filters Web services at each level so that
more costly operations (e.g., reputation calculations) are applied on a reduced number of candidate
services to shorten the time and space complexity of this search process. Moreover, since service
selection is an on-demand process, we apply the S2 R filters on run time.
In this section, we present an example scenario to motivate the problem and associated solution.
Assume a travel planning system that is based on a service-oriented architecture (Figure 1.1.). The
company provides travel planning services that include hotel booking, flight reservation, and car
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rental. In addition to these reservation services, the system also provides an insurance service for
the entire trip or individual travel components.
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Figure 4.2: Example Scenario: A Travel Reservation System

The main Web service for the system is called Travel Web service (TW) with major operations:
Check Availability, Get Quote, Reserve, Apply, and Send Payment. TW does not
implement all these functionalities by itself, rather it outsources some of the functionality to other
component Web services. In Figure 4.2. we can see that component Web services (outsourced
Web services) include: Hotel Web service (HW), Flight Web service (FW), Car Web service (CW),
Insurance Web service (IW), and Credit Web service (CrW). The consumer invokes TW through
the Get Quote operation by providing the travel date, departure and arriving city information.
To get the quote, TW should interact with other services (i.e., HW, FW, and CW) by checking the
availability for the required dates and cities using operation Check Availability. TW then
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requests quotes for the available reservations through the operation Get Quote. Upon receiving
individual quotes from component services, TW aggregates these quotes and sends them to the
consumer. At this point in the reservation process, the consumer also has the option of buying travel
insurance (which TW outsources to IW). If the consumer accepts the quote, the payment process
starts. TW outsources CrW to process the credit payments. CrW in turn outsources the consumer’s
credit check process to ChW. If the consumer’s credit meets the credit score requirements, then TW
makes a reservation with (HW, FW, and CW) and starts the insurance process (if consumer wills).
Finally, TW notifies the consumer with the confirmation number (for flight, hotel and rental car)
and sends the receipt. TW may run into some issues when it is trying to formulate this solution
by outsourcing functionalities to component services. First of all, how would TW calculate the
functional equivalence of two or more similar services, e.g., when TW is looking for a flight Web
service, the first step is to find all the Web services that provide this functionality (i.e., resolve both
syntactic and semantic equivalence). Even if TW is able to find functionally similar Web services
for flight Web service, they may have different non-functional (QoS) properties (such as service
A may have a response time of 3ms and service B may take 7ms to respond to user requests).
Hence TW needs to differentiate among the candidate services based on the value (utility) they
add to the composition. The main motivation behind S2 R is to solve the above mentioned issues
while reducing the time and space complexity of this (services) search process. We believe that
an efficient solution to the service selection problem is also paramount in reducing fault recovery
time in SOAs, for cases where a faulty service needs to be replaced by a ‘similar’ one (Alhosban,
Hashmi, Malik, and Medjahed, Alhosban et al.2011).
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4.0.4

S2 R Architecture

Generally, similarity measurement consists of two components: syntactic and semantic. In
syntactic similarity, we look for the similarity between data items where value of this similarity
usually lies in the range [0,1]. In semantic similarity, we look for defined relationships among
various terms and concepts (e.g. defined in an ontology or extracted). In S2 R, both syntactic and
semantic similarity filters are applied to find a set of Web services that match users’ requirements.
We assume that each Web service is defined using a description language such as WSDL (Web
Service Description Language) which describes the functional service properties and its interface.
WSDL files are published in a service registry that allows providers to advertise general information about their Web services. This information is used by clients for discovering providers and
Web services of interest. UDDI and ebXML are examples of protocols that can be used for the registration of Web services. Since UDDI is the leading specification for the development of servicebased repositories or registries (Bouguettaya, Krüger, and Margaria, Bouguettaya et al.2008) we
use UDDI as a registration repository, where service providers publish their WSDL files (in catalog
form). UDDI is organized in form of business activity categories (including the built-in NAICS,
UN/SPSC and the other user defined categories), and service providers are responsible for publishing their services in the appropriate UDDI category. Numerous Web services providing similar
functionality may thus be listed under the same category in a UDDI. In S2 R, we search the UDDI
and retrieve the Web services under a category and send them to the first level (Functional Context
Filter (FCF)). Thus, S2 R starts by calculating the syntactic similarity for each attribute, and if a
syntactic match is not found, candidate services are checked for semantic similarity. The attributes
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types in FCF are: (1) syntactic attributes, which include the list of input and output parameters, the
data types of the parameters, and the protocol to be used to invoke the Web service such as SOAP.
(2) Semantic attributes, include the pre-conditions and effects of an operations execution.

(n) services in category x

FCF

NCF

BCF

Ranking
(n-m) services

Functional Context Filter (FCF)
Syntactic:
- List of input/output parameters
- Data types
- Protocols
Semantic:
- Pre-conditions
- Post-conditions
Non-functional Context Filter (NCF)
QoS Parameters:
- Response time
- Availability
- Reliability
- Cost
.
.
- Security
Behavioral Context Filter (BCF)
- Monitoring
- Clustering
- Classification

Figure 4.3: Overview of the matching levels for S2 R.

We feed the (reduced) output set from (FCF) into the second level (Non-functional Context
Filter(NCF)) as in Figure 4.3. NCF is a filtering mechanism based on QoS parameters which
measure the quality of a Web service. There are many parameters that can be used to measure
a Web service’s quality such as response time, availability, reliability, cost, security and privacy,
etc. (Comuzzi and Pernici, Comuzzi and Pernici2009) (Lee, Lee2011) (Krishnamurthy and Babu,
Krishnamurthy and Babu2012) (Pernici and Siadat, Pernici and Siadat2011) (Yeom, Tsai, Bai,
and Lee, Yeom et al.2011). In addition, we can add any new specification to each one of these
filters. After finding the providers that support the same service based on functional context (nm providers), we filter them based on QoS requirements and are left with (n-m-k providers). In
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the third level, we cluster the services based on their behavior through (Behavioral Context Filter(BCF)). Finally, we rank the candidate Web services based on their utility. In the ranking level,
we rank the candidate Web services based on their utility. We divide the Web services into two
sets: HighRank set and LowRank set. The HighRank set includes the Web services that have QoS
values higher or equal to consumer’s requested values with the constraint that the price does not
exceed consumer’s maximum price. However, the LowRank set includes the Web services that
have QoS values lower than the requested values. In case of empty HighRank set, the first Web
service in the LowRank set is considered the best candidate. Note that the first three levels (i.e.,
FCF, NCF and BCF) are ‘context based filters’.
A context is “any information that can be used to characterize the situation of an entity. An
entity is any person, place, or subject that is considered relevant to interaction between a user and
an application, including the user and the application themselves” (Dey, Dey2000). Context has
been used in several areas such as machine learning, computer vision, information retrieval, and
decision support (Kouadri Mostéfaoui and Brézillon, Kouadri Mostéfaoui and Brézillon2006). We
view context as any Web service consumer or provider-related information that enables interactions between service consumers and providers. The provider-related context contains meta-data
about the provider and its service (e.g., service description, QoS, etc). Similarly, consumer-related
context contains meta-data about the consumer (e.g., consumer’s location, expertise level, etc). For
example, a non-functional context policy may include a set of quality of service parameters (e.g.,
response time) associated with the service. Each context definition belongs to a certain category
which can be either consumer-related or provider related. From a provider’s perspective, interact-
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ing with a consumer depends on the situation (i.e. current variable values) of that consumer, and
vice versa. Due to space restrictions, we omit further details regarding context definition. The
interested reader is referred to (Medjahed and Atif, Medjahed and Atif2007). The summary of the
levels and their parameters is given in Table 4.1. In the following, we provide details for the S2 R
filtering levels mentioned above.

Level
First

Context
Filter
FCF

Second NCF

Third

BFC

Fourth

Ranking

4.0.5

Table 4.1: S2 R Levels
Context
Parameters
Supported
Type
language
Functional Syntactic
OWL-S,
Context
and semantic WSDL-S,
..

Nonfunctional
Context

response
time,
availability,
reliability,
cost,...
Behavioral Monitoring,
Context
clustering
and classification

WSCL,
HQML, ..

Ranking

None

HighRank
and
LowRank

OWL-S

References
(Martin,
Burstein,
Mcdermott,
Mcilraith,
Paolucci,
Sycara, Mcguinness, Sirin,
and
Srinivasan,
Martin
et al.2007), (Paolucci and
Wagner, Paolucci and Wagner2006)
(Gu, Li, Tang, Xu, and Huang,
Gu et al.2007), (Gu, Nahrstedt,
Yuan, Wichadakul, and Xu, Gu
et al.2001)
(Fogg and Eckles, Fogg
and
Eckles2007),
(Roman and Kifer, Roman and
Kifer2007), (Yahyaoui, Maamar, and Boukadi, Yahyaoui
et al.2010)
N/A

Level I: Functional Context Filter (FCF)

As mentioned earlier, the WSDL files are published in a UDDI and consist of (textual) descriptions of the Web service’s operations (such as input, output, conditional output, precondition and
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postcondition). While some service providers describe these functionalities in different ways (e.g.
both input and precondition are described as input), so S2 R includes preconditions with inputs and
postconditions with outputs.
In S2 R, we extract this and other functionalities’ information from OWL-S. An OWL-S service
is characterized by three types of knowledge:
1. Service profile: it describes the operation of the service. It consists of three types of information: a human readable information section which describes the service, the functions that
the service provides and a list of functional attributes. For example, hotel service provides
the room availability of a specific hotel, this is the human information, the functional attribute is the input, the output and any other quality of service attribute such as the response
time.
2. Process-model: it describes how the service works by defining the services composition and
the exact operations.
3. Service grounding: it specifies the details of how an agent can access a service (i.e., the
information needed by the agent to discover the service).
If the Web service does not support OWL-S, S2 R extracts the Web service information from the
UDDI using the OWL-S/UDDI mapping as shown in Figure 4.4.
In an ideal scenario we would be able to find a service that perfectly matches to user requirements. However in SOAs with numerous combination of service attributes (i.e., input, output, and
operations) the chances of having such a perfect match may be slim. Thus, instead of trying to
find a perfect match, we could find a Web service that fulfills the user’s requirements as much as
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- webURL
- serviceName
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- serviceCategory
- serviceParameter
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- input
- output
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- service Product
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- discovery URL
- business Key
Business Service
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- name
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- hasProcess_TModel
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- input_Tmodel
- output_TModel
- precondition_TModel
- erffect_Tmodel
- serviceProduct_TModel
- serviceClassification_TModel
- bindingTemplates

Figure 4.4: Mapping between OWL-S and UDDI constructs.
possible (i.e., Web services may provide less functionalities or may have more functionalities than
requested). In S2 R, we first look for a perfectly matching service, then we increase our search
to incorporate services that provide more functionalities than requested. If we cannot find any
suitable candidate in the first two searches, we expand our search to include services that provide
less than desired functionalities. However, in such scenarios we would need to compose multiple
services to provide the requested functionality. Thus, we may have the following four scenarios
(see Figure 4.5).
• Equivalent (Figure 4.5a.) Web servicex and Web servicey are equivalent if all operations in
Web servicex are exactly the same as all operations in Web servicey and the number of operations
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Figure 4.5: Service matching scenarios.
in Web servicex is equal to the number of operations in Web servicey . Moreover, the inputs and
outputs for each operation in Web servicex are the same (names could potentially differ, e.g., cost
vs price)as the inputs and outputs for each operation in Web servicey .
• Subsume (Figure 4.5b.) Web servicex is subsumed by Web servicey if all operations in Web
servicex are included in Web servicey . However, Web servicey has extra inputs, outputs or operations. In this case Web servicey can be counted as similar Web service to Web servicex but it may
request or provide extra information.
• Not-equivalent (Figure 4.5c.) Web servicex and Web servicey are not equivalent if all operations in Web servicex do not match any operation in Web servicey . In this case Web servicex and
Web servicey are totaly different.
• Plug-in (Figure 4.5d.) Web servicey is plugged-in Web servicex if some operations in Web
servicey matches some operations in Web servicex . In this case we need to find and compose another Web service(s) that cover the extra operations needed for Web servicex .

To classify any Web service under one of the matching scenarios in S2 R, we identify the ser-
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vice operations according to the following. We consider three main types of operations: one-way,
request-response, and confirmation. In one-way operations, the Web service receives a message
without producing any output message (i.e., one-way communication). In request-response operation, the service receives an input message, processes it, and sends correlated output message to
the sender. Confirmation operation sends an output message but does not expect to receive any
more messages. CW::Get quote::FW is an example of a request-response operation. Its input
includes departure airport, arrival airport, departure date, return date, and the number of passengers. The output message for this request-response message contains a price and room type(s).
ChW::Notify consumer credit::CrW is a one way operation whose input contains a
first name, last name, age and number of days. TW::Confirmation is a confirmation operation
with the output of reservation details and a receipt. As we can see Request-response operations
have both input and output messages. However ,One way operations only contain input messages
and confirmation operations only produce output messages. Each message consists of one or more
parameters called parts in a WSDL. A parameter has a name and a data type. The data type gives
the range of values that maybe assigned to the parameter. The first step in finding functional
equivalence among Web services is to extract this parts information from the WSDL file for the
parameters and return values of operations provided by candidate Web services.

Definition 2. Two operations opik and opjl match if either (1) type of message for opik = “oneway” and type of message for opjl = “confirmation”; or (2) type of message for opik = “requestresponse” and type of message for opjl =“request-response”.
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Definition 3. Each Web service is accessible via operations and each operation is identified by
a tuple < Descriptionij , M odeij , Inputij , Outputij , P urposeij , Categoryij , Qualityij >, where
Descriptionij is a textual summary about the features of the operation, M odeij is the type of operation (i.e., one way, response-request or confirmation), Inputij is the input of the operation (if
it exists), Outputij is the output of the operation (if it exists), P urposeij is the business function
offered by the operation, Categoryij describes the operation domain, Qualityij provides the operation’s qualitative properties. 

Example: The operation TW::Get quote::HW in our running example. is defined by a tuple
<this operation returns the price for a given date to reserve hotel, request-response, dates and number of passengers; price in dollar, bussiness.function = request for quote, hotels, Quality.price>x
and Quality.security=“false”>.

Definition 4. operationij is similar to operationkl or subsumed by operationij if
1. ∀x ∈ Inputij , ∃x′ ∈ Inputkl | x is data type compatible with x′ .
2. ∀y ∈ Outputij , ∃y ′ ∈ Outputkl | y is data type compatible with y ′ .
3. (Categoryij = Categorykl ) ∨ (Categoryij ⊆ Categorykl ).
4. M odeij = M odekl .
5. (P urposeij ≡ P urposekl ) ∨ (P urposeij ⊆ P urposekl ).
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6. Text matching between Descriptionij and Descriptionkl ≥ ℓ|ℓ is a pre-determined threshold.
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Figure 4.6: Functional Context Filter (expanded).

In FCF, we apply neighborhood calculation to find the similar Web services based on their
functional properties. This filter works based on three predefined matrices: input matrix, output
matrix and operation matrix. Figure 4.6 shows the steps of how FCF works. Upon arrival of a
consumer request, a list of n services is retrieved from the UDDI under the requested category.
FCF’s Matrix Builder module then creates the three matrices: input, output and operation. Each
matrix has m × n dimensions where m is the number of retrieved Web services and n is the number
of inputs, outputs or operations for each matrix respectively. For instance, an Am×n operations
matrix is created as
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 1 if Web servicei has operationj ;
Ai,j =



 0 otherwise.

When the Web servicei does not provide the operationj , the value of Ai,j is zero. For example,
if we have non-stop operation (i.e., provide the non-stop routes) and Web servicex does not provide
it, we will add zero under this operation for Web servicex .
Table 4.2: Example of Web-operation Matrix
Get-Quote Get-Destination Get-Price Get-Time
Web service1
1
1
0
1
Web service2
1
1
1
0
Web service3
0
1
1
0
Web service4
1
1
1
1
Web service5
1
1
0
0
Web service6
0
1
1
1

While we are filling the matrix, the main concern is determining if the parameters of servicex is
the same as the parameters in the matrix. For instance, finding a flight using Web servicex requires
the input (airport name), but Web servicey may requires the input (zip code) for the same operation.
Hence it is important to find sematic similarity to address such scenarios.
S2 R extracts the semantic information of the candidate Web services through OWL-S. The
semantics of the parameters are defined by the following attributes:
1. Consumer and provider types: the consumer and the provider should be under the same
category. For example, if they provide travel services then they should be under the travel
category. In case of a composite solution that has multiple categories, the Business role will
define the category for each service.
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2. Category: the category for each parameter describes the area of interest of the parameter.
The category is defined by a tuple (domain, synonym, overlap). Domain gives the area
of interest. For example, “travel” which takes these values from the domain in OWL-S.
Synonym contains a set of alternative names for the domain name. For example, “trip” is
a synonym of “travel”. Overlap contains the list of categories that overlap with the current
category.
3. Purpose: describes the goal of the parameter, for example, the goal of Get-Quote in the
scenario is to return the price of the requested service.
4. Business role: the business role gives the type(category) information about a service under a certain business role. Every parameter has a well defined meaning according to the
taxonomy.
5. Unit: it is the measurement unit for a parameter such as, using miles to measure the distance
and dollar to measure the cost, etc.
We use Table 4.2 to illustrate matrix building. The matrix contains six Web services and four
operations. The matrix dimensions are A6×4 . The operations for Web service1 are (Get-Quote,
Get-Destination and Get-Time), the Web service2 operations are (Get-Quote, Get-Destination
and Get-Price), etc. The first step of S2 R is determining the inputs, outputs and operations of
the Web service which based on the consumer request. If all the properties are available in the
matrix then we just add the service name, and insert one under the property if the service provides
it, else insert zero. However, if the property does not exist, we will edit and add the new property to the matrix. For example, one provider wants to publish Web service7 which includes the
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operations (Get-Quote, Get-Destination, Get-Price and Get-Rate). The first three
operations exist in the matrix but the last operation is a new one. In this case we add the new
property (Get-Rate), add one under the operations (Get-Quote, Get-Destination and
Get-Price), so the new matrix will be as follows
Table 4.3: Example of Adding Web service to the Web-operation Matrix
Get-Quote Get-Destination Get-Price Get-Time Get-Rate
Web service1
1
1
0
1
0
Web service2
1
1
1
0
0
Web service3
0
1
1
0
0
Web service4
1
1
1
1
0
Web service5
1
1
0
0
0
Web service6
0
1
1
1
0
Web service7
0
1
1
1
1

FCF inserts the requirements into a vector by getting the parameters for a specific category from
the service repository. It then builds a priority matrix. The priority matrix is a matrix that gives
weight to each property and will move the focus towards more important operations. Based on
TF-IDF (Karimzadehgan, Li, Zhang, and Mao, Karimzadehgan et al.2011), we define the priority
matrix over the original matrix Am×n to compute the weight of each item as:

wi,j =

Ai,j × |W si |
Ai,j
∗ log
OpM
|Opj |

(4.1)

where Ai,j is one if the operation j exists in Web service i, otherwise Ai,j is zero, |Opj | is the
number of times that Opj has been used by all Web services, OpM is the number of operations
in the matrix and |W si | is the number of operations for Web service i. The result after applying
Equation 1. to our example matrix (in Table 4.3) will be the priority matrix in Table 4.4. The
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operations that are provided most often by the Web services in the same category will have the
highest weights and the operations that are provided less will have lower weights.

Web service1
Web service2
Web service3
Web service4
Web service5
Web service6
Web service7

Table 4.4: Priority Matrix
Get-Quote Get-Destination Get-Price
0.0635
0.1111
0
0.0635
0.1111
0.0794
0
0.1667
0.1190
0.0476
0.0833
0.0595
0.0953
0.1667
0
0
0.1111
0.0794
0
0.0833
0.0595

Get-Time Get-Rate
0.0635
0
0
0
0
0
0.0476
0
0
0
0.0635
0
0.0476
0.0119

After building the priority matrix, FCF converts each row of the matrix into binary vectors, for
example if the consumer request contains the operations <Get-Quote, Get-Destination,
Get-Price, Get-Rate> while the available service has <Get-Quote, Get-Destination,
Get-Price, Get-Time, Get-Rate > then the query vector of this Web service is < 1, 1, 1, 0, 1 >.
FCF finds similar Web services based on vector similarity (Chan, Gaaloul, and Tata, Chan et al.2011)
as:

→ −
−
→
Similarity(I, J) = |cosine Vi , Vj | = |

n
∑
k=1

v
v
u n
u n
u∑
u∑
(ik × jk )| ÷ t
i2k × t
jk2
k=1

(4.2)

k=1

Now, let us suppose that the consumer requests a matching for Web service that includes the
−
→
operations: < Get − Quote, Get − Destination, Get − Price > i.e., the vector will be V1 =<
−
→
1, 1, 1, 0, 0 > and it will compared to all vectors Vd where d ∈ [1,m] in the matrix Am×n .
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(4.3)

If the threshold β for selecting the Web services is (0.8) then the result from FCF is the set
{W ebservice2 , W ebservice3 , W ebservice4 , W ebservice5 }. In this case, we find that W ebservice3
and W ebservice5 have the same similarity value (0.8403). Notice that W ebservice3 does not provide the operation Get-Quote and W ebservice5 does not provide the operation Get-Price.
In such case, we return back to the operation priority matrix which shows the priority for the operation Get-Price is 0.1190 and the priority for the operation Get-Quote is 0.0953, so we
prefer W ebservice3 contains the higher priority operation.

4.0.6

Level II: Non-functional Context Filter (NCF)

NCF is divided into two steps: The first step checks for the service availability, thereby, eliminating the Web services that are unavailable. The second step checks Web service similarity based
on other QoS parameters (e.g., response time, throughput, reliability, etc). We use the ping utility
for the former, which has been used for Web service performance measurements (Guoping, Hui-
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juan, and Zhibin, Guoping et al.2009). After determining the set of Web services that respond
to the ping inquires, we start the second step where we use Context Policy Assistance (CPA) to
test the similarity between the QoS parameters that are required by the consumer and the QoS
parameters offered by the available Web services.
Context Rule NF-cost
Context Property Cost
Instance cost_s, cost_d
Type NFP
Action matchproperity($cost_s$, $cost_d$)
{ If cost_d<= cost_s Then return true else return false }

Figure 4.7: Rule example.
CPA is created by the service provider and should be attached to the service. It facilitates
interaction between providers and the service registry to store the context policies. For further
details, the interested reader is referred to (Medjahed and Atif, Medjahed and Atif2007). A service
provider may create the context specification using a context specification language such as WSPolicy. WS-Policy provides a general model and syntax to describe and communicate the policies
of Web services (Erradi, Maheshwari, and Tosic, Erradi et al.2007). Each policy contains a set of
rules that define the QoS requirements/capabilities of the Web services. A sample rule is shown
in Figure 4.7. where a context rule is identified by a name to specify the property. In this rule we
need two instances: the consumer’s cost and the provider’s cost. The type of this policy is NFP
(non-functional policy) and it compares the cost between the two parties to determine if they are
compatible. We use these policies to determine if two Web services are similar based on the QoS
parameters they both share (Alrifai, Skoutas, and Risse, Alrifai et al.2010).
Definition 5. QoS vector description: it is an extendable vector used to define QoS parameters
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of the provider and the consumer. It is expressed as: QoS = < QoS1 , QoS2 , ..., QoSn >, n ∈ R,
where QoSn indicates nth QoS attributes and QoSi where i ∈ [1,n] is equal to {Availability, Cost,
Response time, Error rate, Throughput, Reliability, Reputation, and Security.}.
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Figure 4.8: Non-functional Filter (expanded).

QoS parameter matching is done as:
1. Convert the parameters into QoS vector descriptions. Then, we have one vector for the consumer request:
< ConQoS1 , ConQoS2 , ..., ConQoSn > and multiple vectors for the provider offerings:
< P ro1 QoS1 , P ro1 QoS2 , ..., P ro1 QoSn > ... < P rok QoS1 , P rovk QoS2 , ..., P rovk QoSn >.
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Here we assume that the providers provide trusted information for the QoS values (Sherchan,
Nepal, Hunklinger, and Bouguettaya, Sherchan et al.2010). There are three different cases
in converting the QoS parameters: the consumer vector is greater than the provider vector,
the consumer vector is less than the provider vector, or the consumer vector is equal to the
provider vector. In the first case we add zeros at the end of the consumer vector and in the
second case we add zeros at the end of provider vector.
2. Create a new vector called conform with length equal to the max length of consumer and
provider vectors. For each element in the vector use the polices to compare the conditions,
and if the condition is met then add one to the conform vector else put zero. At the end of
this step we will have the vector < conf orm1 , conf orm2 , ..., conf ormn >.
3. Calculate the conformity degree between the services for the consumer QoSi and the provider
QoSj as:
Conf ormity(QoSi , QoSj ) =

z
∑

W eightq ∗ conf ormq

(4.4)

q=1

where i,j are Web services, z is the maximum length of parameters, i.e., z = max(|QoSi |, |QoSj |),
and W eightq is the weight assigned to each QoS parameter.
Consumers may have different expectations about the conformity degree of their services. For
this purpose, they provide a conformity threshold θ (0 < θ ≤ 1). In NFC (Figure 4.8), we find all
Web services j where the conformity degree (QoSi , QoSj ) is greater than θ, which are then passed
to the ranking level. The conformity threshold is given by the consumer as a part of his profile,
while the QoS weight is created automatically by the system based on the level of the consumer’s

95
expertise. In S2 R, we defined three types of consumers: expert, regular and normal consumers. The
expert consumers are knowledgable about meaning of all QoS parameters and they may assign the
desired value for the QoS parameters for specific services. The regular consumers have some
knowledge about the QoS parameters, and they may assign values to some QoS parameters and
leave the other parameters without weights. In this case, the system predefined weights are used
for unassigned parameters. The normal consumers do not have any knowledge about the QoS
parameters that the system assigns weights for all parameters.
The main benefit of categorizing the consumers into these types is to let the expert consumer
participate in making a decision by providing weights for each QoS parameter. However, the system will provide all the QoS attribute weights for other categories of the consumers. In essence,
consumer categories are determined based on the assigned values for the current request.

Example: Suppose that Web service HW is one of the candidate Web services as a result of
FCF. Let it have the following QoS vector: < price = $50; response-time= 60 sec; error-rate = 0.01;
security=“false”>. On the other hand, the consumer (Web servicex ) QoS vector is as following: <
price ≤ $70; response-time < 90 sec; error-rate < 0.05; reliability= 0.80; security=“true”>. The
first step is building the conformity vector: < 1, 1, 1, 0, 0 >. The first three values of the vector are
equal to one because the conditions are met between Web servicex and Web servicey . However,
since the values of reliability and security do not match, 0’s are appended. The conformity degree
based on individual QoS parameter weights is then assessed. Assume that the consumer provides
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the weights as < 0.3, 0.2, 0.4, 0.1, 0.3 >, then:

Conf ormity(QoSx , QoSy ) =

5
∑

< 0.3, 0.4, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1 > ∗ < 1, 1, 1, 0, 0 >= 0.8

(4.5)

q=1

4.0.7

Level III: Behavioral Context Filter (FCF)

A behavior observation is an observation of a Web service quality for one interaction. This
observation is computed based on the distance between the score of a Web service and the average
of quality attribute values of Web services belonging to the same domain1 .
1- P

P

P

Unacceptable
behavior

Acceptable
behavior
1- P

Figure 4.9: Behavioral patterns using HMM.

For classification purposes, we cluster the Web service into two states: acceptable (Acc) and
unacceptable (Ucc) behavior (Figure 4.9). The degree of acceptance is based on the conformity of
QoS between the service provider and service consumer. The experiences are evaluated as a ratio
of the number of times in the acceptable state, divided by the total number of times the service
was invoked. Each time the composition orchestrator invokes a service, it records the state of that
service (acceptable or unacceptable) along with the time of invocation. Let the vector V = the
service behavior profile, then to asses the probability that Servicei will be in the acceptable state
in the next time instance:
1

A domain gathers services having the same functionality
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P (Acc|V ) = P (Acc|U cc) + P (Acc|Acc)

(4.6)
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Figure 4.10: Web service behavioral pattern and clusters.

Hidden Markov models have successfully been applied to various pattern recognition problems (Salfner, Schieschke, and Malek, Salfner et al.2006). We also use an HMM to predict services’ behaviors. We use the Forward algorithm to train the model and calculate the sequence
likelihood. The sequence likelihood is the probability that model χ can generate observation O.
Assume that we train two sequences: acceptable sequence χ and unacceptable sequence χ′ . Now,
we need to determine whether a given observation is acceptable or non-acceptable. The new observation is defined using the vector O = [o0 , o1 , ... oh ]. This is done using Bayes decision theory
to classify the observations (see Figure 4.10).
The Forward algorithm is based on a forward variable αt (i) denoting the probability of subsequence [o0 , o1 , ... ot ] and the fact that the stochastic process is in state i at time t:

αt (i) = P r(o0 o1 ..ot , Pt = pi |χ)

(4.7)
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αt (i) can be computed by the following recursive computation scheme:

α0 (i) = χi gi (o0 )

(4.8)

Each time the process enters a state, one observation is generated according to the probability
(gi (oz )), where αt (i) is the probability of the entire sequence and the fact that the stochastic process
is in state i at the end of the sequence, sequence likelihood Pr(O|χ) can be computed as:

P r(O|χ) =

2
∑

αt (i)

(4.9)

i=1

After behavior classification, we rank the Web services based on the utility in L4.

4.0.8

Level IV: Web service Ranking

In this level, S2 R ranks the Web services based on the range compatibility of the QoS parameters. We use weighted sum filter function after converting the QoS parameters into a range vector
in the format of the component vector description.
Definition 6. The component vector description is expressed as:
< (QoS1, QoS1min , QoS1max ), (QoS2, QoS2min , QoS2max ), ..., (QoSn, QoSnmin , QoSnmax ) >,
n ∈ R, where QoSi∈[1,n] is the best QoS value for parameter i, QoSimin is the minimum acceptable value for parameter i, and QoSimax is the maximum acceptable value for parameter i, then
QoSimin ≤ QoSi ≤ QoSimax .

Each vector is accompanied by a decision model, i.e. ranges of all the QoS parameters as well
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as their respective priorities also known as the weights. The ranking will be based on the matching
degree (i.e., how near the QoS parameter that is provided by the provider is to the QoS parameters
required by the consumer). Note that we can use the provider QoS values in one of two ways:(i)
QoS values as advertised by the service provider, or (ii) QoS values obtained using behavior monitoring through the community (i.e., provider reputation). The best ranked Web service will be the
Web service that is closest to the ’best’ value and the worst ranked will be the Web service that is
the farthest from the ’best’ value. However, if a Web service provides a larger value than the best
value but has a lower cost associated to it, then the system will give this Web service a higher rank.

Definition 7. ∀ Web services W Si ∈ ω, where ω is the set of all Web services which are similar
(functional and non-functional) to the requested service:

W ebServiceRankSet =




 HighRank if W Si ≥ µ ∧ cost ≤ ℘;


 LowRank

if W Si < µ.

where µ is the best value of QoSj that is provided by the consumer from the vector
< (QoSj , QoSjmin , QoSjmax ) >, and ℘ is the acceptable cost by the consumer. 
We assume that all the participating Web services are able to articulate their objectives and
prioritize them (Ackoff, Ackoff1978). The articulation and prioritization of objective values is well
accepted in multi-attribute situations and operations research (Chandra, Ellis, and Vahdat, Chandra
et al.2000) (Faratin, Sierra, and Jennings, Faratin et al.2002) (Resinas, Fernandez, and Corchuelo,
Resinas et al.2012). The consumer determines/assigns a priority for each QoS parameter (e.g.,
the price of the service is more important than its execution time). In our method, we covert these
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priorities into a weighted vector to compare the consumer requirements with the provider offer. All
the Web services conform to some constraints in the solution. For instance, any QoS vector cannot
have a negative value (as shown by Equation 4.10), and the QoS values lie between the maximum
and minimum allowable values set by the consumer Web service (as shown by Equation 4.11).

Xj ≥ 0 and Yij ≥ 0

(4.10)

Xj(min) ≤ Xj ≤ Xj(max) and Yij(min) ≤ Yij ≤ Yij(max)

(4.11)

The utility function is a multi-step calculation that evaluates the degree of matching between
the Web services. A weighted sum approach is used to combine these multiple QoS parameters.
We use a distance function to measure the difference among the proposed solutions of both the
consumer and provider Web services. Thus, lower utility values are desired as they translate to
lesser mismatch among the services. Similarly, lower values translate to higher ranks for the
solutions among the solution space. The utility value of a match is calculated as follows

∆ij =

rj =

n
∑
j=0

|Xj − Yij |
Xj

(W Xj ∗ ∆ij + W Yij ∗ ∆ij )

(4.12)

(4.13)
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G
∑
Rs = min
(rj )

(4.14)

j=0

S2 R technique succeed in finding the best performance similar Web services in the Cloud.
Since user requirements for cloud services vary, service providers have to ensure that they can be
flexible in their service delivery while keeping the users isolated from the underlying infrastructure.
On the other hand, the service consumers require faster response time which may be achieved by
distributing requests to multiple Clouds in various locations at the same time. This creates the
need for finding similar services or applications on different clouds. There are many challenges
involved in finding such services such as the functional and non-functional attributes.
Cloud computing could also be refereed to as service-oriented computing (SOC) paradigm.
Web services are self-described, self-contained and platform-independent computational elements
that can be published, discovered, and composed using standard protocols, to build applications
across various platforms and organizations in a dynamic manner. With the increasing agreement on the functional aspects of Web services, such as using WSDL (Booth and Liu, Booth
and Liu2006) for service description, SOAP (SOAP, SOAP2007) for communication and WSBPEL (WSBPEL, WSBPEL2005) for composing Web services etc., the research interest is shifting towards the non-functional aspects of Web services (Papazoglou, Pohl, Parkin, and Metzger,
Papazoglou et al.2010) (Buyya, Yeo, Venugopal, Broberg, and Brandic, Buyya et al.2009).
We present an example scenario to motivate the problem and associated solution. Figure 4.11.
shows a typical service auction scenario in a cloud computing environment. In the example shown,
broker conduct an auction to match bids of multiple resources advertised by different providers.
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These providers advertise their resources with the required price. The consumers then submit their
bids to show the degree of interest in the advertised resources. The bids from the consumers are
queued in the database by Job schedule services which will help in calculating the winning bid.
On the other hand, the resources are indexed and stored in the database by Catalogue services.
After that, the Trading broker service coordinates the matching of resources and bids, and trading
between auction participants. At the end of the auction the broker decides the winners and sends the
reservation requests to the Reservation service. Then the reservation service informs the resource
providers and consumers about the final result (i.e., who won the bid). The payment processing
takes place through the Accounting service.
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Figure 4.11: A trading scenario in the cloud

In Figure 4.11, we focus on five main services: Job schedule services, Catalogue services, Trading broker service, Reservation service and Accounting service. Job schedule service is the service
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that stores the bids coming from the consumers and sorts them by date, time and price. Catalogue
service stores the resources advertised by the providers and indexes them to reduce the complexity
for the bid matching process. Trading broker service is the service that manages the auction and
matches the bids with the required price. Reservation service is the service that reserve a specific
resource to the winner of the auction and informs results to the participants of the auction process.
Finally, accounting service is the service that is responsible for processing payments: check if the
consumer’s credit meets the credit score requirements, make a payment and send the results to the
user. The above scenario has many challenges. First and the foremost would be calculating the
functional equivalence for the two or more similar services, e.g., when looking for an accounting
service, the first step is to find all the Web services that provide this functionality (i.e., resolve both
syntactic and semantic equivalence). Even if it is able to find functionally similar Web services
for accounting service, they may have different non-functional (QoS) properties (such as service A
may have a response time of 3ms and service B may take 7ms to respond to user requests). Hence
we needs to differentiate among the candidate services based on the value (utility) they add to the
composition. The main motivation behind our technique is to solve the above mentioned issues
while reducing the time and space complexity of this (services) search process. We believe that
an efficient solution to the service selection problem is also paramount in reducing fault recovery
time in SOAs, for cases where a faulty service needs to be replaced by a ‘similar’ one (Alhosban,
Hashmi, Malik, and Medjahed, Alhosban et al.2011).
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C HAPTER 5
FAULT MANAGEMENT PROPAGATION
In this chapter, we focus on faults that propagate from participants to composite services. We
refer to these faults as bottom-up. Some of the examples of bottom-up-faults may include, a
hardware failure occurring in the participant service deeming it unreachable by the composite
system, a scheduled maintenance downtime for the participant’s provider, change in participants
interface (e.g. changing an optional parameter to mandatory in WSDL specification). Composite
services therefore need to detect and handle any faults as soon as possible, to avoid any run-time
failures or service outages in overall system.

Figure 5.1: HTTP message example.

Web services generally use HTTP as the underlying message transport (example of such messages in Figure 5.1). Hence, they are either guaranteed message delivery or notified if a message
was not delivered (e.g., because of a server unavailability). This adds another layer of information
to the system and hence could differentiate among a lost message vs. service outages. However,
this also means that composite services become aware of a fault only at the time they interact with
their participants and not at the time that fault occurred. Hence, the current state of a participant
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service is a function of last interaction that occurred among the participant and composite service,
which may or may not represent the current state of the service. This may decrease the availability
of composite services. Besides, users’ requests are pending as long as the composite service did
not recover from the fault (e.g., by replacing the faulty participant with an equivalent one). This
calls for a framework in which composite services are able to detect and handle bottom-up faults
as soon as those faults occur in their participants and once detected should recover gracefully from
these.
In essence, the recovery mechanism should allow the composite system to continue providing
its core services to the customers (e.g., through service change monitoring). Service changes may,
for instance, originate from the introduction of a new functionality, the modification of existing
functionality to improve performance, or the inclusion of new regulatory constraints that require
service behavior to be altered. Such changes should not be disruptive, i.e., requiring radical modifications in the very fabric of services, or the way that business is conducted (Andrikopoulos, Benbernou, and Papazoglou, Andrikopoulos et al.2008). Since routine change increases the propensity
for error, one needs to know why a change was made, what are its implications, and whether the
change is complete. In a Web services environment, changes only affect the Web service provider’s
system. Typically Web service consumers do not immediately perceive the upgraded process, particularly the detailed changes of Web services. Hence, Web service based applications may fail
on the Web service client side due to changes carried out during the provider service upgrade. In
order to manage changes as a whole, the Web service consumers have to be taken into consideration as well, otherwise changes that are introduced at the service producer side can create severe
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disruption.
In addition, to control service evolution, a designer must know why a change was made, what
its implications are, and whether the change is consistent. Eliminating spurious results and inconsistencies that occur because of uncontrolled changes is necessary for services to evolve gracefully, ensure stability, and handle variability in their behavior. We can classify the nature of service
changes depending on their causal effects: Shallow changes. These are small-scale incremental changes localized to a service or restricted to the services clients. Deep changes. These are
large-scale transformational changes cascading beyond a services clients, possibly to entire value
chains (end-to-end service networks). While both shallow and deep changes need an appropriate
versioning strategy, deep changes further introduce several intricacies of their own and require the
assistance of a change-oriented service life cycle to allow services to react appropriately to changes
as they occur (Andrikopoulos, Benbernou, and Papazoglou, Andrikopoulos et al.2008).
In this chapter, we introduce a framework for managing and recovering from bottom-up faults
in composite services. The proposed framework (extending (Medjahed and Malik, Medjahed and
Malik2011)) uses soft-state signaling to propagate faults from participants to composite services
and uses a semantic rule based recovery mechanism to employ the traditional system recovery
strategies. Soft state denotes a type of protocols where state (e.g., whether a server is alive) is
constantly refreshed by periodic messages; state which is not refreshed in time expires. This is
in contrast to hard-state where installed state remains installed unless explicitly removed by the
receipt of a state-teardown message. Advantages of the soft-state approach include implicit error
recovery and easier fault management resulting in high availability (Alhosban, Hashmi, Malik,
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and Medjahed, Alhosban et al.2011). Soft state was introduced in the late 1980s and has been
widely used in various Internet protocols (e.g., RSVP). However, to the best of our knowledge,
this work is the first to use soft-state for fault management in composite services. We then employ
a semantic rule based approach to apply multiple recovery strategies to ensure the stability of
the system. We use ECA based rules that allow system designers the flexibility and consistency to
device multiple recovery strategies. The strategies could be devised at both the system composition
time or during the execution of the system during the optimization/enhancement phase. The major
contributions of the work can be summarized as follows: First, we introduce a bottom-up fault
model for composite services. The model includes a taxonomy of bottom-up faults, a definition
of state for composite services, and a peer-to-peer topology for state propagation. Second, we
propose a soft-state based framework for bottom-up fault management in composite services. The
framework includes: protocols for fault detection (push and pull), propagation (pure soft-state and
soft-state with explicit removal), and reaction (policy-based). Finally, we conduct a comprehensive
set of experiments to assess the performance and applicability of the proposed framework.

5.1 Motivation
To better motivate the need for bottom-up fault management in composite services, consider the
scenario depicted in Figure 5.2. The scenario shows two composite services; Travel Composition,
and City Tour Composition (CS1 and CS2 respectively) that outsource some of their functionality
to other participants. For instance, at the reception of the travel planning request (step 1), CS1
invokes W S1 to book the flight (step 2). Then, it invokes W S2 to book the hotel (step 3). Finally,
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it invokes W S3 to book a car from the airport to the hotel (step 4), and returns the result to the user
(step 5). Similarly, CS2 receives a city tour request from the user (step a). It first invokes W S3
to book a car for site-seeing purposes, etc (step b). Then, it invokes W S4 to book a movie ticket
(step c), and W S5 to book a museum ticket (step d). Finally, it returns the result to the user (step
e). Note that W S3 is being shared by two different compositions.
CS1: Travel Composition

CS2: City Tour Composition

(5)

(1)
(2)

Book Flight
WS1

Book Hotel
WS2

(e)

(b)

(4)

(3)

(a)

Book Car
WS3

(c)

Book Movie
Ticket
WS4

(d)

Book Museum
Ticket
WS5

Figure 5.2: Reference Scenario.

Let us consider the case of a server failure in W S1 . When CS1 receives a user request, it
invokes W S1 (step 2), but since W S1 is no longer able to process incoming requests, CS1 is
notified by the underlying HTTP server (if HTTP is used as a transport protocol) that the message
was not delivered to W S1 . CS1 handles this situation (e.g., as part of its exception handling code)
by returning a run-time error message to the user (e.g., “your request cannot be executed at this
time”). Note that both CS1 and W S1 are autonomous and offered by different providers. Hence the
CS1 provider is not necessarily informed by the W S1 provider about the unavailability of W S1 ;
W S1 provider may even not know that CS1 is planning to use W S1 as a participant. Let us now
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consider the case where the W S3 provider changes the WSDL specification of W S3 by adding a
new parameter to its input message. Let us assume that CS1 and CS2 receive user requests. Since
CS1 and CS2 are not aware of W S3 ’s update, they will forward users’ requests to W S3 using an
obsolete message signature. W S3 will hence send back a run-time error message to CS1 and CS2 .
As in the previous case, both composite services will in turn send error messages to their users.
The above mentioned cases illustrate the following:
• The composite services returned run-time errors to users because of the inability of those
services to promptly detect faults in their participants. Such situations may be unacceptable
in applications such as disaster management (e.g., unavailability of an emergency service),
supply chain (e.g., a supplier running out of stock for a given product because of a strike),
and real-time systems (e.g., failure of a computing resource such as processor in a real-time
application).
• The faults that composite services need to deal with are physical, such as a server failure in
the first case, as well as logical, such as an update of a service policy (i.e., WSDL specification) in the second case.
In the rest of this chapter, we present a framework that enables composite service to automatically manage faults in their participants as soon as those faults occur, as opposed to the participant
invocation time.
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5.2 Fault Model
In this section, we describe our model for bottom-up fault management. We first provide a
categorization of bottom-up faults. Then, we define the notion of a participant’s state. Finally, we
introduce a peer-to-peer topology for bottom-up fault management.

5.2.1

Bottom-up Fault Taxonomy

A fault management approach must refer to a taxonomy that describes the different types of
faults that composite services are expected to be able to manage. We identify two types of bottomup faults: physical and logical (Figure 5.3). Physical faults are related to the infrastructure that
supports Web service. A node fault occurs if the servers (e.g., application server, Web server)
hosting a participant are out of action. Logical faults are initiated by service providers; this is in
contrast to physical faults which are out of service providers’ control. We categorize logical faults
as status change, policy change, and participation refusal. Status change occurs if the service
provider explicitly modifies the availability status of its service. The status may be changed through
freeze or stop. In the freeze fault, providers shut down their services for limited time periods
(e.g., for maintenance, unavailability of a product in a supply chain’s provider). In the stop fault,
providers make their services permanently unavailable (e.g., a company going out-of-business).
Participation refusal occurs if a service is not willing to participate in a given composition. Policy
change occurs if the provider updates one of its service policies. We adopt a broad definition
of policy, encompassing all requirements under which a service may be consumed. Policies are
specified in XML-based Web service languages/standards (e.g., WSDL, WS-Security) (Alonso,
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Figure 5.3: Bottom-up Fault Taxonomy.
Casati, Kuno, and Machiraju, Alonso et al.2004). Changes in the policies of a participant W Si may
impact the way a composite service CSj interacts with W Si . Hence, they should be considered as
logical faults (e.g., as shown in the running example).

5.2.2

State of a participant service

Soft-state signaling enables the propagation of bottom-up faults from participants to composite
services. The main idea of this class of signaling is that the state of each participant is periodically
sent to the composite service. The composite service will then use the received state to determine
whether there was any physical or logical fault in the participant. Several questions need to be
tackled when designing a soft-state protocol: what is the definition of a state? And how is the state
computed? We will give answers to these questions in the rest of this chapter.

The proposed framework must deal with all types of faults depicted in Figure 5.3. Physical
faults are detected by composite services in an implicit manner; if a node fault occurs at a participant, then the composite service will not receive a state from that participant. The participation
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refusal fault is explicitly communicated by participants if they are not willing to be part of a composition. Status change faults are detected either implicitly (pure soft-state protocol) or explicitly
(soft-state with explicit removal protocol). Finally, policy change faults are transmitted as part of
the participant’s state and hence, they are detected in an explicit manner. We will give below a
definition of state and the way it is computed.
ChangeDetails
ChangeStatus Category

Scope

True/False

Figure 5.4: State of a Participant Service.
To keep track of policy changes, each participant W Si maintains a data structure called Statei
(Figure 5.4). Statei is defined by two attributes: ChangeStatus and ChangeDetails. ChangeStatus
is equal to True if policy changes have been made to W Si . Several changes may occur in W Si
during a time period; details about these changes are stored in the ChangeDetails set. Each element
of this set represents a policy change; it is defined by a couple (C,S) where C is the category of the
policy and S is the scope of the change. The initial values of ChangeStatus and ChangeDetails are
False and ∅, respectively. The following definition summarizes the properties of Statei maintained
by a participant W Si .

Definition
The state, denoted Statei , of a participant W Si is defined by (ChangeStatus,ChangeDetails) where:
• ChangeStatus = True ⇐⇒ changes have been made to W Si .
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• ChangeDetails = {(C,S) / C and S are the category and scope of a change in W Si }.
• Initially do: Statei .ChangeStatus = False and Statei .ChangeDetails = ∅ .
• At the occurrence of a change (C,S) in W Si do: Statei .ChangeStatus = True, Statei .ChangeDetails
= Statei .ChangeDetails ∪ {(C,S)}.
A policy category refers to the type of requirements specified by a policy. We adopt the policy
categorization defined in (Garlan and Schmerl, Garlan and Schmerl2002) which classifies policies
as functional, non-functional, value-added, and specialized. Functional policies describe the operational features of a Web service (e.g., in WSDL). Non-functional policies include parameters that
measure the quality of the service (e.g., response time). Value-added policies provide “better” environments for Web service interactions. They refer to a set of specifications for supporting optional
(but important) requirements for the service (e.g., security, privacy, conversation). A specialized
policy defines requirements that are specific to an application domain. Shipping and billing are examples of specialized policies in business-to-business e-commerce. The scope of a change defines
the subject to which that change was applied. It includes details about (i) the location of the modified policy specification and (ii) the element that has been updated within that specification. The
specification location is given by the URI of the XML file that stores the specification. The updated
element is identified by the XPath query of that element within the specification. For instance, let us
consider the following WSDL file (Figure 5.5) located at “http://www.ws.com/stockquote.wsdl”.
Let us assume that the name of the operation “getQuote” has been modified in the WSDL
document. The category and scope of the change can then be defined as:
• Category = (Functional,WSDL).
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<definitions>
<types> <!-- XML Schema --> </types>
<message name=“getQuote_In”> ….
<message name=“getQuote_Out”> …
<portType name=“StockQuoteServiceInterface”>
<operation name=“getQuote”>
<input message=“getQuote_In” />
<output message=“getQuote_Out” />
</operation>
</portType>

Figure 5.5: WSDL file example.
• Scope = (URL,Q) where:
– URL = “http://www.ws.com/stockquote.wsdl”
– Q = “definitions/portType/operation/@name”

5.2.3

Fault coordinators

In the proposed framework, fault management is a collaborative process between architectural
modules called fault coordinators. Each Web service (participant or composite) has one coordinator associated to it. This peer-to-peer topology distributes control and externalizes fault management, hence creating a clear separation between the business logic of the services and fault
management tasks.
We define two types of coordinators (Figure 5.6): soft-state senders (SS-S) and soft-state receivers (SS-R). Each participant (resp., composite service) has a sender (resp., receiver) attached
to it. A sender SS-Si maintains the Statei data structure. To keep track of its receivers, SS-Si
maintains a Receivers(SS-Si ) data structure. If W Si (attached to SS-Si ) participates in CSj (at-
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Figure 5.6: Fault Coordinators.
tached to SS-Rj ) then SS-Rj ∈ Receivers(SS-Si ). SS-Si periodically sends Statei to its receivers
via Refresh() messages. The refresh period is determined by the tSSS timer maintained by SS-Si .
A receiver SS-Rj maintains two data structures: Senders(SS-Rj ) and tSSR . Senders(SS-Rj ) is the
set of senders from which SS-Rj expects to receive Refresh(). If W Si participates in CSj then
SS-Si ∈ Senders(SS-Rj ). tSSR is a timer used by SS-Rj to process Refresh() messages received
from its senders.
Bottom-up fault management involves three major tasks: fault detection, fault propagation, and
fault reaction. The sequence diagram in Figure 5.7 depicts the relationship between these tasks.
First, SS-Si detects faults that occurred in the attached W Si . This task is collaborative between
W Si and SS-Si , as stated in Figure 5.6. Messages may be passed to/from W Si during this task.
Then, SS-Si propagates the fault to SS-Rj . As for fault detection, this task is collaborative between
the sender and receiver. Finally, SS-Rj and/or CSj execute appropriate measures to react to the
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fault. Details about fault detection, propagation, and reaction follow in the upcoming Sections.
Participant WSi

Sender SS-Si

Receiver SS-Rj

Composite Service CSj

Fault
Occurrence

Fault Detection

Fault Propagation

Fault Reaction

Figure 5.7: Sequence Diagram for Bottom-up Fault Management.

5.3 Fault Detection and Propagation
Each fault coordinator is itself deployed as a Web service on the same node and servers (e.g.,
Web server) as the attached service. Hence, identifying physical faults in a coordinator is equivalent to identifying physical faults in its attached service: if a physical fault affects a service
(participant or composite), it also affects its coordinator; and vice versa.
The way participation decision is made varies from a participant to another. We give below
four scenarios on how such decisions could be made:
1. A service load balancer may check that the server workload will not exceed a given threshold
if the service participates in a new composition. The threshold could, for instance, be defined
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to maintain a minimum quality of service.
2. A policy compatibility checker may also verify the compliance of the service policies with
the composite service policies. For instance, the checker could compare privacy policies
to make sure that the participant and composite service have compatible expectations and
requirements about the privacy of their data.
3. A service reputation manager may verify that the reputation (however reputation is defined) of the composite service is higher than a minimum value defined by the participant’s
provider.
4. A notification may be sent to the service provider. The provider will then manually decide
whether to participate or not. An appropriate message will be sent to the composite service
based on the provider’s decision.
Once faults are detected by coordinators, they need to be propagated to relevant composite
services. In the rest of this chapter, we describe the algorithms executed by senders and receivers
for propagating bottom-up faults. We assume that W Si (with SS-Si as an attached sender) participates in CSj (with SS-Rj as attached receiver). We assume the existence of a pre-defined
function Agreed2Join() used by services to decide whether they are willing to participate in compositions.Each service may provide its own definition and implementation of the Agreed2Join()
function. We introduce two protocols: pure soft-state and soft-state with explicit removal. Communication messages in our protocol are shown in Figure 5.8.
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Figure 5.8: Communication between the composition service (CS) and Web service (WS).
5.3.1

Pure Soft-State

The Pure soft-state (Pure-SS) protocol adapts the well-know soft-state signaling described
in (Ji, Ge, Kurose, and Towsley, Ji et al.2007; Garlan and Schmerl, Garlan and Schmerl2002)
to service-oriented environments. It enables the propagation of participation refusal and policy
changes faults to receivers. Physical faults are implicitly detected by receivers if they do not get
Refresh() messages from a faulty sender during a certain period of time.

Sender’s Algorithm
Figure 5.9 gives the algorithm executed by SS-Si . SS-Si may receive two types of messages
from SS-Rj : Join(SS-Rj ) and Leave(). Join(SS-Rj ) is the first message that SS-Si receives from
SS-Rj ; it invites W Si to participate in CSj (lines 1-13). SS-Si calls the Agreed2Join() function
to figure out whether W Si is willing to participate in CSj . If Agree2Join(SS-Rj ) returns False,
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SS-Si sends the Decision2Join(SS-Si ,False) message to SS-Rj . Otherwise, SS-Si adds SS-Rj to its
receivers. If SS-Rj is the first receiver of SS-Si , SS-Si initializes Statei (we should initialize the
value of Receiversi before line 04) and starts its tSSS timer. Finally, SS-Si sends its decision to
SS-Rj through the Decision2Join(SS-Si ,True) message. At any time, SS-Si may receive a Leave()
message from SS-Rj (lines 14-16). This message indicates that CSj is no longer using W Si as a
participant. In this case, SS-Si removes SS-Rj from its receivers.
(01)
(02)
(03)
(04)
(05)
(06)
(07)
(08)
(09)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)

At Reception of Join(SS-Rj) Do
If Agreed2Join(SS-Rj) = True Then
Receiversi = Receiversi {SS-Rj};
If Receiversi = 1 Then
Statei.ChangeStatus = False;
Statei.ChangeDetails = ;
Start SSS timer of SS-Si;
EndIf
Send Decision2Join(SS-Si,True) to SS-Rj
Else
Send Decision2Join(SS-Si,False) to SS-Rj
EndIf
End

(14) At Reception of Leave(SS-Rj) Do
(15) Receiversi = Receiversi {SS-Rj};
(16) End
(17) At the occurrence of Change(C,S) in WSi Do
(18) Statei.ChangeStatus = True;
(19) Statei.ChangeDetails = Statei.ChangeDetails {(C,S)};
(21) End
(22) At the end of SSS timer of SS-Si Do
(23) For each SS-Rj / SS-Rj Receiversi Do
(24)
Send Refresh(Statei) to SS-Rj;
(25) EndFor
(26) Statei.ChangeStatus = False;
(27) Statei.ChangeDetails = ;
(28) Re-start SSS timer of SS-Si;
(29) End

Figure 5.9: SS-Si Sender Protocol for Pure-SS.

W Si detects policy changes that may occur in the attached SS-Si using one of the techniques
described earlier. At the occurrence of a policy change (with a category C and scope S) in W Si
(lines 17-21), SS-Si sets Statei .ChangeStatus to True. SS-Si keeps track of that change by insert-
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ing (C,S) in Statei .ChangeDetails. In this way, the state of SS-Si to be sent to receivers at the end
of tSSS cycle includes all changes that have occurred during that cycle. At the end of each period
(denoted by tSSS timer), SS-Si sends a Refresh() message to each one of its receivers (lines 22-29).
This message includes Statei as a parameter, hence notifying SS-Rj about all policy changes that
occurred in W Si during the last tSSS period. SS-Si then reinitializes Statei and restarts its tSSS
timer.

Receiver’s Algorithm
The aim of SS-Rj protocol is to detect faults in its senders. For that purpose, SS-Rj maintains
a local table called SR-Tablej . SR-Tablej allows SS-Rj to keep track of Refresh() messages transmitted by senders. It contains an entry for each SS-Si that belongs to Sender(SS-Rj ). Each entry
contains two columns:
• Refreshed: SR-Tablej [SS-Si ,Refreshed] equals True iff SS-Rj received a Refresh() from SSSi in the current tSSR cycle.
• Retry: SR-Tablej [SS-Si ,Retry] contains the number of consecutive cycles during which SSRj did not receive Refresh() from SS-Si .
A temporary node failure in SS-Si may prevent SS-Si from sending Refresh() to SS-Rj during
a tSSR cycle. In this case, SS-Rj may want to give SS-Si a second chance for sending Refresh()
during the next tSSR cycle. For that purpose, SS-Rj maintains a variable (positive integer) MaxRetryj . If SS-Rj does not receive Refresh() from SS-Si during Max-Retryj consecutive tSSR cycles,
it considers W Si as faulty. The value of Max-Retryj is set by CSj composer and may vary from a
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composite service to another.
(01) At addition of WSi to CSj Do
(02) Send Join(SS-Rj) to SS-Si;
(03) End
(04) At deletion of WSi from CSj Do
(05) Send Leave(SS-Rj) to SS-Si;
(06) Delete SS-Si entry from SR-Tablej;
(07) End
(08) At Reception of Decision2Join(SS-Si,decision) Do
(09) If decision = True Then
(10)
Sendersj = Sendersj {SS-Si};
(11)
Create an entry for SS-Si in SR-Tablej;
(12)
SR-Tablei[SS-Si,Refreshed] = False;
(13)
SR-Tablei[SS-Si,Retry] = 0;
(14)
If Sendersj = 1 Then
(15)
Start SSR timer of SS-Rj;
(16)
EndIf
(17) Else React(“Refusal”,SS-Si);
(18) EndIf
(19) End
(20) At Reception of Refresh(Statei) From SS-Si Do
(21) SR-Tablei[SS-Si, Refreshed] = True;
(22) If Statei.ChangeStatus = True Then
(23) React(“changes”,SS-Si, Statei.ChangeDetails);
(24) EndIf
(25) End
(26) At the end of SSR timer of SS-Rj Do
(27) For each SS-Si / SS-Si Sendersj Do
(28) If SR-Tablej[SS-Si, Refreshed] = True Then
(29)
SR-Tablej[SS-Si, Refreshed] = False;
(30)
SR-Tablej[SS-Si, Retry] = 0;
(31) Else
(32)
SR-Tablej[SS-Si, Retry]++
(33)
If SR-Tablej[SS-Si,Retry] = Max-Retryj Then
(34)
React(“No Refresh”, SS-Si);
(35)
EndIf
(36) EndIf
(37) EndFor
(38) Re-start SSR timer of SS-Rj;
(39) End

Figure 5.10: SS-Rj Receiver Protocol for Pure-SS.

The smaller is Max-Retryj , the more pessimistic is CSj composer about the occurrence of
faults in participants. SS-Rj submits two types of messages to SS-Si : Join() and Leave(). It
also receives two types of messages from SS-Si : Decision2Join() and Refresh(). Figure 5.10
gives the algorithm executed by SS-Rj . Whenever a new participant W Si is added to CSj , SS-Rj
sends a Join(SS-Rj ) message to SS-Si (lines 1-3). At the deletion of W Si from CSj , SS-Rj sends
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a Leave(SS-Rj ) message to SS-Si and removes SS-Si entry from SR-Tablej (lines 4-7). At the
reception of Decision2Join(SS-Si ,True), SS-Rj adds SS-Si to the list of senders (lines 8-19). It
also creates a new entry for SS-Si in SR-Tablej and initializes the Refreshed and Retry columns of
that entry to False and 0, respectively. If SS-Si is the first sender of SS-Rj , SS-Rj starts its tSSR
timer. At the reception of Decision2Join(SS-Si ,False), SS-Rj calls the React() function to process
the participation refusal fault issued by SS-Si .
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Figure 5.11: Pure-SS Protocol - Example.

At the reception of Refresh(Statei ), SS-Rj sets SR-Tablej [SS-Si ,Refreshed] to True (lines 2025). If Statei .ChangeStatus is True, SS-Rj calls the React() function to process all changes that
occurred in SS-Si during the last tSSR cycle. At the end of tSSR timer (lines 26-39), SS-Rj checks
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if it received Refresh() from each of its senders. If SS-Rj received Refresh() from SS-Si , it reinitializes the Refreshed and Retry columns of SS-Si entry in SR-Tablej to False and 0, respectively. Otherwise, SS-Rj increments SR-Tablej [SS-Rj ,Retry]. If SR-Tablej [SS-Si ,Retry] equals
Max-Retryj (i.e., SS-Rj did not receive Refresh() from SS-Si during Max-Retryj consecutive tSSR
cycles), SS-Rj assumes a physical (node) fault in SS-Si and hence, calls the React() function to
process that fault. SS-Rj finally restarts its tSSR timer.
Let us consider the senders and receivers corresponding to our reference scenario. We focus on
the Refresh() messages sent by SS-S3 to SS-R1 and SS-R2 . We assume that tSSR1 = tSSR2 = 2 ×
tSSS3 . Figure 5.11 depicts the interactions between SS-S3 and SS-R1 /SS-R2 . At time t31 , SS-S3 detects a change (with category C1 and scope S1 ) in W S3 . SS-S3 assigns True to State3 .ChangeStatus
and inserts (C1 ,S1 ) in State3 .ChangeDetails. At time t2 , SS-S3 sends Refresh(True,(C1 ,S1 )) to
SS-R1 and SS-R2 , and re-initializes State3 . SS-R1 and SS-R2 process those changes by calling their React() function at times t11 and t21 , respectively. At t3 , SS-R1 and SS-R2 note the
reception of the Refresh() sent by SS-S3 . At this same time, SS-S3 sends Refresh() to both receivers with the parameters (False, ∅) since no changes have been detected in the second SS-S3
cycle. SS-S3 detects two changes (C2 ,S2 ) and (C3 ,S3 ) in W S3 at t32 and t33 , respectively. At t33 ,
State3 .ChangeStatus equals True and State3 .ChangeDetails contains (C2 ,S2 ),(C3 ,S3 ). At t4 , SS-S3
sends Refresh(True,(C2 ,S2 ),(C3 ,S3 )) to SS-R1 and SS-R2 . SS-R1 and SS-R2 process those changes
at t12 and t22 , respectively. At t5 , SS-R1 and SS-R2 note the reception of the Refresh() sent by
SS-S3 . At times t5 and t6 , SS-S3 sends Refresh() to SS-R1 and SS-R2 with the parameters (False,∅)
since no changes have been detected in the corresponding SS-S3 cycle. At t7 , SS-R1 and SS-R2
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note the reception of the Refresh() sent by SS-S3 . Let us now assume a server failure in W S3 (and
hence SS-S3 ) at t34 . At t9 , SS-R1 and SS-R2 find out that they did not receive Refresh() from SS-S3
during the last SS-R2 cycle. If Max-Retry2 is equal to 1, SS-R1 and SS-R2 conclude that SS-S3
failed and hence call the React() function.

5.3.2

Soft-State with Explicit Removal

In the Pure-SS protocol, SS-Rj assumes a failure in SS-Si if it does not receive Refresh()
messages from SS-Si after Max-Retryi SS-Rj cycles. This could happen because of a node fault
(physical fault) or status change (logical fault) in SS-Si . While physical faults are out of SS-Si ’s
control, status changes are scheduled by service providers and hence, can explicitly be related by
SS-Si to SS-Rj . This would have two major advantages. First, SS-Rj will be able to status change
faults as soon as they occur in SS-Si , instead of waiting the end of Max-Retryi SS-Rj cycles.
Second, SS-Rj may differentiate between logical and physical faults and hence, react to them
appropriately. The soft-state protocol with explicit removal (Removal-SS) extends Pure-SS with
explicit removal messages; these messages announce future status change faults in the participants.

Sender’s Algorithm
Figure 5.12 shows the steps of the Removal-SS algorithm executed by SS-Si . The statements
in lines 1-29 are the same as in Pure-SS. In what follows, we focus on the parts that are specific to
Removal-SS (lines 30-44). If W Si provider is scheduling a service shut-down (lines 30-34), SS-Si
sends an explicit Shutdown() message along with the down and up times (from and to, respectively)
to each SS-Rj in Receivers(SS-Si ). In this case, SS-Si will not send Refresh() messages during the
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(01) At Reception of Join(SS-Rj) Do
(02) If Agreed2Join(SS-Rj) = True Then
(03)
Receiversi = Receiversi {SS-Rj};
(04)
If Receiversi = 1 Then
(05)
Statei.ChangeStatus = False;
(06)
Statei.ChangeDetails = ;
(07)
Start SSS timer of SS-Si;
(08)
EndIf
(09)
Send Decision2Join(SS-Si,True) to SS-Rj
(10) Else
(11)
Send Decision2Join(SS-Si,False) to SS-Rj
(12) EndIf
(13) End
(14) At Reception of Leave(SS-Rj) Do
(15) Receiversi = Receiversi {SS-Rj};
(16) End
(17) At the occurrence of Change(C,S) in WSi Do
(18) Statei.ChangeStatus = True;
(19) Statei.ChangeDetails = Statei.ChangeDetails {(C,S)};
(21) End

(22) At the end of SSS timer of SS-Si Do
(23) For each SS-Rj / SS-Rj Receiversi Do
(24)
Send Refresh(Statei) to SS-Rj;
(25) EndFor
(26) Statei.ChangeStatus = False;
(27) Statei.ChangeDetails = ;
(28) Re-start SSS timer of SS-Si;
(29) End
(30) At Shutdown(from, to) scheduled by WSi Provider Do
(31) For each SS-Rj / SS-Rj Receivers(SS-Si) Do
(32)
Send Shutdown(from, to) To SS-Rj;
(33) EndFor
(34) End
(35) At a service re-start initiated by WSi providerDo
(36) For each SS-Rj / SS-Rj Receivers(SS-Si) Do
(37)
Send Awake(SS-Si) To SS-Rj;
(38) EndFor
(39) Re-start SSS timer of SS-Si;
(40) End
(41) At Stop(SS-Rj) initiated by WSi Provider Do
(42) Receivers(SS-Si) = Receivers(SS-Si) – { SS-Rj };
(43) Send Stop(SS-Si) to SS-Rj;
(44) End

Figure 5.12: SS-Si Sender Protocol for Removal-SS.
period [from,to[. If W Si provider decides to re-start W Si (lines 35-40), SS-Si sends Awake()
messages to all receivers in Receivers(SS-Si ) and re-starts its tSSS timer. If W Si provider decides
to stop its service with CSj (lines 41-44), SS-Si removes SS-Rj from its receivers and sends an
explicit removal message Stop() to SS-Rj . SS-Si will no longer send Refresh() messages to SS-Rj .

Receiver’s Algorithm
Figure 5.13 describes the algorithm executed by SS-Ri . The statements in lines 1-25 are
similar to the ones given in Pure-SS receiver’s algorithm. To handle freeze faults (i.e., tempo-
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rary shutdowns), SR-Tablei entries are extended with “from” and “to” attributes. SR-Tablei [SSSj ,from] and SR-Tablei [SS-Sj ,to] contain the down and up times of the shutdown scheduled by
W Sj provider, respectively. At the creation of an entry for SS-Sj in SR-Tablei , SR-Tablei [SSSj ,from] and SR-Tablei [SS-Sj ,to] are initialized to 0 (lines 14-15). At the end of tSSR timer (lines
20-25), SS-Ri checks if it received a Refresh() message from senders. If a sender SS-Sj is in the
frozen status (lines 28-30), SS-Ri does not expect to receive a Refresh() from SS-Sj and hence
skips SS-Sj .
Otherwise, SS-Ri handles SS-Sj as in the case of Pure-SS protocol (lines 31-41). At the reception of a Shutdown() message from SS-Sj (lines 42-46), SS-Ri processes the shutdown scheduled
by SS-Sj by calling the utility procedure Process-Shutdown(). At the reception of a Awake() message from SS-Sj (lines 47-53), SS-Ri checks if SS-Sj still belongs to Senders(SS-Rj ). SS-Sj could
have been removed from Senders(SS-Rj ) as part of the Process-Shutdown() utility procedure. If
SS-Sj ̸∈ Senders(SS-Rj ), SS-Ri sends a Leave() message to SS-Sj . Otherwise, SS-Ri re-initializes
SR-Tablei [SS-Sj ,DownTime] and SR-Tablei [SS-Sj ,UpTime] with 0. At the reception of a Stop()
message from SS-Sj (lines 54-58), SS-Ri deletes SS-Sj entry in SR-Table and removes SS-Sj from
Senders(SS-Ri ). Finally, it processes the stop notified by SS-Sj by calling the utility procedure
Process-Stop().
Let us consider our running scenario shown in Figure 5.14. We assume that at time t31 , W S3
provider schedules a shutdown during the period [t31 ,t5 ]. This explicit removal is communicated to
SS-R1 and SS-R2 via Shutdown() messages. SS-R1 and SS-R2 receive those messages at times t11
and t21 , respectively, and call Process-Shutdown() procedure. Hence, they do not expect to receive
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(01) At addition of WSi to CSj Do
(02) Send Join(SS-Rj) to SS-Si;
(03) End
(04) At deletion of WSi from CSj Do
(05) Send Leave(SS-Rj) to SS-Si;
(06) Delete SS-Si entry from SR-Tablej;
(07) End
(08) At Reception of Decision2Join(SS-Si,decision) Do
(09) If decision = True Then
(10)
Sendersj = Sendersj {SS-Si};
(11)
Create an entry for SS-Si in SR-Tablej;
(12)
SR-Tablei[SS-Si,Refreshed] = False;
(13)
SR-Tablei[SS-Si,Retry] = 0;
(14)
If Sendersj = 1 Then
(15)
Start SSR timer of SS-Rj;
(16)
EndIf
(17) Else React(“Refusal”,SS-Si);
(18) EndIf
(19) End

(42) At Reception of Shutdown(from, to) From SS-Sj Do
(43) SR-Tablei[SS-Sj,from] = from;
(44) SR-Tablei[SS-Sj,to] = to;

(45) React(“shutdown”, SS-Sj, from, to);
(46) End

(47) At Reception of Awake(SS-Sj) From SS-Sj Do
(48) If SS-Sj Senders(SS-Ri)
(49)
(50)
(51)

Then Send Leave(SS-Ri) to SS-Sj;
Else SR-Tablei[SS-Sj,from] = 0;
SR-Tablei[SS-Sj,to] = 0;

(52) EndIf
(53) End

(54) At Reception of Stop(SS-Sj) From SS-Sj Do
(55) Remove SS-Sj Entry From SR-Tablei;

(56) Senders(SS-Ri) = Senders(SS-Ri) – { SS-Sj };
(57) React(”stop”, SS-Sj);
(58) End

(20) At Reception of Refresh(Statei) From SS-Si Do
(21) SR-Tablei[SS-Si, Refreshed] = True;
(22) If Statei.ChangeStatus = True Then
(23)
React(“changes”,SS-Si, Statei.ChangeDetails);
(24) EndIf
(25) End
(26) At the end of SSR timer of SS-Ri Do
(27) For each SS-Sj / SS-Sj Senders(SS-Ri) Do
(28) If time SR-Tablei[SS-Sj,from] time < SR-Tablei[SS-Sj,to]
(29)
Then Continue;
(30) EndIf
(31) If SR-Tablei[SS-Sj, Refreshed] = True
(32)
Then SR-Tablei[SS-Sj, Refreshed] = False;
(33)
SR-Tablei[SS-Sj, Retry] = 0;
(34)
Else SR-Tablei[SS-Sj, Retry
(35)
If SR-Tablei[SS-Sj, Retry] = Max-Retryi
(36)
Then React(“No Refresh”, SS-Si);
(37)
EndIf
(38) EndIf
(39) EndFor
(40) Re-start SSR timer of SS-Ri;
(41) End

Figure 5.13: SS-Rj Receiver Protocol for Removal-SS.
Refresh() messages at t5 . At time t5 , W S3 is reinstated; SS-S3 sends Awake() message to SS-R1
and SS-R2 . SS-S3 resumes sending Refresh() at time t6 . Assume that at time t32 , W S3 provider
would like to stop its service with SS-R2 . For that purpose, SS-S3 sends a Stop() message to SSR2 . SS-R2 receives this message at time t22 , deletes SS-S3 entry in SR-Table3 , removes SS-S3 from
Senders(SS-R2 ), and calls Process-Stop() procedure. At times t7 and t9 , SS-R1 notes the reception
of Refresh() messages. However, SS-R2 does not expect the reception of such messages since W S3

128
is no longer a composition participant.
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Figure 5.14: Removal-SS Protocol - Example.

5.4 Fault Reaction
Once the (composite) system determines that a fault has occurred, the next step is to prepare
an optimal fault-response and recovery strategy. In this section, we first present Event-ConditionAction (ECA) rules, and then discuss the main recovery polices used by our framework. One of the
issues to be considered is the conversion and negotiation of new policies for the replaced/composed
web service. In our framework we propose an approach that uses ontologies and semantic web
rules to ensure that policy information is correctly translated. The idea is to standardize all the
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policies using a standard policy language i.e WS-Policy that could explicitly describe all the constraints i.e. privacy parameters that need to considered in a composition. Before introducing a new
service to the composition, the systems checks for policy conformance of the selected service. We
use ontologies to translate domain specific terms and use semantic web rules to convert compatible
rules i.e. (uptime of 99.9% to downtime of 0.01% etc). Then we use our automated negotiation
framework to negotiate a suitable solution for the composition (Hashmi, Alhosban, Malik, and
Medjahed, Hashmi et al.2011).
Event processing is a method of tracking and analyzing streams of data about a specific event,
and then deriving a conclusion based on these events. Complex Event Processing (CEP), is event
processing that combines data from multiple sources to infer patterns in more complicated scenarios. The main goal of CEP is to identify meaningful events and response to them as quickly
as possible. CEP employs different techniques such as detection of the complex pattern, event
correlation, event abstraction, event hierarchies and relationship between events (Pascalau and
Giurca, Pascalau and Giurca2009; Wasserkrug, Gal, Etzion, and Turchin, Wasserkrug et al.2008;
Mozafari, Zeng, and Zaniolo, Mozafari et al.2012; Kellner and Fiege, Kellner and Fiege2009).

Event-driven systems are becoming the paradigm of choice for organizing many classes of
loosely coupled and dynamic applications (Garlan and Schmerl, Garlan and Schmerl2002; Ghosh,
Sharman, Raghav Rao, and Upadhyaya, Ghosh et al.2007; Verma and Sheth, Verma and Sheth2005;
Guinea, Guinea2005; Kokash, Kokash2007; Brambilla, Ceri, Comai, and Tziviskou, Brambilla
et al.2005). Events are typically used to provide users or systems awareness about specific sit-
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Figure 5.15: ECA Architecture.
uations that may occur during a system’s execution span. System faults fall into one such category of notifications. To capture and react to events, each service also includes a set of rules.
In this chapter, we adopt the ECA rules model (Garlan and Schmerl, Garlan and Schmerl2002)
for defining these rules. Our selection is based on the fact that ECA rules specify constraints on
the service properties and method and specify the reaction to requests and their responses. In
addition, implementing intelligent systems require reasoning possibilities thus using CEP is not
enough, so we use ECA to represent knowledge and act to the event individually. ECA rules automatically perform actions in response to events provided that slated condition hold. ECA rules
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have a high level, declarative syntax and are amenable to analysis optimization techniques (Bailey, Poulovassilis, and Wood, Bailey et al.2002; Qiao, Zhong, Wang, and Li, Qiao et al.2007;
Papamarkos, Poulovassilis, and Wood, Papamarkos et al.2011; Poulovassilis, Papamarkos, and
Wood, Poulovassilis et al.2006).
We use the previously mentioned communication messages framework to support the ECA
rules. Each ECA rule contains an event, condition, and action part. An event is a method invocation, a service state transition (e.g., termination of a Web service operation), or a combination
of events via logical operations (AND, OR, NOT). A condition is a Boolean expression over the
service state. An action can be a method invocation, a notification or a group of actions to be
sequentially or currently executed. In what follows, we focus on the recovery policy action.
In general, Events are typically used to provide awareness about specific situations such as
notify users about the shipment of a product or tracking changes that may occur in services. We
define an event as the occurrence of fault (i.e., physical and logical fault). The main idea of
using ECA is to react to changes that may occur in the services (e.g. a Web service is no longer
available or out of service). Whenever a change event occurs, information about the corresponding
change is sent to the composition service and/or other services that rely on it. These services
react to the notified changes using their own policies via local ECA rules. The event part of ECA
rule refers to change notification. The actions part allows for the specification of change policies.
Figure 5.15 shows the set of events that may occur during the communication among the individual
Web services and their corresponding composition services, along with their conditions and actions
(recovery policies).
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Every event (fault in our case) has a correlated condition and/or parameter associated to it.
Starting from the event node fault, if the Web service exceeds λ (i.e., condition = ‘true’) then the
Web service is not available and the composition will delete it from the list of component services,
where λ is the time that the service takes to send periodic refresh notifications to its receiver
services. So, if the failing Web service has a high critical value, the suggested action would be to
replace it with a similar service.
Definition (Critical Service). For each composition, critical service is the component service
that has the highest out degree of data dependency in the composition.

Hence in a composition, a service that provides the maximum number of input parameters (as
its output parameters) for the participants of that composition is considered a Critical Service.
There may be more than one critical service in the same composition. If the critical service fails
in providing its service then the dependent component services cannot be executed and the composition will fail. For each composition, we first define the critical services which will help us in
determining the action(s) in ECA rules. The degree of criticality is thus based on the tasks undertaken by these services, where each task contains one or more operations. The main factors
for service criticality (CritS ) are: the operation priority value that is provided by the consumer
(W useri ) and operation criticality (defined as the ratio of the operation’s execution time to the
total execution time of the service).
∑
WOpij × nk=1 Rk
OpCritical(opi , servicej ) =
|W | + |D|

(5.1)
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Where WOpij is the weight of the operation i in service j which is calculated by dividing the
execution time of the operation over the total service time, Rk is the reputation of the service, W
is the number of component services in the composition, and D is the number of Web services that
depend on Web service j. By depend we mean that the operations of one service use the output of
the other service. After determining the criticality of the operation we calculate the criticality of
the task, and the criticality of the overall service (CritS ).
∑z
T askCriticality(taskk ) =

i=1

W useri × OpCritical(opi , servicej )
∑z
i=1 W useri

(5.2)

where z is the number of operations in taskk , and W useri is the user’s weight for opi . Then,

CritS =

m
∑

T askCriticality(taski )

(5.3)

i=1

where m is the number of tasks in the servicej . If CritS > β (where β is a predefined threshold)
then the service is considered as a critical one.
In Figure 5.16, a sample rule in pseudo-code form (R1) is provided for a critical service. In
contrast, when the condition = ‘false’ (i.e. service is not critical), the composite service deletes the
Web service from the list and skips the task (R2). In case of a physical fault (i.e., the composition
service did not receive any response from the component Web service for the join request message)
for a critical service, we implement the replace strategy. We use θ to determine the maximum
response time allowed to receive a reply for join request message (see R3 and R4 in Figure 5.16).
In case of a logical fault, e.g., a freeze fault the providers shut down their services for a limited
time period. In the stop fault, providers make their services permanently unavailable. In these two
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cases, the action could be to retry the service after a certain time period (known as stop or freeze
time). Hence, we defined ∆ which is the freeze time as R5.
Rule R1
event node fault
condition Time.refresh > λ and WS critical
action delete (WS) from (SS--Rj) list
implement Replace strategy

Rule R3
event physical fault
condition Time. join (SS--Rj) >  and WS critical
action delete WS from (SS--Rj) list
implement Replace strategy

Rule R2
event node fault
condition Time.refresh > λ and WS not critical
action delete (WS) from (SS--Rj) list
implement Skip strategy

Rule R4
event physical fault
condition Time. join (SS--Rj) >  and WS not critical
action delete WS from (SS--Rj) list
implement Skip strategy

Rule R5
event freeze fault
condition Change status = ‘YES’ and Time.wait > ∆
action delete WS from (SS—Rj) list
implement Replace strategy

Figure 5.16: ECA examples.

There is another important concept for selecting the recovery policy which is Web Services
Versioning. Because Web services are bound to change and evolve over time and the loose coupling principles of SOA imply that service providers can release a new version of a shared service
without waiting for consumers to adapt, and that service consumers should test and certify on a
new shared service version before switching. Consequently, you might need to have multiple versions of a shared service running concurrently and simultaneously accessible by different service
consumers. Some service consumers might need to continue using an old version of a service until
migration of the consumer code occurs. Therefore, Web services versioning is an important subject that should be considered carefully in all enterprise SOA approaches (Ibrahim, Ibrahim2009;
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Frank, Lam, Fong, Fang, and Khangaonkar, Frank et al.2008). Service versioning comprises service specifications as observed at discrete points in time. These are identifiable by a version identification number; each version is agnostic of the others and managed individually. Each of the
service versions is created by applying a number of changes to a previous service version, which
can be thought of as the baseline for that version. Information regarding the baseline of each version, and how a service version differs from its baseline constitutes the version history of a given
service (Andrikopoulos, Benbernou, and Papazoglou, Andrikopoulos et al.2008).
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C HAPTER 6
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this chapter, we present a comprehensive performance analysis of the different stages of
our work. Each stage has its own experiments, analysis and results. Our prototype SURETY
is deployed to study the performance of different fault management strategies. The WSDreamQoSDataset (Zheng and Lyu, Zheng and Lyu2010) is used, which contains 150 Web services distributed in computer nodes located all over the world (i.e., distributed in 22 different countries),
where each Web service is invoked 100 times by a service user. Planet-Lab is employed for monitoring the Web services. The service users observe, collect, and contribute the failure data of
the selected Web services to our server, which is implemented in C# using Asp.Net running on
Microsoft .Net version 3.5 and SQL as the back-end database. The following table (Table 6.1)
provides a sample of the experiment run.
Table 6.1: Sample Web services run using Planet-Lab
Client IP Response time (ms) Data size
Message
35.9.27.26
2736
582
OK
35.9.27.26
804
14419
OK
35.9.27.26
20176
2624
connect timed out

The notations used hereafter are listed in Table 6.2. Most of the terms in the table are selfexplanatory.
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Symbol
T
t0
tn
ti
k
P (x)t
λi
λ′i
∆i
∆′i
f (si )

Table 6.2: Definition of Symbols
Definition
The total execution time.
Start time.
End time.
Time at which a new service is invoked.
Number of services.
Fault occurrence likelihood for servicex when invoked at time t.
Weight of servicei in relation to T.
Weight of servicei in relation to (T − ti ).
First-hand fault history ratio of servicei .
Second-hand fault history ratio of servicei .
The priority of servicei in the composition.

6.1 Fault Prediction
We simulated a services-based system complete with fault prediction, recovery strategies and
performance measurement. The input to the system is an XML schema of the system that is used
to exhibit the characteristics of a running system.
The experimental results based on the main scenario are discussed below for fault prediction,
the experiment focus is on our in reducing the total execution time. The major motive is to not let
the service executa if there is a high likelihood of it failing at run time (as this increases the total
execution time). In Figure 6.1, we show a system with 11 services and 6 invocation points (details
in these in Chapter 1). The invocation points are set at t1 = 30 ms, t2 = 50 ms, t3 = 450 ms, t4 =
560 ms, t5 = 670 ms, t6 = 890 ms with the total execution time (T) of 1000 ms . At t1 the system
invokes two services (service1 , service3 ) in parallel, at t2 the system uses probabilistic invocation
for three services (service3a , service3b , service3c ). At t3 the system invokes one service (service2 )
which is sequential invocation, and at t4 the invocation is synchronous for one service service4 .
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At t5 the invocation is again probabilistic for three services (service5 , service6 , service7 ) and at
t6 the system invokes one service (service8 ). Table 6.3 shows a sample (i.e. these are not constant)
of the different parameter values for all 6 invocation points.

t1

t2

t3

t4

t5

First invocation
point

Second invocation
point

Third invocation
point

Fourth invocation
point

Fifth invocation
point

Sequential
invocation

Synchronous
invocation

Parallel
invocation
Service1
Service3

Probabilistic
invocation
Service3a

Service2

Probabilistic
invocation

Service4

t6

Sixth invocation
point
Synchronous
invocation

Service5

Service3b

Service6

Service3c

Service7

Service8

Figure 6.1: Simulation Environment of Eleven Services and Six Invocation Points.

Invocation
Point
1
1
2
2
2
3
4
5
5
5
6

Table 6.3: Service Parameters at Invocation Points
Service
Time Priority λi
λ′i
∆i
∆′i

P (si )

Service1
Service3
Service3a
Service3b
Service3c
Service2
Service4
Service5
Service6
Service7
Service8

0.2289
0.2875
0.7498
0.1241
0.1120
0.5414
0.4471
0.2883
0.3522
0.6395
0.0374

180
250
80
90
80
150
1000
80
70
80
100

60%
40%
70%
50%
30%
80%
80%
90%
80%
90%
80%

0.18
0.25
0.08
0.09
0.08
0.15
0.1
0.08
0.07
0.08
0.1

0.1856
0.2577
0.8421
0.0947
0.0842
0.2727
0.2273
0.2424
0.2121
0.2424
0.9091

0.30
0.40
0.90
0
0.50
0.70
0.60
0.70
0.50
0.75
0.70

0.15
0.60
0.70
0.20
0.40
0.80
0.80
0.65
0.80
0.90
0.80

After experimenting multiple threshold values we assume the different theta values for this experiment i.e., θ1 = 0.50, θ2 = 0.60. The table lists the priority of each service involved, the services’
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time weights and their history ratios (from internal and external experiences). Using Equation 3.5,
FOLT calculated the fault likelihood at the first invocation point (Parallel invocation) to be Ppar
=0.4505. Since service1 and service3 had a very low fault likelihood, this in turn implied that the
invocation point fault likelihood was lower. In this case Ppar < θ1 , FOLT did not build any plan and
continued with the system execution. For the second invocation point (Probabilistic invocation), as
per the given parameters FOLT calculated the fault likelihood using Equation 9 to be Ppro =0.0104.
Hence, the system did not build a recovery plan and continued its execution. Similarly at third
invocation point (Sequential invocation): the fault likelihood was calculated using Equation 6 to
be Pseq =0.5414. In this case Pseq > θ1 , the system did build a recovery plan and continued its
execution. However, the execution of the created plan had to wait until the occurrence of fault because Pseq < θ2 . Fourth invocation point (Synchronous invocation): The fault likelihood was same
as of service4 = 0.4471. Fifth invocation point (Probabilistic invocation): The fault likelihood
calculated by FOLT was Ppro =0.0649. Since service7 had a high fault likelihood and the other
two services had low fault likelihood , this in turn implied that the invocation point fault likelihood
was lower. In the case that the selected service was service7 , the system will build a recovery plan
and execute it(fault likelihood of service7 > θ2 ). Sixth invocation point (Asynchronous invocation): The fault likelihood of this invocation point was same as that of service8 = 0.0374. For this
invocation point the system did not create any plan.
In Figure 6.2-(a) We can see the eleven services in this system and their fault likelihoods. We
notice that servie3a has the highest fault likelihood and service8 has the lowest fault likelihoods.
These results are based on the different service’s weight, history, behavior, invocation time and
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priority. Figure 6.2-(b) shows the fault likelihood for each invocation point where the highest fault
likelihood was at t3 and the lowest fault likelihood was at t2 . Figure 6.2-(c) shows the relationship
between the priority and the fault likelihood. For example, service3a has a priority of 70% and
the fault likelihood is 0.7498, however, the priority for service7 is 90% and the fault likelihood
is 0.6395, because it has lower weight. Figure 6.2-(d) presents the relationship between service
weight and the fault occurrence likelihood.
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We also performed experiments to assess the FOLT approach’s efficiency. Figure 6.3-(a) shows
the comparison between FOLT, no fault and systems that use replace, retry and restart as recovery
techniques. Here total execution time is plotted on the y-axis and the number of faults on the xaxis. With increasing number of faults, the execution time also increases. However, FOLT takes
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Figure 6.3: Execution Time Comparisons
less time than compared techniques. This is due to the fact that FOLT preempts a fault and builds a
recovery plan for it. Figure 6.3-(b) shows the total execution time comparisons for the five systems.
Here we fix the number of faults to four.

6.2 Semantic Similarity
In this section, we define an analytical model to study the performance of the proposed semantic
similarity technique (S2 R). Our Analytical model has 1000 Web services that are divided into
three categories. We change the number of polices that are evaluated every time (e.g., 2, 4, 8
policies) while keeping other variables such as number of context specifications per policy, number
of members per category, etc. fixed. We focus on computing the total time and search space
complexity for checking the similarity degree of the target Web services through our three levels
(for details see Chapter 2). We compare our technique with three similar existing works through
this analytical model. Table 6.4 defines the parameters and symbols used here after. We assume
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that Web services are divided into categories (e.g., under UDDI categories).
Table 6.4: Definition of Symbols
Symbol
Xj
Yij
Xj(min)
Xj(max)
Yij(min)
Yij(max)
W Xj
W Yij
rj
Rs
Ncom
Np
Ncs
Nmember
Nr
Ns
Tpall
Tpall1
Tpall2
Tpone
Tcs
TXM L
TN et
Trep

Definition
The value of jth component of consumer’s vector.
The value of jth component of ith Provider’s vector.
The minimum allowed value of jth component of consumer’s vector as provided by
the consumer.
The maximum allowed value of jth component of consumer’s vector as provided
by the consumer.
The minimum allowed value of jth component of ith Provider’s vector as provided
by the provider.
The maximum allowed value of jth component of ith Provider’s vector as provided
by the provider.
The weight of jth component of consumer’s vector as provided by the consumer.
The weight of jth component of ith Provider’s vector as provided by the provider.
Utility of the solution s for participant j.
Utility of the solution s (for all participants).
Number of categories.
Number of policies per service.
Number of context specifications per policy.
Number of members per category.
Number of rules.
Number of services in a particular category.
Time to fetch all policies of a service.
The time to parse a service description and the network transmission delay.
The time spent by each category to process its sub request.
Time to fetch one policy of a service.
Time to get a context specification.
Time to parse a service description.
Network transmission delay.
Time spent to assess a reply from a category.

To simplify the analysis, we assume that the times to retrieve a description from a service
registry and parse that description are fixed values. Based on the categories, we compute the

143
average matching time Tmatch which is the time it takes to find the similar services.

Tmatch =

(TM IN match + TM AXmatch )
2

(6.1)

where TM IN match is the best case matching time and TM AXmatch is the worst case matching time.
Tmatch includes a polling time (Tpoll ) and a decision time (Tdec ), where, Tpoll is a combination of
Tpoll1 and Tpoll2 . Tpoll1 includes the time it takes to fetch the policies, parse a service description
and the network transmission delay. In the best case, the Web service would have only a single
policy (TM IN poll1 ) and in the worst case it may have Ncom polices (TM AXpoll1 ). Hence,

TM IN poll1 = Tpone + TXM L + TN et

(6.2)

TM AXpoll1 = Tpone + Ncom × (TXM L + TN et )

(6.3)

Tpoll2 includes the time spent in each category to process its sub request.

TM IN poll2 = 2 × Tpone + 2 × Tcs + 4 × TXM L

(6.4)

We multiply Tcs by two because we need to compare each policy twice: once for the provider
and once for the consumer. At a minimum, each policy would be compared to a single policy on
both sides. Similarly, we multiply TXM L by four because we need to parse the description of XML
four times (we need to parse XML files twice for the consumer and twice for the provider: once
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for determining the properties and once for determining the policies).

TM AXpoll2 = Tpone + Ncs × (TXM L + Ns × (Tpone + TXM L + 2 × T cs + Nr × (2 × TXM L ))) (6.5)

In calculating TM IN poll2 we multiply Tpone by two because we retrieve the policy for the source
and the category member. The decision time (Tdec ) includes the network delay and the time spent
to asses a reply from the Web services under the same category. In the best case,

TM IN dec = TN et + Trep

(6.6)

TM AXdec = Ncom × (TN et + Trep )

(6.7)

Based on the previous equations, Tmatch is then,

Tmatch =

(TM IN poll1 + TM AXpoll1 + TM IN poll2 + Ncom × TM AXpoll2 + TM IN dec + TM AXdec )
2
(6.8)

The previous formulas give matching times for each technique. In what follows, we calculate
the total matching time for the four techniques: S2 R, CME (Medjahed and Atif, Medjahed and
Atif2007), CCB (Segev, Segev2008) and Brute-force (for details see Chapter 4).
Figure 6.4a. shows a comparison between the Brute-force method (exhaustive search), CME (Medjahed and Atif, Medjahed and Atif2007), CCB (Segev, Segev2008) and S2 R for service matching
time based on the number of services. Note that Brute-force has the highest matching time especially when we have a large number of services. CME performs better than Brute-force method,
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but still takes more time than CCB. However, our method provides the lowest matching time, even
if the number of services is large.
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Figure 6.4: Matching Time and Search Space analysis.

Figure 6.4b. shows the relationship between the number of services and the search space for
each matching method. We can see that Brute-force method has the largest search space and the
smallest search is attributed to S2 R.
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Figure 6.5: Scalability analysis for (a) S2 R. (b) CME. (c) Brute-force. (d) CBB.

In the last set of experiments, we evaluate the services matching time with variable number of
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policies. Figure 6.4 presents the results of two, four, and eight policies. In Figure 6.5a. we can see
that S2 R took a maximum matching time of (8,000 and 10,000 ms) when we use eight policies.
However, in the Brute-force method (see Figure 6.5c.) the maximum time is between (22,000 and
25,000 ms). Figure 6.5b. shows that the maximum time using CME which is between (14,500 and
16,000 ms). Moreover, Figure 6.5d. shows that CCB took the maximum time of (15,000 to 17,000
ms). This shows that S2 R provides better matching time for all variable number of policies.

Legend

40 Web Services

220 Web Services

Figure 6.6: Maximum and minimum matching times.

Figure 6.6 shows the four techniques with their maximum and minimum matching times. We
can see that S2 R takes the least amount of time to find the matching services, and scales very well
when the number of Web services is increased (shown in Figure 6.6 from 40 to 220).
Figure 6.7 shows a comparison between the Brute-force method (exhaustive search), CME (Medjahed and Atif, Medjahed and Atif2007), CCB (Segev, Segev2008) and MASC for service matching time based on the number of services required by the consumer.
Note that Brute-force has the highest matching time especially when we have a large number
of services. CME performs better than Brute-force method, but still takes more time than CCB.
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Figure 6.7: Service Matching Times.
However, our method provides the lowest matching time, even if the number of services is large
because for each filter we reduced the number of compared services. Figure 6.8 shows the relationship between the number of services and the search space (number of service calls) for each
matching method. We can see that our technique (MASC) perform better in comparison with other
approaches because CME calls each service three times for comparison, CCB calls each service
twice, while MASC calls just the candidate services twice.
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Figure 6.8: Service Calls made in relation to the number of services.
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Figure 6.9 shows the different clusters of services obtained after the HMM and utility calculations. The HMM classifies the services into two classes (acceptable and unacceptable), while
based on the utility values, the services are clustered separately. In the experiments, we have used
WEKA for cluster construction.

Unacceptable
Unacceptable

Acceptable
Acceptable

Figure 6.9: Behavioral patterns clustering using WEKA.

Moreover, we test different classification and clustering techniques to find the most appropriate technique for the behavior pattern classification. Table 6.5 shows the comparison between
the classification techniques: 48, J48 with cross-validation, BFTree, NativeBayes and LADTree.
The comparison is based on correctly classified instances, incorrectly classified instances,kappa
statistic, mean absolute error, root mean squared error, relative absolute error and root relative
squared error. The experiments show that NativeBayes performs better than other techniques for
our algorithm and data set.
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Table 6.5: Classification and clustering techniques
Technique
J48
BFTree NativeBayes LADTree
Correctly Classified
64%
68%
98%
96%
Incorrectly Classified 36%
32%
2%
4%
Mean absolute error 0.2036 0.1784
0.0073
0.0555
Mean squared error 0.3345 0.2986
0.0457
0.1248

6.3 Dynamic Planning
In this section, we use both analytical analysis and simulation to evaluate FLEX’s performance.
We focus on evaluating the overall system reliability by evaluating the reliability for each invocation point based on different recovery plans. We then compare our technique with four similar
existing works. The QoS model formally defines a set of quality parameters for Web services.
We define the best quality service through two sets: negative and positive QoS parameters. In the
negative QoS parameters the higher value is the worst quality (e.g., the higher response time is the
worse quality). In the positive QoS parameters the lower value is the worse quality (e.g., the lower
reputation is the worse quality). We calculate the following QoS parameters:
Latency is measured as: Latency(si ) = T imep + T imer . Where T imep is the time of processing the request and T imer is the transmission delay. Reliability is calculate as: Reliability(si ) =
1 − P (si )t . Availability is measured as: Availability(si ) =

Nv
.
Tv

Where Nv is the number of times

that si was available and Tv is the total times that si was invoked.
Based on the above definitions, we use a score function which computes a scalar value from
the (normalized) QoS parameters for assessing the service recovery plan (SRP):
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Score(si ) = (

∑

negative

wi ×

∑
QoSimax − QoSi
QoSi − QoSimin
+
w
×
)
i
QoSimax − QoSimin positive
QoSimax − QoSimin

(6.9)

where QoSimax is the maximum value for ith QoS parameters and QoSimin is the minimum.
Then reliability scores for the different planning strategies (details in Chapter 2) are computed as:

• Retry (si ): find the score for si and multiply it by the same score:

Scoreretry = (Scores )2

(6.10)

• Retry-Until(si , ρ): find the score for si and take the power to the number of retries:

ScoreRetry−U ntil = (Scores )m

(6.11)

• Replace(si , sj ): find the score for si and sj :

ScoreReplace = (Scoresi ) × (Scoresj ) + ∂

(6.12)

where ∂ is the cost of fining similar service.
• Replicate(si , (s1 ...sk )): find the score for the replicated services from si and sk :
∑k
ScoreReplicate = (Scoresi ) ×

h=1 (scoresh )

number of replicas

+∂

(6.13)
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The overall system reliability depends on the reliability for each invocation point, thus we use
a linear function to approximate:

T otal reliability =

I
∑

log(Reliability(α))

(6.14)

α=1

where I is the number of invocation points in the system and Reliability(α) is the reliability
for the invocation point α.
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Figure 6.10: Assessed service score for user’s requirements.

Figure 6.10 compares the scores for various techniques (i.e., FLEX, FACT (Liu, Li, Huang,
and Xiao, Liu et al.2009), BPEL4Job (Tan, Fong, and Bobroff, Tan et al.2010), SMP (Dai, Yang,
and Zhang, Dai et al.2009)and FTWeb (Santos, Lung, and Montez, Santos et al.2005)), for the
different QoS requirements of four users. We can see that SMP is a good choice for U ser1 and
U ser3 incase we had to replace Web service1 with the best performing candidate Web service. Furthermore, FTWeb is the good choice for obtaining a good consistent score since it uses replication.
BPEL4Job depends on the QoS values of a Web service and since Web service1 has high QoS parameters values, it gives BPEL4Job a higher score. Note that FLEX performs better than the above
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mentioned techniques even though we may have different preferences for user requirements, as we
dynamically select the best recovery plan containing Web services with the highest score.
In FLEX, if we have more than one recovery plan at any invocation point, then we consider
two factors for selecting the best recovery strategy. One is the type of service invocation point
(i.e., sequential, parallel, etc) and second is the type of recovery plan (replace, retry, etc). We use a
greedy approach )to select the most suitable recovery plan at each invocation point. This approach
guarantees the selection of the best possible recovery plan (based on the cumulative score) at each
invocation point and hence better system reliability. In addition to calculating the score of the
recovery plans, FLEX calculates the reliability of each invocation point based on the Equations (4,
5, 6, 7, and 8). Table 6.6 summarizes the invocation points’ reliability.
Table 6.6: The conditions for each planning strategy
Invocation
Reliability (R)
Sequential(S : A)
R = R(S) × R(A)
2
Parallel (S : S1 , S2 )
R = R(S) ×
i=1 R(Si )
∑⊓
n
Probabilistic (S : S1 —p, S2 —1-p) R = R(S) × i=1 p ∗ R(Si )
Circular (S—m)
R = R(S)m

Figure 6.11 shows the relationship between the service execution time and the failure ratio.
Each sub-figure represents a category in our running example (e.g., hotel category, flight category,
etc.,). We have 14 Web services under each category, we run each Web service 100 times and
monitor the failure ratio and the execution time. We found that, when the service execution time
increases the failure ratio also increases. In Figure 6.12, we show the results of running SURETY
as a composite service with FLEX support. The same configuration of services is run with similar
fault management techniques defined in the related work section, such as FACT (Liu, Li, Huang,
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Figure 6.11: Impact of the services response time on the failure ratio.
and Xiao, Liu et al.2009), BPEL4Job (Tan, Fong, and Bobroff, Tan et al.2010), SMP (Dai, Yang,
and Zhang, Dai et al.2009), FTWeb (Santos, Lung, and Montez, Santos et al.2005). The three subfigures show the different number of faults (2 faults, 5 faults and 8 faults) generated in SURETY.
As can be seen, FLEX exhibits the lowest failure ratio in all cases due to the selection of the ‘best‘
planning and replacement strategy.
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Figure 6.13: Assessing the over all system reliability.
As we mentioned earlier, the overall system reliability is assessed according to the reliability of
each invocation point (Inv. Pt. in Figure 6.13). Our running example, includes nine Web services
(S1,...,S9) and six invocation points (Inv.Pt1 ,...,Inv.Pt6 ). The running example also includes three
similar Web services for each one of the nine Web services and we assign different scores to them.
For example, the Web services (S11, S12, S13) are similar to S1, and each one of them has a
different score (i.e., ScoreS11 = 0.8, ScoreS12 = 0.5, and ScoreS13 = 0.7). If S1 fails then we
try to recover the system using one of the five recovery strategies. Figure 6.13 shows how the
invocation point scores are calculated for our running scenario. The first step of our experiment
is based on determining the invocation points and their respective sub invocation points. In the
second step we calculate the score for each Web service involved in respective recovery planning
strategy. The third step calculates the score for each Web service at every sub invocation point. The
fourth step calculates the aggregated score for each invocation point and the final step calculates
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Overall System Reliability

the overall system reliability.
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Figure 6.14: Overall reliability for different planning strategies.

We calculate the overall system reliability using Equation 31 for the above mentioned five different techniques in literature: FLEX, FACT (Liu, Li, Huang, and Xiao, Liu et al.2009), BPEL4Job (Tan,
Fong, and Bobroff, Tan et al.2010), SMP (Dai, Yang, and Zhang, Dai et al.2009), FTWeb (Santos,
Lung, and Montez, Santos et al.2005). Figure 6.14 shows the impacts of the five techniques on the
overall reliability in our running scenario. As can be seen, FLEX has the highest overall reliability.
This result is achieved by selecting the qualified (i.e., suitable) recovery plan based on the combination of QoS values of a service and users QoS requirements. FTWeb performs better incase
the replicated services match user’s preferences. While BPEL4Job has the worst overall reliability
because it retries the same service (without much avail).
Figure 6.15 shows the probability of system faults for each planning strategy. BPEL4Job has
the highest fault probability since we retry the same service and FLEX has the lowest probability
of fault because the recovery plan selection is based on selecting the services with the lowest
probability of failure. From the results shown in Figure 6.15, we can see that fault probability
increases when any system ignores the user’s preferences and the Web service performance (i.e.,
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evaluating the selected Web service). However, the main factor that decreases the fault probability

Probability of Faults

in FLEX is the fault prediction.
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Figure 6.15: Probability of system faults for different planning strategies.

Figure 6.16a. shows a comparison between the Brute-force method (exhaustive search), Contextbased matching (CBM) has been proposed in (Medjahed and Atif, Medjahed and Atif2007), Circular context-based (CCB) has been proposed in (Segev, Segev2008) and our similarity module
(SM-FLEX) for service matching time based on the number of services. Note that Brute-force
has the highest matching time especially when we have a large number of services. CME performs better than Brute-force method, but still takes more time than CCB. However, our method
(SM-FLEX) provides the lowest service matching time, even if the number of services is large.
Figure 6.16b. shows the relationship between the number of services and the search space for each
matching method. We can see that Brute-force method has the largest search space and the smallest
search is attributed to SM-FLEX.
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Figure 6.16: Matching Time and Search Space analysis.

6.4 Fault Propagation
In order to evaluate the performance of our proposed technique, we measured multiple factors:
response time (Figure 6.18), failure ratio (Figure 6.19), total cost (Figure 6.20), fault propagation
(Figure 6.21 and 6.22), overhead (Figure 6.23) and dropped messages (Figure 6.24). For this
purpose, we used the the WSDream QoS-Dataset (Zheng and Lyu, Zheng and Lyu2010). This
data-set contains 150 Web services distributed in computer nodes located all over the world (i.e.,
distributed in 22 different countries), where each Web service is invoked 100 times by a service
user. Planet-Lab is employed for monitoring the Web services. The service users observe, collect,
and contribute the failure data of the selected Web services. Our prototype is implemented in C#
using Asp.Net running on Microsoft .Net version 3.5 and SQL as the back-end database.
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Figure 6.17 shows the selected services for 40 compositions that implement our scenario. The
compositions from 1 to 20 are alternatives for CS1 and the compositions from 21 to 40 are alternatives for CS2.
Alternative
Compositions
CS2

Alternative
Compositions
CS1

Figure 6.17: Service selection for multiple compositions

We compared our proposed approach on the overall response time of the composite solution.
Figure 6.18 shows a response time comparison between the three different types of systems. First,
the ideal system (i.e., system without any faults), second a system with faults but without using our
soft-state protocol, and lastly system with faults that uses our soft-state protocol. We compared
these three types of composite systems for the 40 compositions that are using the same car service.
Using the system without faults as a base line, we can see that the system with faults and with
soft-state has a better response time as compared to the system with faults and without soft-state.
We then observe the relationship of increasing user load and failure ratios among the composite
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Figure 6.18: Service selection for multiple compositions
solutions, without using fault propagation (i.e., soft-state protocol). Figure6.19 shows the relationship between the failure ratio and execution time for different simultaneous user loads. When the
number of users is increased, the failure ratio also increased. We can infer that is a multi-user
scenario, if a fault occurs in any component service and the system does not support signaling protocols (i.e., protocols that that would inform other services/users about the failure), services cannot
be notified of the faulty component and will come across this information once that faulty service
is invoked. Hence The faulty service maybe used by another service/user, which will increase the
probability of faults in the composite solution. To enrich our experiment, we create an analytical
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Figure 6.19: The relationship between failure ratio and execution time
module, table 6.7 defines the parameters and symbols used here after.

Symbol
T
ET
λ
TD
Cr
µ
TCr
P
Pr
Cs
TCs
C(tSSR , tSSS )
Ncs
Cre

Table 6.7: Symbol Definition
Definition
The total life time of a connection.
Average life time of a connection.
Message arrival rate.
Teardown state.
Cost of each refresh message.
Total number of refresh messages
Total cost of refresh messages.
The probability of a message getting lost.
The total loss probability for all messages.
The cost per unit time for being in an inconsistent state.
The total time of being in inconsistent states over the connection’s entire life time.
The total cost.
Number of context specifications per policy.
The re-initialization cost.

First, we analyze the relationship between tSSR /tSSS values and the following two parameters:
fault propagation time and false faults. The total number of refresh messages that are sent during
a connection’s life time is the connection’s life time divided by the refresh time which is the
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summation of tSSR and tSSS ,

µ =

T
(tSSR , tSSS )

(6.15)

The total cost of refresh messages during a connection’s life time is the number of refresh
messages times the cost of each refresh message,

T Cr = Cr × µ

(6.16)

The total loss probability for all messages is loss probability for one message times the number
of refresh messages,

Pr = P × µ

(6.17)

Since the cost per unit time of being in an inconsistent state is Cs then the total time of being
in inconsistent states over the connection life time is

C(tSSR , tSSS ) = T Cr + T Cs + Cre × P r

(6.18)

Then, the expected cost is then given as:

E[C(tSSR , tSSS )] = E[T Cr] + E[T Cs] + E[Cre × P r]
Using the Equations 6.15, 6.16 and 6.17:

(6.19)
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E[C(tSSR , tSSS )] = E[Cr×

T
T
]+E[Cs×P ×P r]+E[Cre×P ×
] (6.20)
(tSSR , tSSS )
(tSSR , tSSS )

Since the above mentioned values are based on the connection’s life time (T), the expected
value for the cost is given by:

E[C(tSSR , tSSS )] = Cr ×

E[T ]
E[T ]
+ Cs × P × E[T ] + Cre × P ×
(6.21)
(tSSR , tSSS )
(tSSR , tSSS )

If the time for communication is T, the message arrival rate is λ, and there are n clients sending
requests in different times within the interval [0,T], then the expected number of messages that
reach the server are

T
N = 1 + n × ( ) − (T × λ)n
λ

(6.22)

Using the expected cost equation (Equation 6.21) and the expected number of messages at
the server (Equation 6.22) we evaluate the total cost of our system with variable size window of
refresh messages. Figure 6.20 presents the results of refresh window for 0.1 to 0.25 msec. In
Figure 6.20(a)and (b) we can see that our technique is a still better than the hard state protocol
for when the life time is small (10 and 20 msec). However, when we increase the life time to
40 msec there is a noticeable improvement of the cost for our technique. Figure 6.20(c) shows
that our protocol perform better when we increase the life time of refresh message. Moreover,
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Figure 6.20: Total cost for life time (a) 10 msec (b) 20 msec (c) 40 msec (d) 80 msec
Figure 6.20(d) shows that when the life time is equal to 80, our method significantly reduces the
overall cost of messages in the system. This shows that our method provides a better protocol in
terms of message cost for all variable life time of refresh messages.
To analyze the Fault propagation time let us assume that a fault occurred in a sender service
at time t1 and has been detected by a receiver service at time t2 . The fault propagation time is
equal to t2 -t1 (i.e., the time it took for the receiver to detect a fault in its sender). Figure 6.21
compares the average fault propagation time for various tSSR timer values. We consider different
fault ratios for each tSSR timer value. For instance, a fault ratio of 10 means that 10% (1 out of 10)
of participants within a composite service failed. We focused on physical node faults; these are
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Figure 6.21: Impact of tSSR on Fault Propagation Time.
created by physically stopping the services corresponding to faulty senders (selected randomly).
Figure 6.21 shows that the tSSR timer value has a direct impact on the fault propagation time, e.g.,
the smaller the tSSR , the shorter is the fault propagation time. False faults refer to the situation
where receiver service assume faults that did not actually occur in their corresponding sender
services.
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Figure 6.22: Relationship between tSSS and tSSR and impact on False Faults ratio.

Figure 6.22 depicts the relationship between false faults and time difference (i.e., tSSS − tSSR ).
We set tSSR to 20s and vary tSSS from 20s to 25s, 30s, 35s, 40s, etc. Figure 6.22. shows that false
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faults occur if tSSS − tSSR ≥ 0 (i.e., tSSS ≥ tSSR ). In addition, the bigger is tSSS (compared to
tSSR ), the larger is the number of false faults. These faults correspond to cases where Refresh()
messages are sent after the end of the corresponding tSSR cycles.
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Figure 6.23: Overhead in relation to the number of services and control messages.
We also evaluated our technique on the network traffic overhead. The overhead is calculated
as number of control messages divided by the count of all messages generated by the system. The
simulations show good improvement in the amount of overhead associated with our technique in
comparison to the broadcast method and the hard state protocol. The broadcast means that the
protocol require the server to receive acknowledgements from each client in the network even if
it is not in the service/composition set, the server’s processing capabilities become the bottleneck
when the number of clients grows. Figure 6.23(a) shows that the overhead for broadcast technique
and hard state are high and our technique decreases the overhead by more than 25%. In addition,
we can see that our technique has a fairly low message overhead when we increase the number of
composite services. Moreover, Figure 6.23(b) shows that the overhead for broadcast technique is
much higher than our technique for the number of control messages per Web service.
The last set of the experiments depict cost of dropped messages by each protocol which can
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be seen in Figure 6.24. Dropped message means that the node failed to send the required refresh
message in a timely manner or the message did not reach its intended destination in due time. The
information yielded in the figure shows that the pure soft-state is pretty consistent with the total
cost even if the probability of dropped messages is high, while the hard state protocol has high cost
as compared to our method.
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Figure 6.24: The extra system cost in relation to the probability of dropped messages.

167

C HAPTER 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis, we predict the fault using the fault likelihood, assess the service reliability and
based on this assessment we generate recovery plans on run time. Our main contributions include:

• We proposed a Fault Occurrence Likelihood Technique FOLT in SOAs.
• We extended FOLT to generate recovery plans in case of a fault (through the technique FauLt
with EXception handling technique (FLEX)), using Quality of Service (QoS) definitions
such as availability, cost, time, reputation, etc. to calculate the services’ utility.
• We used the functional and non-functional properties of Web services to rank them for finding the ‘best’ Web services that are similar in case of replacement or replication (S 2 R).
• We applied our similarity algorithm onto the Cloud environment with good results (Matching
Alternative Services in the Cloud (SMART)).

Predicting Faults in Service-oriented Systems
The Web has started a steady evolution to become a vibrant environment (dubbed the Semantic
Web) where applications can be automatically invoked by other Web clients. A key development
in this regard has been the introduction of Web services. The ultimate goal of the Web services
technology is enabling the use of independent components in a ”composition” that is automatically
formed as a result of the consumer‘s demand, and which may dissolve post demand-completion.
Web services may make promises about the provided service and its associated quality but may
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fail partially or fully to deliver these promises and bring down the quality of the whole application.
Moreover, traditional fault management techniques may not totally support these Service-Oriented
Architectures (SOAs) because of their autonomous and heterogeneous nature. My research addresses the fault management challenge by predicting the faults and calculating their occurrence
likelihood in the system. I developed and implemented FOLT: a Fault Occurrence Likelihood estimation approach for service compositions. FOLT depends on three major factors: the service’s past
fault history, the time it takes to complete the required task in relation to the composition’s total
execution time, and the service’s weight in the composition. Since a composed service using one
or more of the invocation models (e.g., sequential, parallel, etc.), may encounter a fault during its
execution, the likelihood of a fault’s occurrence is directly proportional to the system’s complexity. FOLT output values are thus influenced by the invocation model(s) used in the composition. In
designing FOLT, we explored methods for the creation of a novel heuristics, its collection, assessment, and robustness of the system against malicious or incorrect information. The defined metrics
are mathematically sound, and experiment results reveal that our approach provides a more robust,
accurate, scalable, and relatively simple to deploy solution in comparison with existing works.

Semantic Similarity for SOA and Cloud
SOAs enable the automatic creation of business applications from independently developed and
deployed services. Mechanisms are thus needed to select these service components that meet or
exceed the functional and non-functional requirements of SOAs. The primary objective of service
selection in SOAs can be viewed as a maximization of an application specific utility function
that matches the constraints of the service requester against the capabilities and offerings of the
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service provider(s). For this purpose, I developed and implemented S2R: a Semantic Web service
Similarity and Ranking approach. Generally, similarity measurement consists of two components:
syntactic and semantic. In S2R, both syntactic and semantic similarity filters are applied to find
a set of Web services that match users’ requirements. S2R is divided into three levels. In the
first level, we filter the available Web services under a specific category based on their functional
properties such as input, output and operations. In the second level, we further reduce the service
search space based on non-functional properties, such as QoS parameters. Once a reduced pool
of similar Web services is obtained, we rank them based on their utility value (in the third level).
This value is calculated using a utility function which allows stakeholders to ascribe a value to
the usefulness of the overall system as a function of several QoS attributes such as response time,
availability, cost, reliability, etc. according to their preferences. Using the utility function, S2R
filters Web services at each level so that more costly operations (e.g., reputation calculations) are
applied on a reduced number of candidate services to shorten the time and space complexity of
this search process. Moreover, since service selection is an on-demand process, we apply the S2R
filters at run time. We compare S2R with similar existing approaches and the experiment results
show the applicability and performance improvement in the service selection process, through time
and search space complexity reduction.

Efficient Run-time Planning
Another aspect of my graduate research is fault-tolerance through self-healing. In this respect, I developed and implemented FLEX: FoLt with EXception handling technique. FLEX is
a framework for infusing dependability in SOAs through self-healing. We identify a set of high-
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level exception handling strategies based on the composition components’ QoS performances and
consumer requirements. Multiple recovery plans are produced and evaluated according to the performance of the included services, to select and execute the best recovery plan. We assess the
overall system dependability using the generated plan and the available invocation information of
the included services. FLEX combines our planning strategies based on FOLT calculations and
incorporates the exception handling constructs of BPEL. Our planning module captures both the
functional and non-functional features of Web services. Specifically, FLEX dynamically evaluates
the performance of Web services based on their previous history (in terms of QoS), and user requirements. The likelihood of fault occurrence is then used to create (multiple) recovery plans. The
best recovery plan is then chosen to be either executed immediately (if fault likelihood is above a
pre-defined threshold), or saved for a later execution (i.e., to be executed when the fault occurs).
The experiment results show that our proposed technique improves the service election quality by
selecting the services with the highest score, and improves overall system performance.
There are still some limitations in predicting the service failures (i.e., the failure is the result
of error/fault). Building efficient distributed systems that provide integration solutions (across
multiple disciplines) while meeting expectations of reliability, performance and QoS requirements
remains a challenging task. In my future research, I intend to leverage my graduate research
experience in tackling these and related issues. First, I will continue and extend my research on
FLEX; I plan to investigate reliability issues for SOAs and the Cloud. I plan to characterize FLEX
behavior by integrating it to multiple real systems. As I start my career as a faculty member, my
first major objective will be to write research proposals seeking funding from federal and other
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agencies such as NSF. I plan to invest my best efforts towards securing the NSF CAREER grant
to support my research. I plan to continue the current collaborations, and initiate new ones with
faculty interested in my topics. Since fault management systems are relevant to various application
domains, such as semantic Web and cloud computing, I see excellent collaboration opportunities
with faculty members and industrial partners working in the above fields. Some items of immediate
interests are:
• Fault Management in the Cloud: Redundancy is a fundamental concept in dependable
computing which is applied to servers, software components, processors, storage, etc. There
are two types of redundancy: time redundancy and space redundancy. With redundancy in
time, operations are repeated several times whereas redundancy in space relies on redundant
hardware and/or software. Both types increase the cost and lower the performance. Cloud
computing has the potential to change this situation dramatically, since it first lowers the
cost of redundant resources, second, offers to adjust resources dynamically, and third, allows
temporarily the use a huge amount of resources. However, the Cloud still suffers from many
challenges in using the current fault management techniques. Thus, I intend to study the
main factors of increasing the performance of the Cloud, implement my defined techniques
on the Cloud, starting from predicting faults, determining the best recovery strategy for each
situation and improving the system performance (i.e., reduce cost, reduce time, guarantee
availability, and increase reliability).
• Decentralized Automatic Management: Reflection is the ability of a system to monitor and
change its own behavior, as well as aspects of its implementation and allowing the ability to
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be sensitive to its environment. To achieve high level of reflection, I will build an automatic
and decentralized fault management approach. The new approach will be in generic enough
to be implemented in a heterogeneous environment.
• Trustworthy Service Compositions: The sharing of privately owned data through and
across remote applications while respecting access control restrictions poses a fundamental
challenge in building loosely coupled distributed systems (e.g. Web services compositions).
I intend to explore how services hosted at different sites can be composed while respecting
data access requirements. I plan to investigate the applicability of cryptographic techniques
(such as private information retrieval) and reputation in enforcing these requirements.
• Accurate Reputation: A fundamental issue in evaluating any Web service is determining
other Web services reputation accuracy. Our work is primarily dependent on the reputation
that is provided from other services. For example, a technical incident at a server running
a Web service may cause the service to be unavailable. The unavailability may prompt the
service requester to change the reputation rating immediately, decide to wait for a period of
time before updating the reputation rating, or put the suspected service on probation as a temporary measure. I intend to explore techniques for accurate reputation change management
so that no service provider is wrongfully disadvantaged.
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Service Oriented Architectures (SOAs) enable the automatic creation of business applications
from independently developed and deployed Web services. As Web services are inherently unreliable, how to deliver reliable Web services composition over unreliable Web services is a significant and challenging problem. The process requires monitoring the system’s behavior, determining
when and why faults occur, and then applying fault prevention/recovery mechanisms to minimize
the impact and/or recover from these faults. However, it is hard to apply a non-distributed management approach to SOA, since a manager needs to communicate with the different components
through authentications. In SOA, a business process can terminate successfully if all services finish their work correctly through providing alternative plans in case of fault. However, the business
process itself may encounter different faults because the fault may occur anywhere at any time due
to SOA specifications.
In this work, we propose new fault management technique (FLEX) and we identify several
improvements over existing techniques. First, existing techniques rely mainly on static information

195
while FLEX is based on dynamic information. Second, existing frameworks use a limited number
of attributes; while we use all possible attributes by identify them as either required or optional.
Third, FLEX reduces the comparison cost (time and space) by filtering out services at each level
needed for evaluation. In general, FLEX is divided into two phases: Phase I, computes service
reliability and utility, while in Phase II, runtime planning and evaluation. In Phase I, we assess
the fault likelihood of the service using a combination of techniques (e.g., Hidden Marcov Model,
Reputation, and Clustering). In Phase II, we build a recovery plan to execute in case of fault(s)
and we calculate the overall system reliability based on the fault occurrence likelihoods assessed
for all the services that are part of the current composition. FLEX is novel because it relies on key
activities of the autonomic control loop (i.e., collect, analyze, decide, plan, and execute) to support
dynamic management based on the changes of user requirements and QoS level. Our technique
dynamically evaluates the performance of Web services based on their previous history and user
requirements, assess the likelihood of fault occurrence, and uses the result to create (multiple)
recovery plans. Moreover, we define a method to assess the overall system reliability by evaluating
the performance of individual recovery plans, when invoked together.
The Experiment results show that our technique improves the service selection quality by selecting the services with the highest score and improves the overall system performance in comparison with existing works. In the future, we plan to investigate techniques for monitoring serviceoriented systems and assess the online negotiation possibilities for combining different services to
create high performance systems.
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